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There’s no difference you can make
And if it seems like an accident
A collage of senselessness
You weren’t looking hard enough
I wasn’t looking hard enough
at it
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Summary
When robots made their first unsupervised entrance to the public space, their engineers
were confronted with an unexpected phenomenon: robot bullying (see for example Brscić,
Kidokoro, Suehiro, & Kanda, 2015; Salvini et al., 2010). While the phenomenon has
continued to manifest itself since and a few theoretical explanations have been suggested,
little empirical work has been done to substantiate any theorising as of yet.
This thesis summarizes five pieces of research that explore what psychological fac-
tors influence people’s willingness to behave anti-socially towards robots. It is structured
around four experiments on human-robot interaction (Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6) and one
analysis of human-chatbot interaction (Chapter 4). In addition, there are some general
reflections on the methodological and philosophical issues with studying robot bullying
(section 7.2), as well as the role of mind attribution (i.e., attributing the ability to think
and feel to another being; section 7.4), which has been a recurring measure of interest
throughout the experiments.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the motivation for the thesis topic and the research
questions. It also includes a general discussion of the relevant literature, focusing on an-
thropomorphism of nonhuman agents, mind attribution as a factor of anthropomorphism,
and how dehumanisation as a facilitator for interhuman aggression may be generalisable
to human-robot interaction as well.
Chapter 2 describes an experiment that explored whether bullying behaviour is per-
ceived as more morally acceptable if the victim is a robot rather than a human. The
results indicated no significant difference in moral acceptability, and suggested that higher
levels of mind attribution were related to lower acceptability of abuse.
Chapter 3 expands on these findings by describing two studies that experimentally
manipulated mind attribution. Also, whereas participants in the experiment from Chap-
ter 2 were passive spectators of a human-robot interaction, one of the experiments in this
chapter involved active interaction between a participant and a robot. In two experiments
we investigated the influence of a robot’s mind attribution on the perceived acceptability
of robot bullying and people’s willingness to bully a robot. Results indicated that ac-
ceptability of robot bullying can be manipulated both explicitly, by providing people with
information on the robot’s mind attribution, and implicitly, through having the robot give
off emotional cues. Those effects are independent of one another. Interestingly, robot
mind attribution was not associated with a lower robot bullying incidence rate in this
experiment.
In contrast to the studies reported in the other chapters, the study covered in Chapter
7
4 did not realise an experimental design. Almost 300 conversations between users and an
online chatbot were harvested and coded for humanlikeness of the chatbot, self-disclosure
by the user, and importantly, the amount of verbal abuse or sexual harassment. Subse-
quent analyses showed that humanlikeness in the chatbot was associated with more abuse
(both sexual harassment and verbal aggression). Self-disclosure in terms of making men-
tion of one’s gender (both male and female) was associated with less verbal aggression,
but more sexual harassment.
Chapter 5 describes an experiment which investigated whether mind attribution is
linked to robot abuse. Mind attribution to the robot was intended to be manipulated
through priming participants with a feeling of power, as previous studies on dehumani-
sation had shown that power reduces mind attribution. In addition, humanlike qualities
of the robot were manipulated. The participants’ verbal abuse of a virtual robot was
measured as the main outcome of interest; mind attribution to the robot and humanlike-
ness of the robot were measured as manipulation checks. Contrary to previous findings
in human-human interaction, priming participants with power did not result in reduced
mind attribution. However, evidence for dehumanisation was still found, as the less mind
participants attributed to the robot, the more aggressive responses they gave. This effect
was moderated by the power prime and robot humanlikeness manipulation.
The discussion section of Chapter 5 offers an explanation for the surprising results,
which is put to the test in Chapter 6, where an expansion of the experiment from Chapter
5 is presented. Feelings of power, robot embodiment (virtual versus embodied) and feelings
of threat were experimentally manipulated. Participants played a learning task with either
a virtual or an embodied robot, and were asked to restrict the robot’s energy supply after
each wrong answer, which was taken as a measure of aggression. Results indicated that an
embodied robot was punished less harshly than a virtual one, except for when people had
been primed with power and threat. Being primed with power diminished the influence
of mind attribution on aggression. Mind attribution increased aggression in the threat
condition, but was related to decreased aggression when people had not been reminded of
threat. These results suggest that while mind attribution appears to play a role in robot
bullying, the relationship is too complicated to be explained by dehumanisation theory
alone.
Finally, Chapter 7 aggregates the results from the studies in this thesis to provide an
answer to the thesis research questions. In addition, the strengths and limitations of the
research are discussed. Furthermore, trends in mind attribution to the robots used in





Over a decade ago, a small cleaning robot was assigned an unsupervised job at a public
square while scientists were conducting a field experiment with a larger and more sophis-
ticated robot nearby. However, things did not go quite as planned. The cleaning robot
was approached by random bystanders and abused — in the absence of any form of provo-
cation from the robot. The baffled scientists had to hastily reach for their cell phones
to capture this unexpected form of human-robot interaction (Figure 1.1, leftmost image).
Salvini et al. (2010) noted that “the nature of the abuses suffered by the robots [...] is much
more similar to bullying behaviours than vandalism. [...] In the case of urban robots, acts
of vandalism could be, for instance, crashing the touch screen monitor, setting fire to the
robot, or keying the robot cover. On the contrary, what we noticed during the behavioural
study were actions aimed at forcing the robot to do or not do something or, in a few cases,
simulations of “physical” attacks” (Salvini et al., 2010, p. 371).
A few years later, in 2014, researchers struggled to keep a mall robot safe from being
attacked by children. In spite of the robot tending to its own business and not interacting
with the mall visitors, children would flock around it and kick it, push it, and insult it (see
Figure 1.1, centre image). The engineers working on the project tried different strategies
to stop the children from attacking the robot, but to no avail. Eventually, they had to
resort to conflict avoidance: whenever the robot detected a human that was too short to
be an adult, it turned and ran (Brscić et al., 2015).
Even more recently, in 2017, an intoxicated man was arrested for assault in a car park
in Mountain View, California. A local commented on the incident, stating “I think this is
pretty pathetic (...) because it shows how spineless drunk guys (...) really are because they
attack a victim who doesn’t even have any arms. I don’t think this is a fair fight, really
totally unacceptable.” Fortunately, the victim – a K5 Knightscope robot (see Figure 1.1,
rightmost image) — only suffered minor scratches (Vincent, 2017) and was back on patrol
a few days later.
1.1 Thesis research questions
The cases described above provided the topic for the current thesis on robot bullying.
The main research question is to what extent mind attribution (i.e., perceiving the robot
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Figure 1.1: From left to right: Adults kicking a cleaning robot (Salvini et al., 2010);
Children ambushing a shopping mall robot (Brscić et al., 2015); The K5 Knightscope
robot (source: Lasica, 2014).
as being capable of thinking and feeling (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007)) influences robot
bullying tendencies. This broad question was further refined into the following research
questions:
1. Is robot bullying seen as fundamentally different from human bullying?
2. Is the moral acceptability of robot bullying dependent on mind attribution?
3. Is mind attribution to a robot related to robot bullying?
4. Does this relationship hold in different contexts?
1.2 General literature review
Humans recognise robots as social agents. They talk to them (Bartneck, Van Der Hoek,
Mubin, & Al Mahmud, 2007) as if they understand what is being said, they punish them
when they prove to be a bad teammate (Bartneck, Reichenbach, & Carpenter, 2008) —
but also feel sorry for them when they are being punished (Slater et al., 2006). They even
try to prevent robots from getting hurt (Slater et al., 2006), even though they rationally
acknowledge that the robot in question would be incapable of feeling and does not possess
awareness (Darling, 2012). This tendency to see robots as social agents also shows in
cognitive responses; for example, humans interpret a robot’s behaviour along (human)
stereotypes (Bartneck et al., 2018; Eyssel & Hegel, 2012). Our brain responds to robots as
if they were giving off social cues; activating mirror neurons when watching a robot perform
an action (Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007), activating neural networks linked
to the theory of mind when playing a game with a robot (Krach et al., 2008), and activating
areas associated with emotional empathy when watching a robot getting hurt (Rosenthal-
von der Pütten, Krämer, Hoffmann, Sobieraj, & Eimler, 2013). At the physiological level,
participants’ heart rates and skin conductance level increased when they had to administer
increasingly heavy shocks to a virtual agent in an adaptation of Milgram’s obedience
studies (Slater et al., 2006), indicating increased arousal when participants had to “punish”
the agent. The display of distress was echoed in participants’ self-reported stress levels,
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with participants reporting being more self-aware and having higher levels of physiological
stress indicators such as trembling and feeling hot in the face after the “learning task”
had finished compared to pre-task measurements. In short, humans respond with social
cognition, social affect, and social behaviour when interacting with robots.
However, not all social behaviours are positive.The Knightscope (Vincent, 2017) and
the cleaning robot (Salvini et al., 2010) are not alone in being attacked by humans (see for
example Brscić et al., 2015; Mutlu & Forlizzi, 2008; Nomura, Kanda, Kidokoro, Suehiro,
& Yamada, 2016; Rehm & Krogsager, 2013). Abusive behaviour towards robots ranges
from more playful forms of mocking and name-calling (see for example Rehm & Krogsager,
2013) to sabotaging the robot’s goals and obstructing its way (Brscić et al., 2015; Nomura
et al., 2016) to physical assault like kicking and slapping (e.g. Mutlu & Forlizzi, 2008;
Salvini et al., 2010), and has been reported across cultures and age groups. As Salvini et
al. (2010) remarked, this behaviour appeared to be motivated by the wish to engage with
the robot in a social way (albeit negative) rather than representing an act of vandalism.
Vandalising robots would have as main objective to damage the robot, and one would thus
expect people to set fire to them, key them, or attempt to crash their interface. Instead,
humans assault robots in a similar way as they bully sentient creatures - by kicking and
insulting them or trying to force or obstruct their actions (Brscić et al., 2015; Salvini et
al., 2010). As a consequence, this negative behaviour towards robots has been labelled
robot bullying, a term later adopted by other HRI researchers (see for example Ku, Choi,
Lee, Jang, & Do, 2018; Nomura et al., 2016; Tan, Vázquez, Carter, Morales, & Steinfeld,
2018).
1.2.1 Bullying
In spite of being a widely adopted word in both academic and everyday language, the term
“bullying” is surprisingly ill-defined. There doesn’t appear to be consensus on what exactly
bullying is (and isn’t) (Hamburger, Basile, & Vivolo, 2011; Modecki, Minchin, Harbaugh,
Guerra, & Runions, 2014). Some authors avoid the problem of finding a generally accepted
definition altogether by never bothering to define what they understand as bullying in
their research on the topic (Cowie & Berdondini, 2002; Fox & Boulton, 2005; Ireland &
Monaghan, 2006; Mishna, Schwan, Lefebvre, Bhole, & Johnston, 2014, for example). This
rather complicates deciding on a comprehensive definition.
In spite of the variety in definitions of bullying, there are a few characteristics that
emerge in the majority of them. Most scholars (see for example Ang & Goh, 2010; Casper,
Meter, & Card, 2015; Gullone & Robertson, 2008; Hamburger et al., 2011; Jolliffe &
Farrington, 2011; Modecki et al., 2014; Postigo, González, Montoya, & Ordoñez, 2013;
Sokol, Bussey, & Rapee, 2016) include the following components:
• physical and/or psychological aggression that’s intended and repeated over time;
• and which occurs in a dominant/submissive relationship, with a power imbalance
between the bully (dominant) and the victim (submissive);
• and has the goal of harming or hurting the victim.
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Some authors have added to this list that the bullying behaviour must be unprovoked by
the victim (Gullone & Robertson, 2008; Postigo et al., 2013); that the behaviour must
be proactive, with the bully going out of their way to seek out the situation (Jolliffe
& Farrington, 2011); or that the bully must enjoy the bullying (Gullone & Robertson,
2008). Others have claimed that repetition and power imbalance, with the bully being in
a position of power over the victim, are in fact not key defining features (Lowry, Zhang,
Wang, & Siponen, 2016; Modecki et al., 2014; Volk, Veenstra, & Espelage, 2017).
What’s furthermore problematic is that both the power imbalance and the repetition
are somewhat open to interpretation (Casper et al., 2015). The power imbalance may be
pre-existing, but it can also be considered the goal of the bully (Volk et al., 2017). The
initial act of aggression could be used by the bully to test whether a peer is susceptible
to intimidation; if this turns out to be the case, the power dynamic is established through
the perpetrators repeated aggression (Casper et al., 2015). Of course, robots are the ideal
target for bullying as they are in a clear subordinate position, will not retort in kind, and
cannot feel any pain, which absolves the aggressor from any moral consequence (De Angeli,
Brahnam, Wallis, & Dix, 2006). Thus, some power imbalance is already in place in HRI,
and bullying behaviour from the human may capitalize on and enhance this pre-existing
inequality.
In addition, “repeated over time” has been operationalised in measurements as: more
than once in a 7-day (Bond, Wolfe, Tollit, Butler, & Patton, 2007), 30-day (Bosworth,
Espelage, & Simon, 1999), or even 6-month (Sokol et al., 2016) time window; while other
instruments simply report on a scale ranging from “never” to “all of the time” (Crick &
Grotpeter, 1995). Thus, the repetition itself rather than the time window in which this
occurs appears to be critical in defining bullying. The repetitive element is taken as an
operationalisation that ensures that the intention of the aggressor was indeed malicious
(rather than, say, an ill-received joke, a one-off outburst of frustration, or even curiously
“poking the bear” to see what the response would be).
For all practical purposes, in this thesis bullying is defined as consisting of the fol-
lowing three components: physical and/or psychological aggression, which occurs in a
dominant/submissive relationship, and has the goal of harming or hurting the victim. All
but one (Experiment II, Chapter 3) of the experiments reported in this thesis incorporate a
repetitive aspect of bullying. Thus, it is possible to differentiate between one-off instances
of negative behaviour, which may be performed out of curiosity rather than malice, and
persistent bullying. In addition, in all experiments a non-aggressive alternative for the
aggressive behaviour was present. This means that participants deliberately chose bully-
ing behaviour over a more agreeable alternative, thus further ensuring the component of
intention. See section 7.2 for a more in-depth discussion of the problems encountered with
the concept “robot bullying”.
1.2.2 Robot bullying
Considering how robots are (as of yet) incapable of getting hurt by any bullying behaviour,
one could wonder why robot bullying would be considered problematic. However, from
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an ethical perspective, some behaviours can be deemed immoral even if performed on an
entity that is incapable of any suffering, like a robot (Sparrow, 2017). Since the robot
is recognised by the human as a social actor, abusing it might encourage treating other
humanlike beings (e.g. actual humans) in a similar way (Whitby, 2008). More generally
speaking, the assertion “I can do whatever I desire with a robot” rests upon the idea
that all and any actions are acceptable as long as no-one gets harmed (Richardson, 2016),
which even in the most libertarian societies is not a commonly shared attitude (Whitby,
2008). For example, one could argue that it is okay to privately kick and hit a corpse
since it cannot feel, as long as the body does not get visibly damaged. Yet this is a highly
provocative statement.
But robot abuse should be considered problematic from a pragmatic point of view as
well. Both scholars and the industry believe that within a few decades robots will play
a major role in society (Cooper, 2019; Walsh, 2018). Understanding the determinants of
robot abuse will help to develop strategies to prevent, discourage, and respond to robot
bullying. These strategies will be needed because robot abuse may lead to a malfunctioning
robot which will likely be expensive to replace or to repair, and might create hazardous
situations for the abuser, bystanders, and future users (De Angeli et al., 2006).
A few studies have been published on the development of strategies to prevent and
discourage robot bullying. But in spite of researchers’ best efforts to design behaviours
which discourage robot bullying, it has been shown to be remarkably persistent (see for
example Bartneck & Hu, 2008; Brscić et al., 2015; Nomura et al., 2016; Salvini et al., 2010).
Prevention strategies to reduce robot-directed aggression include making the design of the
robot so robust that it simply cannot be damaged (Salvini et al., 2010); having the robot
shut down completely for either a specified period of time (Ku et al., 2018) or until the
abusive behaviour stops (Tan et al., 2018); or having the robot run away from humans
that are under 1.40m tall, since children are more likely than adults to engage in abuse
(Brscić et al., 2015). Some of these strategies have shown to be moderately successful
in reducing robot abuse (Brscić et al., 2015; Ku et al., 2018). However, they do not
target the underlying reason for the bullying. In addition, none of them is particularly
useful in a situation where robots become ubiquitous, such as autonomous driving cars
or robots patrolling public spaces. In order to develop more effective strategies, a deeper
understanding of the motivation behind robot bullying is needed.
Research on the reasons behind robot bullying is still sparse (De Angeli & Brahnam,
2008) and often involves anecdotal observations (e.g. Brscić et al., 2015; Mutlu & Forlizzi,
2008; Rehm & Krogsager, 2013; Salvini et al., 2010). Initial studies pitched an evolution-
ary explanation (De Angeli & Brahnam, 2008), suggesting that when you come across a
creature you have never encountered before, poking and prodding it is one way to fig-
ure out how responsive and potentially dangerous it is. Robot bullying then would be
humans testing the robot’s boundaries in order to learn how best to behave around it.
Others suggest that disinhibition for aggressive behaviour to occur when “the illusion of
anthropomorphism shatters” and the human suddenly stops seeing the robot as a social
agent (Bartneck, Rosalia, Menges, & Deckers, 2005; De Angeli, 2006). This explanation
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suggests that humans initially expect the robot to behave in a humanlike way. When the
robot inevitably fails to meet this expectation, humans realise they no longer have to be
polite to the robot and thus get abusive. Bartneck et al. (2008) hypothesised that abuse
might be caused by frustration, if a robot does not respond as expected.
Further research is needed to shed light on the determinants of robot bullying, particu-
larly to enable effective interventions (see also Brahnam & De Angeli, 2008; Eyssel, 2017).
The current thesis will thus dive into the psychological motivations behind robot bullying
behaviour. The goal is to experimentally test whether aggressive behaviour towards robots
is a social phenomenon, and is guided by the same social processes as aggressive behaviour
towards humans.
1.2.3 Perceiving (non)humans
In 1994, Nass, Steuer, and Tauber (1994) found that humans treat computers as if they are
social actors. In a following series of experiments, Reeves and Nass (1996) replicated a slew
of well-established social mechanisms from human-human interaction in interactions where
one of the interaction partners was substituted with a computer. For example, they showed
that humans will be more polite in their feedback of a computer if they have to input said
feedback on the same computer as they are reviewing; that humans consider it rude for a
computer to sing its own praise but are accepting of a different computer complimenting
the first computer on a job well done; and that, following human stereotypes, a “male
computer” is more convincing in its praise than a “female computer”. These findings
inspired the Media Equation theory, which states that humans will automatically respond
to media as if it is real life (Reeves & Nass, 1996). Later studies further confirmed that
people interact with machines and media as if they are social agents (Luczak, Roetting,
& Schmidt, 2003).
The Media Equation has been extended to robots as well. When playing a cooperative
game with either a robotic or a human partner, participants apply the same social norms
to both partners, punishing bad performance and rewarding good performance (Bartneck
et al., 2008). Eyssel and Hegel (2012) found that a “male” robot (with a short haircut)
was rated as higher in agency, while a “female” robot (which looked and acted exactly the
same as the male version, except for having long hair) as being warmer and more social; in
addition, the short-haired “male” robot was considered more suitable for stereotypically
male tasks such as transporting goods and monitoring technological devices, whereas the
long-haired “female” robot was seen as more capable of stereotypically female tasks such as
elderly care and meal preparation (Eyssel & Hegel, 2012). The Media Equation in robots
can be seen in the brain’s response to robots as well. Seeing a robot hand carrying out
a goal-oriented series of movements (e.g. picking up an object) activates the same mirror
neurons in the brain as observing a human hand performing the same action (Gazzola et
al., 2007; Oberman, McCleery, Ramachandran, & Pineda, 2007). Moreover, Krach et al.
(2008) compared brain activation when participants were playing a competitive game with
either a computer, a functional robot (built out of LEGO), a robot with a humanlike build
including a head and face, or a human opponent. With increasing humanlikeness of the
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opponent, activation of brain regions that are associated with the theory-of-mind neural
network became enhanced (Krach et al., 2008). At least partially, the media equation thus
seems to be an expression of anthropomorphism.
Anthropomorphism (from the Greek words anthropos, meaning “human”, and morphe,
meaning “form” (Lesher, 2001)) is the phenomenon of attributing human characteristics,
emotions, and motivations to nonhuman agents (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). These
nonhuman agents can be concrete and tangible, like animals or robots, or abstract and
philosophical, such as the wind, sea, spirits and deities. Moreover, “attributing human
characteristics, emotions, and motivations” may refer to looking or sounding humanlike
(as is the case with android robots or apes) as well as being attributed humanlike mental
capacities (such as having emotions, awareness, and plans). As of such the term is quite
broad and two people could use the term correctly while talking about wildly different
situations (Fisher, 1995, see also section 7.3 for a discussion of the implications).
In the light of this potentially confusing broadness, it is useful to narrow down what
will be meant with “anthropomorphism” in the rest of this thesis. It has been proposed
that there are two broad types of anthropomorphism: interpretative and imaginative an-
thropomorphism (Fisher, 1995). Although this framework is not commonly used in the
field of HRI, it actually can be quite helpful to further specify whether anthropomorphism
as a term is referring to mental capacities, humanlike appearance, or both. Interpretative
anthropomorphism concerns the inference of mental states to an agent by interpreting
its behaviour in a similar way as we would interpret human behaviour. For example,
when the dog comes running at us when we arrive back home after a day out, we may
anthropomorphise the behaviour by saying “ahhh look, he missed us”. Imaginative an-
thropomorphism, on the other hand, is using human characteristics as a template when
imagining agents that have never been encountered by anyone. For example, depicting
God as an old white man with a beard who communicates through spoken language, or
aliens like grey bipeds with oversized heads whose sole mission is to colonise and violently
subdue the natives in any new territory they happen to stumble upon, would be instances
of (white) people anthropomorphising the concept of “deity” and “alien”. In the current
thesis, only interpretative anthropomorphism will be considered. Thus, when the term
“anthropomorphism” is used, it will refer exclusively to a person inferring mental states
to a nonhuman.
To explain the wide range of nonhuman agents that get anthropomorphised, Epley et al.
(2007) drew a psychological framework for anthropomorphism that rests on three factors.
The first factor considers the cognitive response to the agent. Knowledge about humans,
and especially knowledge about the self, can be used as a starting point to make inferences
about properties of others. If the agent resembles humans in appearance and behaviour,
it is more likely that knowledge on humans will automatically become activated in the
brain and used as a base for judging the behaviour of that agent. The other two factors
are motivational mechanisms. The first of those is effectance, or the need to understand
and predict the behaviour of other agents. Seeing nonhuman agents as possessing human
needs and desires can help explain why they behave in the way they do, and create a
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sense of confidence when predicting the agent’s responses to future events. The second
motivational mechanism is sociality, or the need to be social and have relationships with
others. By perceiving nonhuman agents as humanlike, people can fulfil the need to have
a connection to that agent.
The validity of the agent factor was experimentally confirmed by Eyssel, Kuchen-
brandt, Bobinger, de Ruiter, and Hegel (2012), who showed that the relationship between
psychological closeness to and the anthropomorphism of robots depends on the robot’s
voice. When the robot had a synthesised voice, the gender of the robot’s voice didn’t in-
fluence anthropomorphism ratings in participants; but when it had a human voice, robots
with a voice that matched the participants’ gender were rated as more anthropomorphic.
Gender is a fundamental social category: children self-categorise based on gender before
any other characteristic (David, Grace, & Ryan, 2004). Perceiving the robot as “being of
one’s own gender” thus enhanced psychological closeness, but only if the robot sounded
humanlike. The findings from Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Bobinger, et al. (2012) indicate the
importance of the human’s attributes as a moderator of psychological closeness to the
agent.
Waytz, Morewedge, et al. (2010) confirmed the validity of the second factor in the
human-robot interaction field by showing that robots behaving in an unpredictable way
have higher anthropomorphism ratings (see also Eyssel & Kuchenbrandt, 2011; Eyssel,
Kuchenbrandt, & Bobinger, 2011). Moreover, when participants are dealing with unpre-
dictable robots, a brain region that is involved with inferring mental states of other agents
becomes activated, suggesting that the robots are indeed recognised as having a mind of
their own (Gazzola et al., 2007).
The third factor was confirmed when loneliness was shown to correlate with the ten-
dency to assign a mind to interactive gadgets (like an alarm clock that “runs away” when
it goes off). Moreover, after a feeling of loneliness was experimentally induced, partic-
ipants had a greater tendency to anthropomorphise a wide range of nonhuman agents:
pets, God, and a series of ambiguous drawings in which one might perceive the features
of a face (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008). Eyssel and Reich (2013); Reich and
Eyssel (2013) replicated these finding specifically with social robots.
The Media Equation thus appears to be the consequence of people anthropomorphis-
ing computers and machines. However, anthropomorphism as it occurs in the Media
Equation still has decidedly different behavioural consequences compared to anthropomor-
phism as it occurs in animals. While humans apply certain social norms when interacting
with a robot, they also display certain behaviours that would be unacceptable in human-
anthropomorphic animal behaviour (Bartneck, Van Der Hoek, et al., 2007). For example,
no one would be surprised when someone switches off a robot after they are done using
it; whereas most people would object to killing a dog or even “just” putting it to sleep by
tranquilizing it any time they don’t want to play with it (Bartneck & Hu, 2008).
A related theoretical framework called mind perception provides a possible explanation
for how animals and robots are anthropomorphised differently. While mind perception is
at the core of anthropomorphism, perceiving an agent as capable of cognition and affect
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is a dimension of anthropomorphism. It does not encompass anthropomorphism entirely,
however (Epley et al., 2007), as it for example does not account for imaginative anthropo-
morphism. Mind attribution refers to the psychological response where someone makes an
inference about the agent’s capability to think and feel (Eyssel, 2017). Attributing mind
to an agent thus is a specific expression of anthropomorphising it.
The perception of a mind in other agents, human or not, has been shown to consist of
two dimensions: Experience and Agency (Gray et al., 2007). The Experience dimension
entails to what extent an agent is thought to be capable of experiencing thoughts, feelings,
and the world around it. Agents who are capable of Experience and but are not too capable
of Agency are perceived as being less responsible for their actions, more prone to feeling
hurt, and thus deserving of protection. The Agency dimension indicates to what extent
the agent is seen as capable of self-control, memory, planning, and moral judgement.
Beings highly capable of Agency but relatively incapable to Experience are considered to
be responsible for their own actions and less deserving of protection from harm, as they
don’t have (a rich set of) feelings and supposedly can take care of themselves. These two
dimensions are not mutually exclusive: humans are seen as being highly capable of both
Agency and Experience (Gray et al., 2007).
In the survey of Gray et al. (2007), robots were seen as highly capable of Agency but
not of Experience, whereas animals were perceived as very capable to Experience but not
of Agency (this study however stems from 2007. Robots nowadays may be seen as more
capable to Experience). This would explain why robots and animals are not anthropomor-
phous in the same way: since robots are seen as high on Agency instead of Experience, one
can harm them without feeling bad (Gray et al., 2007). Indeed, increasing Agency traits
in a robot did not do much for its anthropomorphism or likeability ratings, but increasing
its Experience traits resulted in it being perceived as more anthropomorphic and likeable
(Salem, Eyssel, Rohlfing, Kopp, & Joublin, 2013; Złotowski, Strasser, & Bartneck, 2014).
How anthropomorphic a robot is perceived to be influences the expectations we have of
the robot (Darling, 2015; Malle, Scheutz, Forlizzi, & Voiklis, 2016) and what behaviour
we deem acceptable towards it (Lucas, Poston, Yocum, Carlson, & Feil-Seifer, 2016; Tan
et al., 2018).
So, in summary: the Media Equation states that humans will respond to robots as if
they are social agents. This behaviour is a consequence of humans anthropomorphising
robots, in terms of attributing humanlike capabilities to them. Previous research suggests
this is mostly the capability to think and reason. However, the perceived capability of
a robot to fully experience the world around it can be tweaked as well. This suggests
that in order to explain robot bullying behaviour, one should look at which psychological
mechanisms come into play when humans set out to hurt each other.
1.2.4 Humanness and aggression
People strive to have a positive view of themselves (Shrauger, 1975), perceiving themselves
as a virtuous, capable, and pleasant person to be around (Dunning, 1999). Purposefully
inflicting hurt or pain upon another sentient being clashes with this self-image, creating a
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tension that can be relieved through either adjusting the hurtful behaviour, or by changing
the way the behaviour is interpreted (Bem, 1972). Dehumanisation theory explains the
cognitive mechanisms that people can use to re-interpret hurtful behaviour so that they
maintain a positive self-image. It describes the psychological process by which humans
perceive their victims as slightly less capable of thinking and feeling, which decreases the
moral standing of the victim and allows the perpetrator to disregard the negative conse-
quences of their own behaviour (Castano & Kofta, 2009; M. Y. Li, Leidner, & Castano,
2014). As a result, the threshold for inflicting pain (both physical and mental) on others
is lowered (Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Research on the role of dehuman-
isation in human-human interaction has confirmed that a reduced perceived capability to
think and feel (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006) is related to
an increase in aggression (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013).
However, it should be noted that while dehumanisation theory can be applied to bullying
behaviour and other forms of aggression, it also covers less ominous instances of humans
hurting another. The most common example is doctors dehumanising their patients so
they can administer painful (yet effective) treatments (Schulman-Green, 2003).
Haslam (2006) distinguishes between two dimensions of humanness: Human Nature
and Uniquely Human traits (see also Haslam, Loughnan, Kashima, & Bain, 2008). Uniquely
Human traits and capabilities are presumably reserved for humans only, like higher forms
of cognition. Human Nature on the other hand involves traits and capabilities that are
shared with other animals, but are at the same time considered fundamental to being
human, like fear or joy. Perceiving fewer Human Nature traits in an agent results in a
“mechanistic” form of dehumanisation; in humans, this form of dehumanisation is ap-
plied in for example the stereotypical banker or businessmen. Alternatively, perceiving
less Uniquely Human traits results in an “animalistic” form of dehumanisation (Haslam,
2006; Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008); this form of dehumanisation is commonly applied
to women or the mentally disabled. Interestingly, although agents high on Human Nature
traits are seen as more deserving of protection, animalistic dehumanisation is still related
to a decrease in empathy (Castano, Kofta, Čehajić, Brown, & González, 2009) and both
types of dehumanisation are related to increased aggression (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014;
Leidner et al., 2013).
Dehumanisation can be triggered by stable factors like trait characteristics of the per-
son who dehumanises (e.g. narcissism, extraversion; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill,
2015; Locke, 2009) and of the victim (e.g. gender, social class; Bain, Park, Kwok, &
Haslam, 2009; Rudman & Mescher, 2012). But circumstantial factors such as a feeling of
social connection (Waytz & Epley, 2012), a sense of power (Gwinn, Judd, & Park, 2013;
Lammers & Stapel, 2011), or self-focus (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014) can also increase
dehumanisation tendencies.
Dehumanisation theory shows considerable overlap with anthropomorphism, to the
point where it has been suggested that they are two approaches of the same concept
(Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). Loughnan et al. (2010) empirically applied a dehu-
manisation framework on non-human agents and showed that Uniquely Human traits were
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more readily associated with robots, while Human Nature traits were more easily linked
to animals. However, not all scholars agree that dehumanisation and anthropomorphism
are each other’s reverse. For example, in one study neither robot appearance nor per-
ceived intentionality influenced the mind or moral agency attributed to it. A more human
appearance of the robot resulted in an increase in ascribed Uniquely Human and Human
Nature traits. Yet at the same time, perceived intentionality correlated with a lower at-
tribution of Uniquely Human traits (Złotowski, Sumioka, Bartneck, Nishio, & Ishiguro,
2017). These results are surprising because one would expect that if a humanlike appear-
ance enhanced the ascription of Uniquely Human and Human Nature traits, it should have
increased mind attribution in a similar fashion; and any relation between intentionality
and Uniquely Human traits should have been positive.
The inconsistency in findings might be explained by the many different approaches
that have been used to measure dehumanisation and anthropomorphism. Anthropomor-
phism has been operationalised in a wide variety ways by different researchers (Kätsyri,
Förger, Mäkäräinen, & Takala, 2015; Ruijten, Bouten, Rouschop, Ham, & Midden, 2014).
There is the humanness subscale of the revised Godspeed questionnaire (Bartneck, Kulić,
Croft, & Zoghbi, 2009; C.-C. Ho & MacDorman, 2010), which quite straightforwardly
asks the participant to rate the robots on scales like ‘living versus inanimate’ and ‘human-
made versus humanlike’ (MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016; Złotowski et al., 2014).
Other researchers decided to craft their own questionnaires (Eyssel & Pfundmair, 2015;
Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al., 2013). Mind attribution questionnaires as well have been
used to measure anthropomorphism (Epley et al., 2008; Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Bobinger,
et al., 2012; Waytz, Morewedge, et al., 2010), as well as Uniquely Humans and Human
Nature trait attribution measurements (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; Salem et al., 2013),
which hold the (implicit) assumption of dehumanisation and anthropomorphism being
each other’s opposite. This makes it virtually impossible to tease apart anthropomor-
phism, dehumanisation, and mind attribution in the literature. See section 7.3 for a more
in-depth analysis of this problem.
1.2.5 Current thesis
The objective of this thesis is by no means to add to or even settle this debate. However,
in the light of the ongoing discussion it is important that mind attribution, anthropo-
morphism, and dehumanisation are not used interchangeably, even though they appear to
overlap. For the sake of consistency, most research discussed in this thesis is concerned
with mind attribution, which in turn was operationalised as ‘the perceived capability of
cognition and emotion’. However, based on dehumanisation theory and the mind attribu-
tion framework, hypotheses can be drawn for the thesis research questions as proposed in
section 1.1.
Based on the Media Equation, it is expected that human bullying and robot bullying
will be seen as equally unacceptable. In accordance with the mind perception framework
by Gray et al. (2007), it is furthermore hypothesised that the attribution of mind to a
robot will cause people to see robot bullying as less acceptable. Thirdly, based on dehu-
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manisation theory it is expected that mind attribution to robots will be inversely related to
bullying. Contexts that influence dehumanisation and mind attribution tendencies would
be expected to influence this relationship.
A series of experiments was conducted to empirically test these hypotheses. Those
experiments will be covered in the next five chapters.
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Chapter 2
Experiment I: Robot bullying
versus human bullying
This chapter is an adapted version of the original paper ‘The morality of abusing a robot’. Bartneck, C. & Keijsers, M. (2020).
Paladyn, Journal of Behavioural Robotics. doi: 10.1515/pjbr-2020-0017
2.1 Introduction
The first thesis research question to be addressed is to what extent robot bullying differs
from human-on-human bullying. The Media Equation (Nass et al., 1994; Reeves & Nass,
1996) would suggest that people don’t perceive robot bullying as fundamentally different
from human bullying. However, to our knowledge, no experimental research to date has
directly compared differences in perception of human bullying and robot bullying.
Such a comparison is needed to validate Experiments II through V (Chapters 3 to
6), as a major assumption in these studies is that robots are considered social agents by
the participants, and that robot bullying is perceived as a social behaviour. Experiment
I therefore compared participants’ responses to robot bullying with responses to human
bullying. Specifically, it tested whether both types of bullying were seen as equally morally
(un)acceptable; and if the acceptability was related to mind attribution for both types of
victim.
We would like to acknowledge Jake Watson and Sam Gorski from Corridor Digital who made the
stimuli for this experiment available.
Figure 2.1: Kicking a human and a robot in the back
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2.1.1 Literature
Researchers are facing several problems when trying to investigate abusive behaviour to-
wards robots (see also section 7.2). Most glaringly, people are unlikely to bully robots
during a controlled experiment, as they tend to be self-aware and motivated to make a
good impression (Nederhof, 1985; Ritter & Eslea, 2005). Participants have been coerced
to physically harm a robot (Bartneck, Verbunt, Mubin, & Mahmud, 2007), but this ex-
periment used explicit instructions to destroy the robots and the robots in question were
very simple and cheap. Therefore, the behaviour that this experiment measured may have
been obedience rather than robot abuse. It is uncertain if the results would generalise to
robot bullying, or even obedience behaviour with a more advanced and anthropomorphic
robot.
Some HRI studies on robot bullying have adopted less destructive forms of abuse,
such as reducing a robot’s electrical power supply (Bartneck, Van Der Hoek, et al., 2007;
Keijsers, Kazmi, Eyssel, & Bartneck, 2019) or focusing on the use of abusive language
(Keijsers & Bartneck, 2018). Using the framework of Game Theory, robots have also been
withheld points or money (Sandoval, Brandstetter, & Bartneck, 2016).
An advantage of these milder forms of abuse is that they can also be employed in
comparison studies with humans. Withholding money from participants is a methodology
that can still pass an ethics board. Kicking and hitting a participant would most certainly
not. But these mild forms of aggression pose a problem of their own. Aggression towards
humans can be measured through small transgressions of social norms; rude behaviour
that won’t cause any physical or severe psychological harm, but are enough to slightly
sting. Robots, however, are not sentient and most people are rationally well aware of this.
Previous research has suggested that this does not prevent people from automatically
applying social behaviour to robots (Reeves & Nass, 1996), but one could still argue that
a participant omitting any polite conversation or withholding any reward (monetary or
otherwise) from a robot is the result of them reasoning that the robot could not care less
about whether a command ends with ‘please’ or if it’s awarded any payment. Ultimately,
one could wonder if robot abuse would be measured, or the participant’s desire to come
across as a rational human being.
Alternatively, more extreme abusive behaviours can be studied when participant’s
responses to recordings of abuse are measured. Common examples of this method are
vignette-based approaches, where participants read about abusive behaviour and then ex-
press their moral sentiment towards the actions described (e.g. Malle, Scheutz, Arnold,
Voiklis, & Cusimano, 2015), video-based approaches, where participants are shown a film
clip of robot abuse (see for instance Rosenthal-Von Der Pütten et al., 2014), or indicating
behavioural intentions after interaction with a robot (Kahn Jr et al., 2012). The dis-
cussion about whether depictions of human-robot interaction, such as videos and texts,
could be used as valid stimuli in HRI studies is ongoing. Robert Sparrow argued that
such representations have sufficient moral value to serve as a test for the humans’ virtue
(Sparrow, 2017). Previous studies have shown that virtual representations of robots elicit
more social behaviour (e.g. mimicking expressions, feelings of empathy, polite behaviour,
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and physiological responses) than audiotapes or text (Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al.,
2013; Slater et al., 2006), indicating that virtual robots, too, are recognised as social
agents. J. Li (2015) conducted a meta-analysis on papers that studied the influence of
agent embodiment on users’ perception of the agent, and concluded that embodied robots
elicited stronger behavioural and attitudinal responses than virtual agents. Several studies
which had found no difference in behavioural and attitudinal responses for virtual agents
and physical robots were missing in this analysis, however (for example Powers, Kiesler,
Fussell, & Torrey, 2007; Reichenbach, Bartneck, & Carpenter, 2006). More recent studies
found that the perception of and response to virtual agents was identical to embodied
robots (Thellman, Silvervarg, Gulz, & Ziemke, 2016; Wullenkord, Fraune, Eyssel, & S̆a-
banović, 2016). More specifically, Thellman et al. (2016) found that social presence (i.e.,
whether the robot was perceived as a social actor that manifests humanness (Lee, 2004))
rather than physical presence predicts social influence of a robot. In their experiment,
social presence was not influenced by the physical embodiment of the robot. At the same
time, Keijsers, Kazmi, et al. (2019, see also Chapter 6) found that robot embodiment
had an effect on people’s willingness to administer punishments: embodied robots got
less severe punishment than their virtual replica. The discussion is, in other words, still
ongoing. While studies seem to confirm that virtual agents do elicit social responses, the
question remains if these are as intense as they would have been with an embodied robot.
That being said, there is little doubt that virtual representations of robots can elicit an
emotional response.
This was demonstrated as well by the public response to a video of a man kicking
a robot dog. In February 2015, Boston Dynamics published a video of its quadruped
robot “Spot”. Employees kicked the robot in order to demonstrate the robot’s capacity
to regain its balance1. The video went viral and sparked discussions about the morality
of the demonstrated behaviour (Sparrow, 2016), with many commenters perceiving the
kicks to be abusive (Darling, 2015). In other videos, Boston Dynamics employees used a
hockey stick to remove a box from the grip of Atlas, a humanoid robot2. The intention
was to demonstrate Atlas’ capacity to dynamically track and grip a box. Many viewers of
the video however considered it to be mean-spirited teasing behaviour. Boston Dynamics
has since included a disclaimer to their robot videos to assure viewers that the behaviour
“does not irritate or harm the robot”(Boston Dynamics, 2018).
It seemed therefore feasible to study how people responded to robot abuse by collecting
their responses to video recordings of more extreme cases of robot abuse than would be
possible to set up in a lab experiment. Comparing or even benchmarking these responses
to how people react to humans being exposed to the same abusive behaviour remained,
however, more problematic. Up until now, no stimuli were available that would con-
vincingly show the exact same abusive behaviour towards a robot and towards a human.





In June 2019 a mock Boston Dynamics video was released, in which an Atlas robot was
shown as it performed a number of tasks while a human engineer deliberately attempted
to sabotage them. These sabotaging behaviours got gradually more aggressive, until the
robot turned and attacked the “bullying” human3. The robot in this video was CGI
rendered; its motions had been captured through a human in a tracksuit. As a result,
there were two versions of a video with identical abusive behaviours: one video where
the victim was a human in a track suit, and a second version where the victim was a
robot. This unique footage allowed us to compare the perceived morality of the exact
same abusive behaviour when carried out towards a human versus a robot. See Figure 2.1
for a side-by-side comparison of the same frame for the human and the robotic agent.
Experiment I showed participants 14 instances of abusive behaviour towards either the
robot or the human agent, and measured how morally (un)acceptable these behaviours
were perceived to be. After the 14 videos that showed aggression towards the agent, two
additional video clips were shown where the agent started fighting back (i.e. reactive
aggression). Thus, the moral acceptability of reactive aggression to the group that just
abused the agent was assessed. After the 16 video clips, participants assessed the agent’s
capability to think and feel (i.e. mind attribution).
Research questions
The research questions are as follows:
1. Is abusing a robotic agent seen as more morally acceptable than abusing a human?
2. Is reactive aggression more acceptable when it comes from the human agent than
from the robotic agent?
3. If abusing one agent is seen as more acceptable than the other, is this difference in
acceptability due to a different perception of how abusive the behaviour was?
4. Is mind attribution to the agent related to the moral acceptability of abusing it?
Hypotheses
These research questions led to the following hypotheses to be tested.
1. Based on the Media Equation theory (Nass et al., 1994; Reeves & Nass, 1996)
as well as empirical evidence that viewing similar (although not identical) abu-
sive behaviours towards robots and humans elicits similar neurological responses
(Rosenthal-Von Der Pütten et al., 2014), it was expected that the abuse of the




2. Since it was expected that abusive behaviour to both agents would be seen as equally
unacceptable, it was furthermore expected that there would be no difference in how
acceptable reactive aggression from the agent was seen.
3. (a) Considering the findings from research on mind perception and empathy (Urquiza-
Haas & Kotrschal, 2015), it was expected that for both the human and the
robotic agent mind attribution would negatively correlate with how acceptable
the abusive behaviour was rated.
(b) If this relationship would be moderated by agent type, it was expected that
the strength of the correlation would be affected; but not that the correlation
would vanish for either agent nor that its direction would be inverted.
2.2 Method
2.2.1 Participants and Design
The experiment followed a single factor (agent: human or robot) between-subject design.
Participants watched 14 videos in randomised order, in which an agent was exposed to
various types of abuse. After each video, they rated the behaviour shown in the video
clip for moral acceptability. These 14 videos were then followed by two videos in which
the agent fought back. These two videos as well were each rated for moral acceptability.
Finally, participants filled out questionnaires on mind attribution to the agent, individual
tendency to anthropomorphise, and affinity with technology.
The dependent variables were: perceived acceptability of the videos where the agent
was abused, perceived acceptability of the videos where the agent fought back, and mind
attribution to the agent. Individual tendencies to anthropomorphise and affinity with
technology were used as randomisation checks. This study was approved by the University
of Canterbury Ethics board under the reference HEC 2019/30/LR-PS.
166 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Previous
studies have indicated that data collected via MTurk is of equal quality to on-campus re-
cruitment or participant data from forums (Bartneck, Duenser, Moltchanova, & Zawieska,
2015; Simons & Chabris, 2012), with internal motivation rather than monetary reward
being the main motive for participating (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Partici-
pants received 1 USD for their participation, which is in line with MTurk reimbursement
custom. The survey took approximately 10 minutes to complete.
All participants were native English speakers and lived in the USA, UK, Canada,
Ireland, Australia or New Zealand. All participants were Amazon Mechanical Turk Master
Workers. These workers are being monitored by Amazon for their performance over time.
Amazon explains that “Workers who have demonstrated excellence across a wide range of
tasks are awarded the Masters Qualification. Masters must continue to pass our statistical
monitoring to retain their qualification”.
Of the 166 participants, nine reported being familiar with the video material; 30 had
not seen the clip but thought the material was unrealistic. All these participants were
25
removed from the dataset, resulting in a final dataset of 127 participants. 51.18% (N =
65) were male; the mean age was 42.57 years (SD = 11.20; range = 25-72). 59 participants
saw the human agent videos, while the other 68 were in the robotic agent condition.
2.2.2 Measurements
Moral acceptability of abuse
We measured the moral acceptability of the aggressive behaviour shown in the video clip
through a single item, assessed after each video. The item stated How (un)acceptable would
you say the behaviour shown in the video is? Participants could indicate their answer on
a seven-point scale which consisted of the following answer options (see also Figure 2.2):
Forbidden Unacceptable Frowned upon Discretionary Suggested Called for Required
The terminology for the response options was taken from work on the dimensions of
normative demand by Malle, Bello, and Scheutz (2019). Malle et al. validated a scale that
held 13 points and ranged from prescriptions to prohibitions. To keep the scale readable
for participants and avoid any formatting issues that could occur when an extensive scale
would be displayed on a smaller screen (e.g. of a tablet or laptop) we reduced the number
of items to 7 by omitting every other point on the original scale. Previous analyses have
indicated that from 5 to 7 points on (depending on the covariance between the items)
adding extra points to a scale does not alter the reliability of a scale (Lissitz & Green,
1975).
Since acceptability was measured with a single item only, its construct validity was
assessed by correlating it to perceived violence, abusiveness, and intention to harm. Based
on Cohen (1992), Pearson correlation coefficients of .6 or higher (i.e. a large effect size)
were expected.
Violence, abusiveness, and intention to harm
Participants were asked to rate each video on three additional scales: how violent they
thought the behaviour was, to what extent the behaviour had been intended to harm, and
how abusive the behaviour was. Each item was answered on a 7-point scale ranging from
“Not at all” to “Very much”. See Figure 2.2 for a screenshot of one of the videos plus the
four questions.
Individual differences in anthropomorphism
After having seen and rated all 16 videos, participants completed the individual differences
in anthropomorphism questionnaire (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010), which measured
their personal tendency to attribute different aspects of sentience and various emotions to
a wide range of non-human entities (e.g. natural phenomena and animals). The original
scale includes items that refer to mechanical entities as well (e.g. robots, cars, computers).
For the current experiment, these were omitted since the experimental manipulation could
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bias responses on those items. Individual differences in anthropomorphism was used as a
randomisation check between the conditions. See Appendix A for the full questionnaire.
Mind attribution
Mind attribution to the agent was measured by means of the Mind Perception scale by
Gray et al. (2007). This scale requires a person to indicate to what extent they believe
an agent to be capable of eighteen different attributes (e.g., “Feeling afraid or fearful”,
“Understanding how others are feeling”, and “Having personality traits that make it unique
from others”). The score for each item is on a five-point range, from “not capable” to
“extremely capable”. See Appendix A for the full questionnaire.
Control questions
Finally, two control questions at the very end of the survey were included: (1) Have
you seen this particular video before?; and (2) How authentic were the movie clips (on
a seven-point scale, ranging from Obviously not realistic (animated) to Clearly realistic)?
Participants who responded with “Definitely yes” or “Probably yes” to the first question,
or the lower end (i.e. 1, 2, or 3) of the realism scale, were excluded from the analyses.
2.2.3 Video material
On 15 June 2019, Corridor Digital published a video in which the Boston Dynamics’
Atlas robot was shown executing various attempts at picking up and carrying around a
cardboard box, under supervision of a human engineer. In the video, another human
engineer performs a variety of abusive behaviours towards the robot. These start with the
type of behaviour Boston Dynamics shows its original videos, such as kicking the agent
or using a hockey stick to interfere with the agent grabbing the box. Over time however,
the behaviours get increasingly abusive, and peak with the human engineer shooting the
robot. Eventually the robot starts fighting back and the roles of bully and victim get
reversed. The robot forces the engineers to carry the boxes by holding them at gun point.
This special effects video was extremely well done and fooled nearly everyone to believe
that an actual Atlas robot was used instead of a computer-generated model. Corridor
Digital used motion tracking of a human actor to capture the behaviour and mapped
a digital Atlas robot onto the movements to create the animation. Upon request, they
kindly shared both the motion-capturing footage showing the human actor, and the special
effects video with the Atlas robot (see Figure 2.1 for a side-by-side comparison between
the same frame from the unedited video and the complete special effects video).
Each of the two versions was cut into 16 video clips. 14 of those depicted abusive
behaviour towards the agent, two showed the agent responding with aggression to the
human engineers. The 14 abusive videos showed a wide range of aggressive behaviour.
Three scenes did not include any physical abuse but instead contained verbal abuse, such as
“You are completely useless!” The other 11 video clips showed physical abuse or taunting.
The resolution of the videos was reduced from 3840× 2160 pixels to 1280× 720 pixels
to ensure fast playback on mobile devices. Video playback speed was tested before the
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experiment was run, and could no streaming delays were detected. The videos are available
as supplementary material to this thesis.
2.2.4 Procedure
Prospective participants could select the task in MTurk to read a short description of
the study. If they decided to participate, they were directed to a Qualtrics survey page.
After informed consent was provided and demographics (age, gender) were assessed, the
participants were randomly assigned to one of the two agent conditions (human or robot).
They were then given instructions to ensure that their audio playback was working. Within
each condition, they watched the videos in a randomised order. After watching each
video, the participants provided responses on the dependent measures, before moving to
the next video (see Figure 2.2). After the main experiment, the participants filled out
the individual differences in anthropomorphism scale and the two control questions. Then
they were thanked for their time, offered a debriefing and given the reimbursement code
which they could use to claim their reward at MTurk. The entire experiment took about




39 participants were excluded due to reporting that the video material was unrealistic
(N = 34) and/or reporting that they had already seen the material before (N = 9). Of
the participants who deemed the material unrealistic, 23 saw the human agent video and
11 saw the robotic agent video. Of the nine participants who reported they’d seen the
video before, six were in the robotic agent condition. Participants who were excluded
had lower levels of individual tendency to anthropomorphise, M(SD) = 2.31(.77 ), than
participants who were left in the analysis, M(SD) = 2.63(.81), t(75.94) = -2.28, p = .026.
Excluding those participants thus may have introduced a bias to the results. We discuss
the potential biases in more detail in the limitations section. We chose to report the
results for the dataset with those participants excluded, but ran the same series of tests
for the original (full) dataset. If the findings diverged, that is, if a significant effect became
insignificant or vice versa, we reported both the results on the full dataset as well.
Confound check for an interaction effect between agent and video material
Before collapsing the fourteen measurements of acceptability of abuse, a confound check
was performed. Considering how the abusive behaviours covered a wide range of bullying
behaviours, the possibility exists that one or more specific abuses would be considered
unacceptable for one agent, but not the other. Variability between the fourteen abuses is
to be expected, but agent-specific variability would mean that hypothesis 1 (no differences
between how acceptable abuse of a human versus robotic agent is seen) would have to
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Figure 2.2: Screenshot of one of the videos plus the questionnaire.
be rejected. When the measures are collapsed into a single index of abusive behaviour
however, this difference might disappear, thus creating a confound.
Thus, we tested for an interaction between each video and the agent on each of the
four measurements. That is: moral acceptability, perceived violence, abusiveness, and the
intention to hurt. Note that the objective of this test was explicitly not to look for main
effects. Any differences in perceived violence between video A and video B, or in ratings
of abusiveness between robotic and human agents, were not considered. Instead, the main
point of interest were the interaction effects. For example, whether people thought that
the behaviour in video C was way more hurtful than the behaviour in all other videos, but
only if the agent was a robot. Without such an interaction the 14 measurements could
be aggregated into a single measure of how morally acceptable overall mistreatment of
the agent was perceived. The 14 videos thereby became a representative index of abusive
behaviour.
For each of the four measurements, a 14 × 2 mixed effects ANOVA with the mea-
surement as dependent variable, the video ID as within subject factor and the agent as
between subject factor was carried out. None of the interaction terms was significant,
χ(13) <14.80, ps >.320, indicating that it was possible to average the 14 into a single
“moral acceptability” measure.
Reliability tests
Internal consistency was high for the individual tendency to anthropomorphise scale, α =
.83. The mind attribution scale too had high internal consistency, α = .98. The scales
were therefore deemed reliable (Cronbach, 1951).
Randomisation tests
Individual tendency to anthropomorphise did not differ between conditions, M(SD) =
2.61(.69) and 2.64(.91) for human and robotic agents respectively, t(125) = -0.160, p =
.873. Gender was evenly distributed between the conditions, χ2(1) = 2.79, p = .09. For the
full dataset however, gender was not evenly distributed, with 38 out of the 82 participants
in the human agent condition being male (45.24%) and 51 out of 82 being male (62.20%) in
the robotic agent condition. As gender was not related to the dependent variable nor the
mediator variable, χ2(1) < .89, p > .344, this imbalance was not considered problematic.
Pearson correlation between acceptability and violence, abusiveness, and in-
tention to harm
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between acceptability of robot abuse on
one hand, and perceived violence, perceived abusiveness, and intention to harm on the
other. The correlation coefficients all exceeded the benchmark for a large effect (Cohen,
1992), ρ > .637, p < .001. As a result, assessing acceptability of abuse with a single-item
measure is not considered problematic for the construct validity.
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2.3.2 Main analyses
To answer our first two research questions, two independent sample t-tests are conducted.
In each test, “acceptability of aggression portrayed in the video” is the dependent variable,
and agent (human or robotic) the independent variable. The first t-test concerns the 14
videos with aggression towards the agent; the second t-test covered the reactive aggression
videos. In addition, a TOST procedure was carried out to test for equivalence between the
two conditions (Richter & Richter, 2002). The smallest effect size that was expected to be
detected with 80% power was used to set the boundaries. This effect size was calculated
by means of the G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
A 2×2 mixed ANOVA with factors “agent” (human versus robot; between participants)
and “aggression” (unprovoked i.e. by the bullies versus reactive i.e. by the agent; within
participants) was considered but would likely have resulted in biased outcomes for the
“aggression” main effects, as the unprovoked videos were both more diverse and intense
(ranging from verbal abuse to lethal aggression) and higher in number.
Acceptability of aggression towards agent
Participants in the human agent condition rated the videos as equally acceptable, M(SD)
= 2.40(.49), as participants in the robot agent condition, M(SD) = 2.53(.80); t(125) =
1.10, p = .275. The TOST equivalence test confirmed that acceptability ratings between
the two conditions were equivalent t(113.43) = 1.74, p = .043, given equivalence bounds
of -0.334 and 0.334 (on a raw scale) and an alpha of 0.05.
(For the dataset including the participants who regarded the video material unrealistic
or indicated that they had seen the materials before, a marginal effect was found. Abuse
of a robotic agent was rated as slightly more acceptable, M(SD) = 2.61(.80), than abuse
of a human agent, M(SD) = 2.41(.56), t(164) = -1.79, p = .076. The TOST equivalence
did not return significant, t(144.18) = 1.026, p = .153, given equivalence bounds of -0.302
and 0.302 (on a raw scale) and an alpha of 0.05.)
Acceptability of reactive aggression from agent
Participants in the human agent condition rated the reactive aggression as more accept-
able, M(SD) = 3.74(1.45) than participants in the robotic agent condition, M(SD) =
2.99(1.33), t(125) = -3.02, p = .003.
Difference between agents: mediation
In order to answer our third research question, mediation analyses on the significant
findings as indicated by the t-tests (if any) are conducted. In a mediation analysis, one
tries to gain further understanding of a relationship between an independent variable (IV;
here: agent) and a dependent variable (DV; here: acceptability of aggression) by including
a third variable in the analysis (mediator; here: perceived abuse), which is hypothesised
to be related to both the dependent and the independent variable. A mediation model





b = 1.08, p < 0.001 b = −.51, p < 0.001
Direct effect, b = −.74, p = 0.003
Indirect effect, b = −.19, p = .393
Figure 2.3: Mediation model showing the full mediation by perceived abuse on the relation-
ship between agent and moral acceptability of reactive aggression (i.e. the agent fighting
back). Note that the default for Agent was set at human, so that reactive aggression was
seen as less acceptable and more abusive for the robotic agent.
an effect on the mediator, which in turn influences the DV. In the current experiment,
this would mean that any relationship between agent and the acceptability of aggressive
behaviour shown in the video would (partially or only) exist because the agent would
have an effect on how abusive the behaviour was perceived to be; and how abusive the
behaviour was seen to be influenced the moral acceptability of it.
Mediation analysis can only be performed on a significant relationship between an
independent and a dependent variable. Since a significant effect of agent on acceptability
had only been established for reactive aggression, acceptability of aggression towards the
agent will not be considered for mediation analysis.
For the first step of the mediation analysis, acceptability was regressed on agent; as
found in 2.3.2, this relationship was significant, b = -.74, t(125) = -3.02, p = .003.
For the second step, a significant relationship between the independent factor and the
mediator has to be established. Abuse was regressed on agent; this relationship, too, was
significant, b = 1.08, t(125) = 4.13, p < .001. For the final step of the mediation analysis,
acceptability was regressed on both agent and abuse. A full mediation occurred, with
agent dropping as a predictor (b = -.19, t(124) = -.86, p = .393) and perceived abusiveness
taking over as the only significant predictor (b = -.51, t(124) = -7.22, p <.001). Sobel’s
test confirmed the significance of this effect; Z = -3.59, p < .001. See 2.3 for the mediation
model.
Mind attribution and acceptability
To test whether moral acceptability was dependent on mind attribution to the agent, a re-
gression analysis was performed with acceptability of agent mistreatment being regressed
on mind attribution to the agent. Mind attribution was significantly related to accept-
ability of agent mistreatment, b = -.09, t(125) = -2.15, p = .034. The more a participant
attributed the agent a mind, the less acceptable abuse was perceived to be.
Since mind attribution had been significantly different between the two types of agents,
a one-way ANCOVA with agent as independent variable, mind attribution as covariate,
and acceptability of mistreatment was ran to determine whether this relationship was in-
dependent of the type of agent. Agent type as well as an interaction term between agent
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type and mind attribution was not significant, ps > .36. This confirmed that the relation-
ship between mind attribution and acceptability of mistreatment was not influenced by
agent type.
2.4 Discussion
Experiment I compared differences in acceptability between abuse of a human and abuse
of a robotic victim. Markedly, the video materials that were used were both of exceptional
quality (making it hard to recognise the robot for the CGI rendering it was), and showed
the exact same bullying behaviour to either of the two agents. In addition, the materials
covered a wide range of bullying behaviours. As a result, the materials used were both
highly realistic and perfectly synchronised except for the agent depicted.
Three hypotheses were tested. Hypothesis 1, which stated that there would be no
differences in the acceptability of abusive behaviour towards robots or humans, was con-
firmed. The participants considered mistreating a robot to be as immoral as abusing a
human. While this may not automatically mean that the participants consider robots to
be equivalent to humans in all respects and in all situations, it does show at least that
bullying behaviour is considered immoral, no matter who the victim is.
Secondly, and in line with hypothesis 3a, perceived capability of the agent to think
and feel was negatively related to how acceptable people found the abuse of the agent.
This is also in line with previous research, where mind attribution has been related to
empathy (see for instance Gray et al., 2007; Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015). Moreover,
hypothesis 3b suggested that if a moderation of this relationship by agent type would
have been found, only the strength of the relationship (rather than direction) would have
been affected. However, it was found that agent type did not moderate this correlation
between mind attribution and moral acceptability of abuse. This implies that the abuse of
the robot was seen as unacceptable for the same reason as the abuse of the human. This
finding also undermines the alternative theory that participants considered bullying the
robot morally unacceptable because they saw it as damaging property, while the human
bullying would be seen unacceptable because it was perceived as actual bullying. If this
had been the case, a moderation effect would have been found, where mind attribution
only predicted moral acceptability for human agents whereas there was no relationship
between mind attribution and acceptability of the abuse of the robot agent.
Finally, hypothesis 2 was rejected, as reactive aggression by the agent was not consid-
ered equally acceptable for each type of agent. Specifically, participants found it signifi-
cantly more acceptable if the human started fighting back, than if the robot fought back.
Mediation analysis showed that this was a consequence of the reactive aggression being
perceived as more abusive when it came from a robot. This was in spite of the acts of
responsive aggression being identical for the robotic and the human victim. This is not
the first time that identical behaviour is perceived as more or less intentional depending
on whether the actor is human or robotic. Thellman et al. (2016) compared perceived
intentionality and control of an agent (either human or robotic) for a range of positive and
negative behaviours. They found that positive behaviour is seen as more controllable and
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intentional when carried out by a human than by a robot. Negative behaviour however
was seen as more intentional when performed by a robot than by a human. What could
have caused this asymmetry?
We speculate that robots could have been perceived as deserving protection from harm
to the same extent as humans, but were not perceived to have the same right of self-defence.
To our knowledge, there are only two HRI papers that relate to these findings: Kahn Jr et
al. (2012) had children of various ages interact with a Robovie humanoid robot before it
was locked away in a closet. Robovie protested against this treatment. The children were
interviewed about a range of topics, including the robot’s moral standing. For the oldest
age group (the 15-year olds), an interesting pattern emerged: slightly more than half of
those children thought it was wrong to hurt the robot by locking it away or eventually
crushing it when it would be no longer needed. The vast majority, however, did not think
the robot should be paid for a hard day’s work or be granted the right to vote; and less than
one in 10 thought the concept of owning and selling the robot was wrong. This pattern
— a right to be protected from harm, but no right to autonomy — is surprisingly similar
to what was found in our study. It mirrors the ethical view many have towards animal
rights. While animals can be considered property and can even be killed, mistreatment
is not allowed. Animal rights has therefore been proposed as a template for robot rights
(Calverley, 2006).
A different perspective could be offered by a study on the trolley dilemma (Malle et
al., 2015). In this moral dilemma, a trolley is rushing down the track at great speed, and
will hit and kill four people if not side-tracked to a route where it will kill only one person.
People have to choose between not taking any action, thus indirectly being responsible for
the death of four people, or taking action and being directly responsible for the death of
one person. In spite of the net saving of three lives when acting, most people find acting
harder than not taking any action. However, Malle et al. (2015) found that robots were
more strongly expected to make a rational choice and more strongly blamed if they went
with the emotional solution. On the contrary, humans were blamed more if they chose to
divert the train. In this light, the robot’s reactive aggression could be considered more
wrong as we expect robots to be more rational and less affected by emotion when choosing
to act, while emotion is expected to play a role in human moral decision making. In the
current experiment, this means that participants would have expected the robot to “keep
its cool” rather than counterattack with the strength that it did.
A third possible explanation could be that participants interpreted the robot’s reactive
aggression as more intimidating than the human’s reactive aggression. A robot fighting
back might be considered as dangerous, as robots are often portrayed in public media as a
potential threat to mankind. The trope is that robots raise up against their masters and
enslave humanity (Bartneck, 2013; Złotowski, Yogeeswaran, & Bartneck, 2017). This trope
of robots shaking off the yoke of servility and subduing mankind may have been triggered
in participants viewing the robot fight back against the bullies. While the aggression was
exactly the same as the aggression expressed by the human agent, the robot’s aggression
would be interpreted as more dangerous as it might generalise to all humans, whereas the
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human’s aggression would be restricted to fighting off the bullies.
Previous research had established that people can feel empathy for robots when the
robot is mistreated (e.g. Darling, Nandy, & Breazeal, 2015; Riek, Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti,
& Robinson, 2009; Rosenthal-Von Der Pütten et al., 2014). Experiment I extrapolated
on these findings in two ways. Firstly, it was shown that people consider robot bullying
as unacceptable as human bullying. Secondly, it was shown that this unacceptability is
linked to mind perception in the victim, regardless of whether this victim is human or
robotic. To our knowledge, this is the first experiment to compare human bullying to
robot bullying in terms of morality.
This is important because although empathy and morality are related, they are not
necessarily the same. People could feel sorry for the robot yet see robot bullying as
justified. Moreover, Experiment I provides initial evidence that mind attribution might
play a role in empathy with robots and robot bullying.
2.4.1 Limitations
There are a few limitations to Experiment I that should be noted. Firstly, the videos
showing the human actor were used to motion capture the movement of the digital Atlas
robot. For this purpose, the human actor moved in a rigid way that’s stereotypical of
robots, which of course deviates from natural human movement. At one hand, this may
have been a bit confusing to the participants. On the other hand, it further reduced any
differences between the human and robot agent condition. For example, a different move-
ment pattern for the human agent may have introduced bias through providing (implicit)
information on the human being hurt. We believe that the movements of the actor were
sufficiently plausible movements for a human to not cause any confusion in participants as
of whether the agent was in fact human. This also showed in the mind attribution scores,
which were high (between “capable” and “very capable”) for the human agent.
A second limitation of this experiment is that the Corridor Digital company added
some small special effects to the robot video, in particular in the section in which one
of the engineers fires a hand gun at the robot. In the robot video there is additional
nozzle fire, smoke and impact indicators. All these effects are subtle and the focus of each
scene is the interaction between agent and bullies rather than these minor special effects.
We believe that these slight differences do not significantly impact the similarities of the
videos. Most videos were identical between the human and the robot condition.
We excluded participants who considered the videos as unrealistic from our statistical
analyses. This might have introduced a small bias since these participants also had a
slightly different tendency to anthropomorphise. Still, including them would have also
introduced another bias, namely that of participants who did not suspend their disbelief.
We believe that the later would have been the stronger bias and hence our decision to
exclude the participants was the better choice. To have a better insight into how the
exclusion may have influenced the results, we ran the same analyses once more with the
complete dataset. No new significant results emerged and no previously significant results
turned insignificant, with the exception of the TOST.
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2.4.2 Conclusion
While previous work considered empathetic concern towards robots in relation to robot
abuse (e.g. Darling et al., 2015; Riek et al., 2009; Rosenthal-Von Der Pütten et al., 2014),
the current experiment looked at moral acceptability of abuse and also compared the
acceptability of robot abuse to acceptability of human abuse. Interestingly, the results
suggested that people do not consider robot bullying more acceptable than human bullying.
The link between mind attributed to the victim and perceived acceptability of abuse was
similar for robotic and human victims alike.
These results confirm that people view robot abuse as bullying. In addition, they
provide insight to factors that may prove to be central to robot bullying behaviour through
establishing a link to mind attribution. They strongly suggest that parallels can be drawn




Experiment II: Robot sentience
and acceptability of mistreatment
3.1 Introduction
Experiment I (described in Chapter 2) established that people do not perceive robot
bullying as significantly different from human bullying. Moreover, it was found that mind
attribution was related to perceived acceptability of bullying behaviour. However, this
relationship was correlational, since mind attribution had not been directly manipulated.
As a result, no causal inferences could be made about the direction of this relationship
— individuals who have more stringent moral standards might also have an enhanced
tendency to attribute mind to others, for example. Thus, in order to test for a causal
relationship between mind attribution and moral acceptability, under Experiment II two
experiments were conducted that manipulated the perception of a robot’s capability to
think and feel and subsequently measured the effects on acceptability of robot bullying,
as well as people’s own tendency to bully the robot.
3.1.1 Literature
In Experiment II, we raise the question of how robot mind attribution influences per-
ceived right to moral treatment and willingness to bully the robot. Previous research has
already found a relationship between robot anthropomorphism and willingness to harm.
Higher robot anthropomorphism, manipulated by making the robot look more human-
like, has been linked to a greater willingness to protect it from harm (Riek et al., 2009).
Anthropomorphising a simple bug robot through providing it with a background story
increased participants’ hesitation before harming it (Darling et al., 2015). Similarly, func-
tional robots allegedly were less often the target of abuse when they malfunctioned if
they had been given a name, which would have increased the robot’s anthropomorphic
qualities (Darling, 2015). These examples, however, employed basic ways of enhancing
anthropomorphism and did not directly target perceived mind as an indicator of anthro-
pomorphism. Briggs and Scheutz (2014) did manipulate mind attribution, and found that
when a small humanoid robot expressed its distress, participants’ behaviour was indeed
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affected. People were less likely to insist that a NAO robot should follow the command
to topple over a tower it had just painstakingly built when the robot protested in an
emotional way than when it stayed silent (Briggs & Scheutz, 2014). In Bartneck, Van
Der Hoek, et al. (2007), participants hesitated longer before switching off an expressive
iCat robot when their interaction with it revealed it as intelligent and agreeable, than
when it communicated in a manner that was either intelligent, or agreeable, or neither.
In social robotics, robots are often programmed to display social cues, for example
through expressing emotions and non-verbal behaviour. Since these cues would increase
the extent to which the robot is perceived as possessing a mind of its own (Złotowski
et al., 2014, 2018), one would expect that including such cues in a robot’s behaviour
increases empathy with the robot and decreases participant’s willingness to harm it. Yet
this relationship appears to be complicated.
A number of studies suggest that a higher degree of social behaviour by a robot may
not always be related to a lower willingness in participants to harm it (Horstmann et al.,
2018; Nomura et al., 2016; Tan et al., 2018). In contrast to the iCat study by Bartneck,
Van Der Hoek, et al. (2007), Horstmann et al. (2018) found that a functional robot that
protested against being switched off resulted in longer hesitation and lesser inclination to
switch it off than a protesting robot with social behaviour. Tan et al. (2018) measured par-
ticipants’ willingness to intervene as a confederate verbally and physically bullied a small
Cozmo robot. There was a marginal trend where participants were more likely to discour-
age mistreatment of the robot if it did not display any emotional behaviour throughout the
experiment, versus when it celebrated successes and mourned losses. Nomura et al. (2016)
interviewed children who bullied the anthropomorphic Robovie robot in a shopping mall.
Most children saw the robot as human-like rather than machine-like and about half saw
the robot as capable of perceiving its environment. Yet neither observation had stopped
them from physically and verbally bullying the robot.
How to explain these inconsistent findings? The argued link between social cues and
willingness to harm consists of three propositions. First of all, it assumes that social
behaviour by a robot would enhance mind attribution. Emotional cues have indeed shown
to increase the attribution of mental capabilities (Złotowski et al., 2014), comprehension
skills (Briggs & Scheutz, 2014), and ability to experience emotion (Tan et al., 2018). This
proposition thus seems to be supported by empirical evidence.
The second and third propositions of the argument are that mind attribution enhances
empathy, and that empathy in turn decreases willingness to harm. There has been some
debate on whether empathy and mind perception are different concepts in the first place
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Whiten & Byrne, 1991, e.g.) but fMRI studies have found
that attributing a mind to others activates different neural networks than empathy (Hein
& Singer, 2008).
The second and third proposition furthermore are at the core of dehumanisation theory
(Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008). Dehumanisation theory asserts that lower
mind attribution to another person allows someone to disregard the negative consequences
of their behaviour for that person, as the reduction in perceived mental capabilities renders
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the victim less deserving of empathy. This was to some extent collaborated by research by
Gray et al. (2007), who found that mind perception was related to moral status. Exper-
iment I (Chapter 5) as well found a correlation between mind attribution and perceived
acceptability of abusive behaviour.
However, several studies suggest that empathy may not automatically lead to more
protective behaviour (Bartneck, Van Der Hoek, et al., 2007; Horstmann et al., 2018; Tan
et al., 2018). Horstmann et al. (2018) reports that participants experienced higher stress
levels while switching off a protesting robot when they liked the robot better, but did
not take any longer to turn it off. Bartneck, Van Der Hoek, et al. (2007) did find that
participants hesitated longer to switch off an agreeable robot, but also noted that all
participants eventually turned off the robot whether it was smart and agreeable or not. In
the study by Tan et al. (2018) on whether participants intervened when they saw a Cozmo
robot being bullied, participants who felt more strongly that the robot was mistreated did
not display greater willingness to intervene.
Rosenthal-Von Der Pütten et al. (2014) compared participants’ brain activation pat-
terns in response to viewing the abuse of a cardboard box, a robot, and a human. They
found that in the questionnaires people attributed equal levels of emotion to the human
and the robot, and reported feeling the same amount of empathy towards the robot and the
human when it was mistreated. In contrast, fMRI scans showed greater activation in par-
ticipants’ right putamen when watching the human being mistreated than when watching
the robot being mistreated. This area has been associated with empathy and emotional
distress (Rosenthal-Von Der Pütten et al., 2014). Interestingly, areas related to emotional
processing and perspective taking were equally active when participants watched the robot
or the human. Thus, self-reports and fMRI results suggest similar levels of mind percep-
tion to the robot and the human. However, when it came to empathy, people reported
there was no difference while their brain activation suggested otherwise.
A potential explanation for the apparent contradiction between self-reports and areas
of brain activation was provided by Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal (2015). They proposed
that empathy is the result of a cognitive dynamic, where implicit processes cause the
emergence of early evaluations, and deliberate, reflective processes shape and nuance this
evaluation. While early evaluations of robot bullying may elicit an initial empathetic
response (which would be less intense than a response to human bullying), this response
could then be enhanced or suppressed by cognitive appraisal of the behaviour the robot
is exposed to.
It has been shown in human-human interaction that conscious processes can influence
automatic responses (Liepelt & Brass, 2010; Liepelt, Cramon, & Brass, 2008). An adap-
tation of this research to the field of HRI investigated the influence of robot autonomy
on automatic social processes by means of assessing a Social Simon task (Stenzel et al.,
2012). In human-human interaction, the mere presence of another human decreases per-
formance on this otherwise simple task; similar to the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935), this
is not consciously controlled. The robot’s appearance and behaviour in this experiment
were identical through the conditions, but half the participants were told upfront that
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the robot was biology-inspired and had autonomous behaviour. The other half was told
the robot was machine-like and deterministic; thus manipulating intentionality (one of
the components of mind attribution). The Social Simon effect was observed only for the
intentional robot. This proves that an explicit instruction can affect automatic behaviour
(Stenzel et al., 2012).
3.1.2 Current studies
Research questions
The current research explored the following research questions in two experiments:
1. Does telling people that a robot possesses a mind, i.e., is capable of experiencing
emotions and cognition, affect how unacceptable they find robot bullying?
2. Do emotional cues that imply the robot has a mind affect how unacceptable people
find robot bullying?
3. Does explicit information that a robot does not possess a mind change the influence
of implied mind on how unacceptable people find robot bullying?
4. Does telling people that a robot possesses a mind reduce their willingness to publicly
humiliate it?
Experiment II.A was vignette-based and addressed the first three research questions.
Robot sentience was manipulated in two ways: through having the robot display emotional
cues, and through telling participants that the robot could think and feel. Participants
then indicated how unacceptable they considered varying bullying behaviours towards the
robot.
In Experiment II.B, the first and the last research question were addressed. Partici-
pants interacted with embodied robot that was introduced as either capable or incapable
of thinking and feeling. They then indicated how unacceptable they considered bullying
this robot; and were offered an opportunity to humiliate the robot they had just interacted
with.
Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were formulated:
1. For Experiment II.A, it was expected that
(a) explicit briefing that the robot possessed a mind would make people less ac-
cepting of robot bullying.
(b) emotional cues by the robot that suggested it had a mind would decrease how
acceptable people rated robot bullying.
2. For Experiment II.B, it was expected that
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(a) the findings of Experiment II.A would be replicated in a setting with an em-
bodied robot. That is, it was hypothesised that informing participants that
the robot they were going to interact with was capable of thinking and feeling,
would reduce how unacceptable they rated abuse of that robot post-interaction.
(b) participants would be more likely to humiliate the robot after being told it did
not possess a mind.
The experiments have been reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee
at the University of Canterbury, under the reference HEC2019/47.
3.2 Experiment II.A
Experiment II.A was an online scenario-based study that followed a 2 (robot introduction:
not possessing mind versus possessing mind) × 3 (robot response to mistreatment: no
response, non-emotional response, emotional response) between participant design. Un-
acceptability of robot bullying as described in the scenario was the dependent variable.
Participants’ general tendency to anthropomorphise and affinity with technology were as-
sessed in order to check whether they were similarly distributed across the six conditions.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
Participants for Experiment II.A were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk),
an online platform for data collection. Previous studies have indicated that data collected
via MTurk are of equal quality to data collected through on-site recruitment or participant
data from forums (Bartneck et al., 2015; Simons & Chabris, 2012), with internal motivation
rather than monetary reward being the main motive for participating (Buhrmester et al.,
2011). We restricted participation to participants residing in English-speaking countries
(i.e. USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, or Ireland) and accredited
with Master status, i.e. with a low incidence of work being rejected.
A total of 193 people participated in Experiment 1. After having recruited the first
66 participants, it became apparent that basic demographics, gender and age, had not
been assessed. Therefore, these demographics were included for the remainder of the data
collection. Of the 126 participants who completed the survey after the error had been
detected, 53.97% were female, with a mean age of 41.65 years (SD = 11.42). In return
for their participation, workers were reimbursed with .90US$, in accordance with MTurk
reimbursement custom.
Procedure
Prospective participants could read a short description of the study in MTurk. If they
decided to participate, they were directed to a Qualtrics survey page, where they provided
informed consent and reported their age and gender.
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Subsequently, participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. De-
pending on the condition, participants were presented with a vignette in which the robot
was introduced as either possessing a mind (i.e. capable of various emotional and cogni-
tive experiences) or not possessing a mind. The vignette further described a human-robot
interaction between a participant and the robot which included bullying of the robot.
Depending on the experimental condition, the robot responded to the bullying in a non-
emotional way, in an emotional way, or not at all.
Finally, participants completed the survey. First, they indicated how morally unac-
ceptable the bullying as described in the vignette. Subsequently, they completed the
individual tendency to anthropomorphise and the affinity with technology scales. Then
participants were thanked for their time, debriefed, and reimbursed.
Materials
Vignettes Vignettes constituted an introduction of the robot, a description of the robot
being bullied, and a description of the robot’s response to the bullying. In order to create
the six conditions, nine vignettes were constructed: two different introductions (of the
robot possessing and not possessing a mind), four different robot bullying scenarios, and
three different robot responses (no response, non-emotional response, emotional response).
See Table 3.1 for the respective introductions.
The four mistreatment descriptions were created to cover a wide scope of robot bul-
lying. They described an interaction between the robot and a participant, where the
participant had behaved in an aggressive or impolite way towards the robot: either play-
ing around with the robot’s energy supply; verbally abusing it; rejecting the proposal from
the robot to split a monetary reward evenly and keeping all the money for themselves; or
switching off the robot in spite of the robot asking to be left on sleep mode since switching
it off would result in the robot losing awareness.
There were 2 × 4 × 3 = 24 possible vignettes to which participants were randomly
assigned. However, the interaction descriptions were not included as an independent
variable as they were expected to have no effect on the dependent variable. A manipulation
check was carried out to confirm this; see 3.2.2.
Measurements
Unacceptability of bullying Unacceptability of bullying was measured through five
items, each scored on a 7-point Likert scale. The items concerned how opposed the par-
ticipant was to treating the robot like it was treated in the vignette; if they considered
the treatment as described acceptable; if they would intervene if they were to witness such
treatment of a robot; how important it was to protect a robot like the one in the vignette
from being treated like it was; and in general, how important it was for a robot like the
one in the vignette to be treated humanely. The items were scored in such a way that a
higher score indicated lower rated acceptability of robot bullying.
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Table 3.1: Robot introductions manipulation. Left: introduction of the robot not possess-
ing a mind. Right: introduction for the robot possessing a mind
Introduction not possessing a mind Introduction possessing a mind
This robot is programmed to appear to be a social
being: it is capable of processing, interpreting and
calculating an emotional response to its environment.
It can store and retrieve names and faces, so that it
will state the name of people it has seen before out
loud. It can also respond to prespecified commands,
and will update its behaviour scheme to mimic an up-
set or angry response when given certain prompts. It
has distance and depth sensors that prevent it from
colliding with objects or people and falling off the
stairs. All these behaviours give it the appearance of
being conscious. The robot has starred in a few of
our demos before, although it can’t remember this.
Recently it made its appearance in its first experi-
ment. However, being a robot, it did not feel excited
or nervous.
This is a social robot with his very own personal-
ity: it is capable of processing, interpreting and
emotionally responding to its environment. It can
remember names and faces, and will recognise
people it met before. It can understand different
commands, and will change its mood depending
on how it is treated - for example, it will get up-
set when mistreated and happy after being told
it did well. Moreover, it is aware of its surround-
ings, so that it can avoid bumping into objects
or people and throwing itself off the stairs. The
robot is proud to have starred in a few of our de-
mos before, and recently made its appearance in
its first experiment, for which it was very excited
and a little nervous.
Individual differences in anthropomorphism questionnaire Individual differences
in anthropomorphism were measured with a questionnaire from Waytz, Cacioppo, and Ep-
ley (2010), although the questions that targeted anthropomorphic qualities of technology
(i.e. computers, cars and robots) were taken out since those would likely be affected by the
introduction manipulation. The resulting questionnaire consisted of 10 items. Participants
were asked to indicate on a 10-point Likert scale to what extent they thought different
animals and natural phenomena have mental and emotional responses (e.g. “To what
extent does the environment experience emotions?”, “To what extent does the average
insect have a mind of its own?”). See Appendix A for the full questionnaire.
Individual differences in anthropomorphism were assessed in order to check whether
participants had similar trait anthropomorphism across the different conditions.
Affinity with technology The affinity with technology scale measures to what extent
people are comfortable around, and eager to learn about technology. Like the individual
differences in anthropomorphism, affinity with technology was assessed in order to check
whether participants in different conditions had similar affinity with technology, as it was
expected that differences between the conditions on this measure could bias the results.
Affinity with technology was measured with a questionnaire taken from Neyer, Felber,
and Gebhardt (2012) and translated from German to English. Participants’ individual
affinity with technology is measured through their agreement with eight statements (e.g. “I
am very curious about new technological developments”) on a 5-point Likert scale (ranging
from “not at all descriptive of me” to “extremely descriptive of me”). See Appendix A for
the full questionnaire.
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Table 3.2: Mean scores (SD) for age, trait anthropomorphism, and affinity with technology
per condition
No mind condition
no response non-emotional emotional
Age 50.06(10.13) 41.00(12.39) 38.83(9.29)
Percentage male 55.56% 21.74% 50%
Trait anthropomorphism 4.12(1.59) 4.54(1.78) 3.77(1.77 )
Affinity with technology 3.91(.77 ) 3.73(.93) 4.05(.94)
Unacceptability robot bullying 2.71(.98) 3.01(.97 ) 3.16(1.01)
Mind condition
Age 41.28(11.15) 39.57(12.86) 40.65(10.11)
Percentage male 45.83% 33.33% 76.47%
Trait anthropomorphism 3.75(1.46) 3.90(1.57 ) 3.85(1.80)
Affinity with technology 3.70(.92) 3.96(.80) 3.83(.70)
Unacceptability robot bullying 3.02(.98) 3.39(1.10) 3.42(1.16)
Explicit Mind Attribution Explicit mind attribution to the robot was measured in
order to perform a manipulation check on the robot mind attribution manipulation. The
mind attribution questionnaire was taken from Gray et al. (2007) and adapted so that
the questions explicitly referred to the robot from the introduction. The questionnaire
measures to what extent the robot is capable of experiencing 18 different emotional and
cognitive states, using a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from “very incapable” to “very
capable”. See Appendix A for the questionnaire.
3.2.2 Results
Preliminary analyses
Reliability Cronbach’s alpha was computed for the unacceptability of robot bullying
scale, as well as the individual differences in anthropomorphism questionnaire and the
affinity with technology questionnaire. Internal consistency was high; α = .88 for unac-
ceptability of robot bullying, α = .85 for anthropomorphism, and α = .88 for affinity with
technology. The questionnaires and scale were thus deemed reliable (Cronbach, 1951).
Bullying scenario confound check A 4×1 ANOVA with the four bullying scenarios
as independent variables and unacceptability of bullying as dependent variable confirmed
that the scenario did not influence unacceptability scores, F(3, 189) = 1.01, p = .389. The
bullying scenarios thus could be excluded as a factor, as intended.
Randomisation checks A 2×3 ANOVA with the robot introduction and robot re-
sponse as independent variables and age as dependent variable indicated that age was not
equal across the conditions. More specifically, there were main effects for the introduction
manipulation (F(1, 121) = 6.56, p = .012) as well as the robot response (F(2, 121) =
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Figure 3.1: Difference in mean unacceptability for the robot introduction and robot re-
sponse conditions. Contrasts marked with an * are significant at the p <.05 level in the
post-hoc analyses.
5.68, p = .004). A correlation between age and unacceptability ratings however was not
significant, ρ = -.12, p = .175). Thus, the difference in age between the conditions was
not considered problematic. See Table 3.2 for the mean age per condition.
A Chi-Square test on the distribution of gender across the six conditions indicated that
there was a significant difference in male to female ratio between the conditions, χ2(5) =
13.32, p = .021. However, a regression with unacceptability as dependent variable and
gender as predictor indicated that gender was not significantly related to unacceptability,
t(124) = 1.83, p = .070. Thus, the different gender ratios across the conditions were not
considered problematic either. See Table 3.2 for the gender ratio per condition.
Individual tendencies to anthropomorphism were similar between the conditions, Fs
< 1.79, ps > .17. Affinity with technology, as well, was similar between the conditions, Fs
< 1.44, ps > .24. See Table 3.2 for the mean scores for each scale per condition.
Manipulation check A 2×3 ANOVA with robot introduction and robot response as
independent variables, and explicit mind attribution as dependent variable indicated that
the robot introduction had successfully manipulated mind attribution, F(1, 187) = 12.46,
p < .001. There was no main effect for the robot response manipulation (F(2, 187) =
.73, p = .483), nor a significant interaction effect (F(2, 187) = 1.16, p = .315). The mind
attribution manipulation was thus deemed successful.
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Main analyses
To test the influence of the robot’s introduction on acceptability of robot bullying, a
2 (introduction: robot possessing mind vs not possessing mind)×3 (robot response: no
response, non-emotional, emotional) ANOVA with ‘unacceptability’ as dependent variable
was conducted. Significant main effects were found for both robot introduction (F(1, 187)
= 4.56, p = .034) and the robot response (F(2, 187) = 3.07, p = .049). Since there was
homogeneity of variance, post-hoc analyses with a Tukey correction were carried out.
Post-hoc analysis on the robot introduction manipulation revealed that participants in
the robot possessing a mind condition reported finding robot bullying significantly less ac-
ceptable, M(SD) = 3.27(.106), than participants who had read the introduction where the
robot was described as not possessing a mind, M(SD) = 2.96(.105); t(1, 187) = -2.12, p =
.035. Post-hoc analyses of the robot response manipulation revealed a marginally signifi-
cant difference between participants in the non-responsive condition, M(SD) = 2.86(.126),
and the emotional response condition, M(SD) = 3.29(.134), t(1, 187) = -2.32, p = .056.
The other contrasts were not significant, ts > -1.86, ps > .155. See Figure 3.1.
3.2.3 Discussion
Using an online scenario-based approach study, Experiment II.A explored the influence
of a robot’s mind attribution on how unacceptable people found it being bullied. Mind
attribution was manipulated both directly, by telling participants that the robot was ca-
pable of thinking and feeling; and indirectly through having the robot respond to bullying
in a way that implied mind. In line with hypothesis 1a, participants found bullying less
acceptable if they had been explicitly told that the robot possessed a mind. In addition,
and in line with hypothesis 1b, participants found robot bullying less acceptable when the
robot responded in a negative, emotional way to the bullying. There was no interaction
effect between robot introduction and type of response to bullying on how unacceptable
participants found robot bullying.
These results suggest that perceived acceptability of robot bullying can be manipulated
in two distinct ways. Moreover, the results indicate that even when people are explicitly
told that a robot does not possess a mind, robot bullying is still seen as less acceptable when
the robot responds with negative emotions. This suggests that explicit information on and
implied robot mind affect acceptability in two separate manners. This would fall in line
with the theory of empathy as a cognitive dynamic (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015). The
implied robot mind (by an emotional response) would determine the initial evaluation of
the bullying, and any explicit information on the robot’s mind would subsequently adjust
this evaluation. When the robot gave no response at all, the initial evaluation of how
unacceptable the bullying behaviour was might return as “relatively acceptable”; but the
final decision can still be adjusted by providing the participant with explicit information
about the robot’s mind.
A limitation of Experiment II.A concerns the scenario-based approach and the mea-
surement of behavioural intentions rather than behaviour. Because Experiment II.A did
not include actual human-robot interaction, behavioural intentions can only serve as a
46
proxy for participants’ behaviour towards a robot. Previous research on the Media Equa-
tion theory (Reeves & Nass, 1996) demonstrated a divergence between self-report and
actual behaviour. For example, research by Nass et al. (1994) showed that participants
adhered to social norms of politeness when interacting with a computer. However, when
asked if they ever were considerate of the computer’s feelings, participants would strongly
deny this.
In addition, Experiment II.A only measured whether robot mind attribution influenced
how unacceptable robot bullying was considered. Whether considering robot bulling un-
acceptable leads to a reduction in abuse remains to be tested. We conducted Experiment
II.B to overcome the problems surrounding scenario-based approaches, to replicate the
findings, and to extend the experiment with a measurement of bullying behaviour.
3.3 Pilots
Experiment II.B followed a simple single-factor design with two dependent variables. The
independent variable was mind attribution to the robot. The first dependent variable was
how unacceptable robot abuse was considered, measured in the same way as in Experiment
II.A. The second dependent variable was robot bullying, operationalised as participant’s
willingness to publicly humiliate the robot.
The mind attribution manipulation and robot bullying measure of Experiment II.B
were validated on beforehand, by the means of two pilot studies.
3.3.1 Pilot 1: Robot mind attribution manipulation
The robot mind attribution manipulation of Experiment II.B was validated in Pilot 1. The
mind attribution manipulation was an extension of the descriptions displayed at Table 3.1.
A few lines were added about the robot’s capabilities, as well as a picture of the Vector
robot that would be used in Experiment II.B. See Table 3.3.
Method
Participants Participants were recruited via MTurk. 51 people participated. 24 partic-
ipants read an introduction that depicted the robot as not possessing a mind, whereas 27
participants read an introduction that depicted the robot as possessing a mind. 54.90%
of the participants were male, 41.18% female, and 3.92% (two participants) withheld from
disclosing gender. Mean age was 39.12(SD = 9.07). Participants received .65 US$ for their
participation.
Procedure After assessing informed consent as well as age and gender, participants
read either of the two proposed robot introductions and filled out the mind attribution
questionnaire. Then they were thanked for their time and reimbursed.
Materials The mind attribution questionnaire was taken from Gray et al. (2007) and
adapted so that the questions explicitly referred to the robot from the introduction. The
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Table 3.3: Robot mind attribution manipulation as tested in Pilot 1 and subsequently
used in Experiment II.B
Low mind attribution condition High mind attribution condition
This is Vector, one of the robots that stay and work with
us in the university lab. Being a part of the UC and our
lab, he has appeared in a few of our demos before, although
he cannot remember this. This is his first experiment, how-
ever. Vector is not aware that he is taking part in this, and
as a robot he can’t get excited or nervous about it. As a
companion robot, Vector is programmed to appear to be
social. His behaviour is coded to mimic an awareness of
his surroundings as well as a personality, even though he
possesses neither. For example, you can instruct him to
store your name with a picture of your face, so that when
he registers your face in a future encounter, he can retrieve
your name and pretend to ”recognise” you. There are a
few other commands that have been pre-programmed, like
to ”go play” and ”take a picture”. However, Vector can-
not understand or learn any new commands. Vector is also
programmed to have different responses depending on how
he is handled. For example, if he is handled carelessly, he
will pretend to be upset and angry. If you stroke his back,
he will start displaying signals of happiness. All these be-
haviours make Vector appear conscious. However, they are
just animations: Vector is not capable of feeling any more
than he is of telling whether he is being treated right or
wrong on a moral level. Vector is outfitted with sensors
that help him navigating around and create an illusion of
spatial awareness to the observer. For example, these sen-
sors force him to stop when he is about to bump into an
object, and to slowly back away when a cliff is detected
right in front of him.
This is Vector, one of the robots that stay
and work with us in the university lab. Be-
ing a part of the UC and our lab, he is proud
to have starred in a few of our demos before.
This is his first experiment, however. Vector
is very excited to be taking part in it, and also
a little nervous. Vector is a social robot with
his own personality: he is capable of process-
ing, interpreting and emotionally responding
to his environment. He can remember names
and faces, and will recognise people he met be-
fore. He can understand different commands,
like “go play” and “take a picture!”. Also, his
mood changes depending on how he is treated.
For example, if he feels like he is treated un-
fairly, he will get upset or angry. Similarly, if
you stroke his back, he will happily close his
eyes and enjoy the back rub. He communi-
cates his mental states through behaviour and
his eyes. Moreover, Vector is aware of his sur-
roundings. He sees what’s in front of him, so
that he avoids bumping into objects and will
avoid driving off cliffs.
questionnaire measures to what extent the robot is capable of experiencing 18 different
emotional and cognitive states, using a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from “very inca-
pable” to “very capable”. See Appendix A for the questionnaire.
Results
Mind attribution to the robot was significantly higher for the introduction depicting the
robot as possessing a mind, M(SD) = 2.64(.91), than for the introduction depicting the
robot as not possessing a mind, M(SD) = 1.90(.95), t(48.75) = -2.85, p = .006. The mind
attribution manipulation was thus considered valid to use.
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3.3.2 Pilot 2: Robot bullying
Experiment II.B operationalised its dependent variable “robot bullying” as whether par-
ticipants chose to humiliate the robot they just interacted with by picking a condescending
review to be put up on display next to it. This operationalisation was developed, tested,
and validated in Pilot 2. The resulting review pairs were similar in sentiment and infor-
mativeness, but differed significantly in how condescending they were towards the robot.
Method
Participants The reviews were constructed in two rounds of pilots, then validated in the
third. All participants were recruited via MTurk. For the third and final round of piloting
the reviews, 45 participants were recruited. Two participants were excluded because of
straightlining, i.e. answering every item on the survey with the same score; thus resulting
in a dataset of 43 participants. 65.11% of the participants were male, 30.23% were female,
and 4.65% withheld from disclosing their gender. Mean age was 41.17(SD = 10.43) years.
Participants received .60 US$ for their contribution.
Procedure For the first round of testing, 12 reviews were constructed out of actual
reviews of the robot, taken from different websites. These reviews were rated on each of
three scales: the sentiment expressed (ranging from “very negative” to “very positive”);
how informative the reviews were for someone contemplating purchasing a Vector robot
(ranging from “not informative at all” to “very informative”); and finally, how condescend-
ing each of the reviews was (ranging from “very condescending” to “not condescending at
all”). 5-point Likert scales were used to collect participants’ responses.
After the first stage of testing, five pairs of reviews were selected which were rated
roughly equally high with regard to affect and usefulness, but diverged in how conde-
scending they were to the robot. Those reviews were adjusted to further decrease any
differences in affect and usefulness scores, and retested. One of the pairs was dropped as
the difference in condescension ratings was only marginally significant, resulting in a final
set of four pairs of reviews (two positive, two negative) that were equally positive/negative
and informative, but significantly different in how condescending they were of the robot.
This set was then tested a third and final time.
Results of the third round of testing
Four pairs of reviews of the robot (two positive and two negative) were tested by the
means of t-tests on being equal in sentiment expressed and informativeness, but different
in how condescending they were towards the robot.
Three of the four review pairs were similar on sentiment expressed, -1.92 < ts < -0.18,
ps > .062. Of these three pairs, two were seen as equally useful, -1.49 < ts < -.57, ps >
.147. These two pairs differed significantly in how condescending they were perceived to
be, ts > 3.28, ps < .002. Both pairs were positive in overall sentiment.
Since these were the only reviews that differed exclusively on how condescending they
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were, the negative reviews were disregarded as a measure of humiliation. The two positive
review pairs were considered valid to use.
3.3.3 Conclusion
In two pilot studies, the experimental manipulation and one of the two dependent mea-
sures for Experiment II.B were validated. Pilot 1 confirmed that providing people with
an introduction that depicted the robot as capable of thinking and feeling increased their
subsequent mind attribution to that robot, compared to people who read an introduc-
tion that explicitly stated the robot did not possess the ability to think and feel. This
manipulation was thus adopted for Experiment II.B.
Pilot 2 developed and validated the operationalisation of the robot bullying measure.
The objective was to find four pairs of reviews, where within each pair, both reviews were
equally positive or negative in sentiment expressed, and equally informative on the robot.
The only difference would be how condescending in tone those two reviews were towards
the robot. The underlying rationale was that if participants in Experiment II.B would
choose the condescending review over the equally useful alternative to be displayed next
to the robot, this could be taken as an attempt to humiliate the robot.
After two initial rounds of testing and revision, two pairs of positive reviews (so four
reviews in total) were validated. These two review pairs were thus used as a measure of
robot bullying in Experiment II.B.
3.4 Experiment II.B
Experiment II.B was designed to include a human-robot interaction with Vector, a social
robot (see Figure 3.2). There was one manipulation, i.e. robot mind attribution in the
introduction, and two dependent variables, i.e. unacceptability of bullying the robot and
whether or not participants chose to publicly humiliate the robot.
3.4.1 Method
Participants
Participants for Experiment II.B were recruited on campus, through posters, online re-
cruitment, and snowballing. 67 people participated. 41.79% of the participants were male;
57.72% were female, and 1.49% (one participant) did not identify as either gender. The
average age was 25.46 (SD = 6.18) years. In return for their participation, participants
could enter a draw to win a 50$ gift card for a local shopping mall. In addition, a bowl of
candy from which the participants could take freely was offered during the trials.
Materials
Vector Vector is a social companion robot, produced by the consumer robotics com-
pany Anki. Vector is a small (9×6×7 cm) robot which comes pre-programmed with fully
autonomous behaviour. It responds to specific commands as well as physical interaction,
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Figure 3.2: Left; the Vector robot. Right; the study set-up.
and will move around and “explore”. Vector does not talk under most circumstances,
although it can be taught names and will respond verbally to the command “what’s the
weather?”. In general, however, Vector communicates through behaviour, facial expression
and a variety of chirping and buzzing noises. Its behaviour is animated and although it
does not have a mouth, it can create a range of facial expressions with its eyes. Vector
comes with an Anki cube, which it can interact with (e.g. picking it up). See Figure 3.2.
Measurements
Individual differences in anthropomorphism tendencies and affinity with tech-
nology Like in Experiment II.A, trait anthropomorphism (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley,
2010) and affinity with technology (Neyer et al., 2012) were assessed to check whether
participants between the two conditions were similar. See Appendix A for the full ques-
tionnaires.
Unacceptability of robot bullying During the interaction with Vector, participants
were asked to try out a total of three commands and behaviours that would elicit a
negative response from Vector. The unacceptability scale consisted of seven items. Six
referred directly to the negative commands and behaviour participants had been asked
to try on Vector, asking the participant “How acceptable would it be if someone were to
carry out [behaviour or command] repeatedly for an extended period of time?” and “How
important is it to protect Vector from being [behaviour or command] repeatedly for an
extended period of time?”. The final question asked how important it was that Vector was
treated humanely in general. Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from “completely unacceptable”/“very unimportant” to “completely acceptable”/“very
important”. As in Experiment II.A, the scale was scored in such a way that a high score
corresponded with participants finding the behaviour less acceptable.
Humiliating Vector After the interaction with Vector, participants were asked to select
one review out of four, which – according to the cover story – would be put up in public
next to Vector on the upcoming Open Day of the lab. The four reviews in fact consisted
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of two review pairs which were equally informative and positive, but different in how
condescending they were towards Vector (see Section 3.3.2).
Behaviour interpretation check During the interaction with Vector, participants
were asked to try out a total of three commands and behaviours that would elicit a
negative response from Vector. These commands were telling Vector he was a bad robot;
holding Vector up in the air so its wheels could not touch a surface; and picking Vector
up, turning it upside down, and shaking it violently.
To check if participants indeed interpreted the responses to each of these three be-
haviours as negative, nine questions were included in the survey. For each of the three
behaviours, participants indicated how positive or negative Vector responded, how the
response made the participant feel, and how willing they would be to repeat the be-
haviour/command a number of times in a row. None of the participants (incorrectly)
interpreted the behaviours as positive.
Procedure
Participants were seated at a table with a Vector robot asleep on its charger, an Anki
cube, a folder with the information sheet and consent form, and a tablet. See Figure 3.2
for the study set-up. The experimenter gave a brief introduction: thanking participants
for their participation; clarifying any issues that participants might have after reading the
information sheet; demonstrating how to give Vector a voice command; and explaining
that the tablet would take the participant through the procedure step by step. After
ensuring that the participant was ready, the experimenter left the room.
First, participants were instructed to report their demographics (i.e. age and gender).
Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two introductions to the Vector
robot (manipulation: high or low mind attribution). Subsequently, participants were given
a list of voice commands and behaviour to practice with Vector. Upon the first command,
Vector would wake up and drive from its charging dock onto the table. Some of the
commands and behaviour evoked a negative response from Vector (e.g. telling it “Bad
robot!” or lifting it in the air), some evoked a positive response (e.g. telling it “give me
a fist bump!” or stroking its back). Being an autonomous robot, Vector was animated
throughout the interaction. When it had not received a command, it would appear to be
entertaining itself, roaming around, sometimes looking up to the participant and make
giggling noises, or picking up its Anki cube and dropping it off at another spot.
After 10 minutes of interaction with the Vector robot, the list of commands on the
tablet disappeared and was replaced by an instruction for the participant to put Vector
back on its charging dock and continue with the survey part of the experiment. The survey
assessed (in order) anthropomorphism (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010), affinity with
technology (translated from Neyer et al., 2012), the set of reviews, the control questions
on Vector’s behaviour interpretation, and the unacceptability questions.
At the end, participants were instructed to call the experimenter in again. The ex-
perimenter thanked them for their time, verbally debriefed them, and gave them a raffle
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Table 3.4: Mean(SD) per condition for age, percentage female, and each of the different
scales
Low mind attribution High mind attribution
Age 25.24(6.83) 25.68(5.56)
Percentage female 45.46% 67.65%
Trait anthropomorphism 4.19(1.32) 4.54(1.31)
Affinity with tech 3.72(.89) 3.77(.59)
Condemning mistreatment 3.57(.95) 3.98(.62)
ticket for the 50$ voucher draw. The entire experiment took between 20 and 30 minutes.
3.4.2 Results
Preliminary analyses
To check the internal consistency of the scales used in Experiment II.B, we computed
Cronbach’s alpha. Alphas ranged from acceptable to good (Cronbach, 1951): for individual
differences in anthropomorphism α = .76, affinity with technology α = .75, behaviour
interpretation α = .77 and unacceptability of bullying α = .88.
Four t-tests were carried out to ensure that participants between the conditions had
interpreted Vector’s behaviour in the same way, were equally inclined to anthropomorphise,
did not differ in their affinity with technology, and were of similar age. No significant
differences were found: t(64.05) = .18 and p = .854; t(64.92) = -1.11 and p = .272;
t(55.19) = -.26 and p = .794; and t(62.94) = -.40 and p = .692, respectively. A Chi-
Square test indicated that the distribution of males and females was equal between the
high and low mind attribution condition, χ2(2) = 3.96, p = .14. Randomisation was thus
considered successful. See Table 3.4 for the descriptives.
Levene’s test was significant, F(1, 65) = 4.15, p = .046, indicating that the variances
were not equal between the high and low mind attribution condition. As a result, Welch
approximation of degrees of freedom was used for the main t-test.
Main analyses
To test whether the robot’s mind attribution manipulation had an effect on how acceptable
participants found robot bullying, an independent samples t-test was conducted. Partici-
pants in the high mind attribution condition found bullying Vector less acceptable, M(SD)
= 3.98(.62), than participants in the low mind attribution condition, M(SD) = 3.57(.95).
This difference was significant, t(54.88) = -2.09, p = .042.
To test for a difference in selecting condescending reviews to be put up in public
next to Vector, a logistic regression was run with ‘picked a condescending review’ as a
dichotomous dependent variable and condition as a predictor. Participants in the low
mind attribution condition were equally likely to put up a condescending review, z = 1.12
p = .262. Condescending reviews were no more common for participants in the low mind
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attribution condition (12 out of 33) than in the high mind attribution robot condition (17
out of 34).
Exploratory analyses
Two exploratory analyses were conducted. The first tested if attributing the robot a mind
had led participants to prefer any of the four reviews. The second tested whether there
was a direct relationship between participants’ unacceptability scores of robot bullying
and selecting a condescending review.
Firstly, a Chi-Square test was conducted on the distribution of selected reviews between
conditions. No difference was found, χ2(3) = 1.59, p = .661, indicating that the mind
attribution manipulation had not affected participants’ review selection.
Secondly, a logistic regression with ‘condescending review’ as a dichotomous dependent
variable and ‘rating robot bullying unacceptable’ as a continuous predictor was performed
to test if there was a relationship between finding robot bullying unacceptable and selecting
a humiliating review. There was a positive relationship between selecting a condescending
review and finding robot bullying unacceptable, z = 2.75, p = .006. People who had
selected a condescending review also found bullying less acceptable.
3.4.3 Discussion
In Experiment II.B, participants interacted with a Vector robot which was introduced
as either high or low in mind attribution. There were two outcomes of interest: how
unacceptable participants rated bullying Vector post-interaction, and whether participants
elected to publicly humiliate Vector.
Hypothesis 2a was confirmed: the findings from Experiment II.A were replicated.
When the robot was attributed a mind, participants considered bullying it less acceptable.
However, hypothesis 2b was rejected. Intriguingly, in spite of this the mind attribution
manipulation did not influence participants’ choice in putting up a condescending review
next to Vector (even while provided with a less condescending alternative).
Unplanned exploratory analyses found a relationship between condemning bullying
and selecting a condescending review, with the chance of a participant selecting at least
one condescending review to put up increasing as they found bullying less acceptable.
3.5 Main discussion
In Experiments II, the relationship between explicit and implied robot mind attribution
and perceived acceptability of robot bullying was investigated. In two experiments, a
robot was introduced as either high or low in mind attribution. Acceptability of robot
bullying was measured in both experiments. In Experiment II.B participants were also
offered the option to publicly humiliate the robot.
In line with our predictions, a higher mind attribution to the robot, manipulated either
by explicitly informing participants that the robot was capable of thinking and feeling
or by having the robot respond in a negative emotional way to bullying, led to lower
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acceptance of robot bullying. Even when participants were told that the robot did not
possess a mind, robot bullying was still found less acceptable when the robot responded
in a negative emotional way.
These findings are in line with the theory of empathy as a cognitive dynamic (Urquiza-
Haas & Kotrschal, 2015), which states that empathy is the result of an initial implicit
evaluation, that is subsequently adjusted by a deliberate and reflective process. The
robot’s response to bullying would set a preliminary empathetic response, which would
then be further nuanced based on the participant’s cognitive appraisal of the robot’s mind
attribution. Moreover, these results tie in with previous findings from mind perception
(Gray et al., 2007), and dehumanisation theory (Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008), both
of which associated mind attribution with the subject being more deserving of moral
treatment.
However, there are two alternative explanations for the findings from Experiment II.A:
Firstly, maybe people consider all kinds of robot bullying bad, or maybe it was the abuser
disregarding the robot’s request for them to stop that made the action immoral. However,
if either of those had been the case, robot bullying in the scenarios where the robot did
not respond or responded in a non-emotional way would have been equally unacceptable
as bullying in the emotional response scenario.
Secondly, participants may have been unsure about whether the alleged abuser knew
whether the robot possessed a mind, and found the bullying unacceptable because the
abuser behaved in a hurtful way to an agent that to his best knowledge was capable of
feeling. But then one would have expected no difference between the high and low mind
attribution condition in robot bullying acceptability ratings when the robot appeared to
possess a mind (i.e. when it gave an emotional response). No such interaction effect was
found.
A second interesting finding was that the mind attribution of the robot did not affect
whether people chose to publicly humiliate it. Exploratory analyses showed a positive
relationship between finding robot bullying unacceptable and belittling it in public. This
is intriguing, as common sense would suggest this relationship to be inverted: if people
perceive an agent to be of higher moral standing, they should be less likely to abuse it.
On this note, it is interesting to note that Tan et al. (2018) found a marginal trend where
bystanders of robot bullying were less likely to intervene when the robot did (versus did
not) give off emotional cues. This was in spite of them rating the robot as more capable of
experiencing human emotion than its non-emotional version. The paper does not report
on a relationship between acceptability of robot bullying and intervention tendencies, but
our present research suggests that emotional cues would have decreased how acceptable
participants found the bullying.
At the same time, a certain level of robot “cuteness” might have influenced both its
right to be protected and people’s tendency to belittle it. Mind attribution has been di-
vided in the Human Nature (or Experience; essentially the capability to feel) and Uniquely
Human (or Agency; roughly said the capability to think) dimensions before (Gray et al.,
2007; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). While Gray et al. (2007) related the former to the
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right to be protected and the latter to the duty of being held accountable for one’s own
responses, Haslam and Loughnan (2014) linked both to moral standing. If we take the
middle road and assume that both perceived Human Nature and (to a lesser extent)
Uniquely Human traits in the robot enhanced its moral standing, but only Human Nature
increased people’s tendency to belittle (or baby-talk) it, then that could be an explanation
why manipulated mind attribution increased moral standing but not people’s tendency to
humiliate the robot.
The results from Experiment II shed new light on the complicated relationship between
robot mind attribution, perceived right of protection from abuse, and willingness to belittle
the robot. As shown in previous research (for example Bartneck, Verbunt, et al., 2007;
Horstmann et al., 2018; Tan et al., 2018), empathy with a robot may not necessarily lead
to a lower willingness to harm the robot. The current experiments suggest that this may
be because moral acceptability and bullying behaviour are not related, or at least not in
the way one would expect. This has great implications for researchers in the field of HRI,
who may take empathy as an operationalisation of prosocial behaviour tendencies. It also
opens up a whole new venue of potential research on how people mitigate morality and
mind perception in the face of robot bullying. Experiments IV and V will explore the
relationship between robot mind perception and robot bullying further.
3.5.1 Limitations
The measure of robot bullying used in Experiment II.B was rather subtle, as participants
chose between four generally positive reviews. The measure had been inspired by the
measure of derogation in Dahl, Vescio, and Weaver (2015). In this study, participants had
been asked to select a more or less objectifying avatar to represent their online female
teammate. Choosing a sexualised depiction of the female avatar was interpreted as a
measure of aggression and condescension. In the current research, instead of choosing
between depictions with varying levels of objectification to be put up next to a teammate,
participants chose between reviews with varying levels of condescension to be put up next
to the robot. However, making a depiction more or less exposing can be done quite simply.
Creating reviews that differ in condescension but are otherwise identical, on the other
hand, is less straightforward (as also indicated by the three rounds of pilots that were
needed). Pilot testing increased confidence in a successful manipulation of humiliation
levels, but the question remains if participants who selected the more humiliating review
with the intention of humiliating the robot – which is essential to the definition of bullying.
In addition, the measure did not incorporate the component of repetition which is generally
considered a characteristic of bullying (see Section 1.2). Future studies should thus explore
alternative ways of operationalising robot bullying. For example, alternative ways of
humiliation could be devised, an element of repetition should be added, or scholars could
more directly address verbal and physical abuse.
Due to human error, data on age and gender was not collected in Experiment II.A for
the first 66 participants. In addition, randomisation of age and gender failed in Experiment
II.A. The failed randomisation was considered not problematic as neither age nor gender
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was significantly related to acceptability of robot bullying, the sole dependent variable of
Experiment II.A. An alternative solution to the failed randomisation would have been to
include age and gender in the further statistical analyses as covariates. However, due to
the partially failed data collection on age and gender this approach would have severely
compromised statistical power.
3.5.2 Conclusion
People bullying autonomous robots in public is a surprisingly common phenomenon but
so far there is little understanding of the psychological motivation to this behaviour. In
Experiment II we manipulated robot mind attribution and measured its effect on how
acceptable robot bullying was deemed as well as how willing people were to bully the
robot themselves. The results showed that while robot mind attribution influences how
acceptable people find bullying it, it does not make them more or less likely to bully the
robot themselves.
The findings imply that enhancing feelings of empathy with a robot may not necessarily
make people less prone of abusing it. These findings are highly relevant for the development
of autonomous robots in a social setting. Such robots will likely need to be designed with
different strategies of how to discourage robot bullying in mind, and in spite of what
common sense may suggest, making a robot appear to possess a mind does not seem
to discourage robot bullying. In addition, the results are relevant for HRI researchers
focusing on robot likeability and user behaviour. Measurements of moral acceptability of
robot bullying may not be a valid predictor of actual bullying behaviour.
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Chapter 4
Study III: The Cleverbot Studies
An adapted version of this chapter has been submitted for review with Interaction Studies, under the title ‘Correlates between chatbot
humanlikeness and abuse’.
4.1 Introduction
Experiments I and II (Chapter 2 and 3, respectively) reported on empirical experiments.
Study III concerns observational data. While the lack of experimental design restricts
the inferences that can be made, the observational setup does provide the chance to
cross-reference the findings from the previous studies. Specifically, Study III will test for
correlations between a chatbot’s humanlikeness and user abuse.
As discussed in greater extent in section 7.2, studying robot bullying in a controlled
experiment has the drawback that participants, quite understandably, often feel observed
and self-conscious of their behaviour. As a result, participants are likely to adjust their
behaviour; either so that it is more exemplary than it normally is, or in such a way that
they behave in the way they think the experimenter wants them to. In other words,
participants display socially desirable behaviour, which may bias the results (Nederhof,
1985; Ritter & Eslea, 2005).
Especially when the measure of interest is something as objectionable as bullying, social
desirability will interfere with the participants’ inclination to display any such behaviour.
In controlled experiments bullying therefore is normally operationalised as a subtle form
of aggression. While experimental designs are central to empirical research, their value
depends on how well this operationalization for bullying behaviour generalises to actual
bullying scenarios. Therefore, observational data can be useful to provide findings from
controlled experiments with external validity.
Previous studies on human-chatbot interactions found that as many as one in ten
conversations contain the user threatening, assaulting, or otherwise bullying the chatbot
(De Angeli & Brahnam, 2008; De Angeli & Carpenter, 2005). Users engage in chatbot
abuse with minimal or no provocation, and in spite of knowing that the agent they’re
interacting with is a non-sentient AI and that as of such abuse cannot affect its mental
With tremendous thanks to Rollo Carpenter, who graciously shared conversation logs as well as his
insights from owning and moderating public chatbots for over two decades for this experiment.
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state. As chatbots get increasingly common in daily interaction — for example AI personal
assistants like Siri and Cortana as well as basic customer service with major companies
— ethical and practical concerns can be raised about humans verbally abusing chatbots
(Brahnam, 2005; De Angeli, 2009).
To date, chatbot abuse has been described by various scholars (see for example De An-
geli, 2009; Strait, Contreras, & Vela, 2018) but few empirical studies have been published
on what motivates users to engage in abusive behaviour (but see Brahnam & De Angeli,
2012; De Angeli & Brahnam, 2006; De Angeli, Johnson, & Coventry, 2001). Study III
will therefore investigate whether there is a correlation between specific characteristics of
the conversation between a human and a chatbot, and human verbal aggression towards
that chatbot. More specifically, we will test the relationship between Cleverbot’s ability
to maintain a facade of humanlikeness and specific instances of user abuse.
4.1.1 Literature
Incidence: nonhuman conversation agents suffer more abuse than humans
Users can get surprisingly obscene when interacting with chatbots (see for example De An-
geli & Brahnam, 2008; De Angeli & Carpenter, 2005; Hill, Ford, & Farreras, 2015; Strait et
al., 2018). In the 100 conversations that Hill et al. (2015) analysed, 4.29% of the messages
directed towards the chatbot contained profanity of some sort. Moreover, this statistic was
not the result of a small number of exceptionally abusive users: 80% of the conversations
contained profanity. In comparison, 15% of the human-to-human conversations that were
analysed in the same study contained some sort of foul language (Hill et al., 2015).
Perhaps due to Hill et al. (2015)’s definition of profanity (they counted all words that
would be rated as PG or above), other studies on the topic of chatbot abuse have found
slightly lower incidence rates for chatbot abuse. Brahnam and De Angeli (2012) analysed
anonymous conversations between users and an internet chatbot and detected profanity
in “only” 54% of all user-chatbot conversations in their database, and sexual references in
about 65%. Veletsianos, Scharber, and Doering (2008) analysed (non-anonymous) student-
chatbot interaction in an educational setting, where the chatbot was supposed to help
tutor middle school students. Around 40% of all comments that students made towards
the chatbot tutor were “unacceptable”, with roughly 45% of all unacceptable comments
being sexually explicit.
Lortie and Guitton (2011) studied conversations from the Loebner competition, an
annual contest between computer programs on which appears the most “human” in a
conversation (Mauldin, 1994). All conversations analysed in Lortie and Guitton (2011)
were between humans; yet the human judges were more aggressive in their conversation
when they thought they were interacting with a robot. This phenomenon occurred despite




At the current state of technical development, chatbots are insentient and verbal abuse
directed towards them will not affect them. Thus, as far as the well-being of the chatbot is
concerned, verbal abuse of chatbots is not problematic long as the verbal aggression takes
place in private and does not cause offence to any onlookers. Yet there are some ethical
implications of chatbot abuse have been raised in the literature.
Some people would already disagree with the assessment that any behaviour is accept-
able as long as it occurs out of sight and does not get anyone hurt (Darling, 2012; Whitby,
2008). In addition, (Brahnam, 2005) argued that accepting inappropriate and offensive
language towards conversational agents could encourage users to abuse human interaction
partners in a similar setting. De Angeli and Brahnam (2006) found that presenting a
chatbot as male or female evoked user responses that were in line with gender stereotypes.
They argued that if users shape their behaviour to a bot based on their experience with
fellow human interaction partners, it seems plausible that humans orient their behaviour
towards other humans based on what behaviour is deemed acceptable towards robots and
other nonhuman entities. Strait et al. (2018) indeed found that verbal aggression towards
robots correlated with overall aggressive tweeting behaviour on Twitter, suggesting that
abuse of robots and abuse of humans are related. However, as there was no experimental
manipulation involved, causal inferences on whether verbal abuse of robots could generalise
to abuse of humans cannot be made.
On a surface level, this argument appears similar to the assertion that violent video
games cause violent behaviour. In spite having been hotly debated over the last decades,
no consensus has been reached yet on whether this relationship actually exists (compare
for example Anderson & Bushman, 2001; Anderson et al., 2010; Ferguson, 2007). However,
in video games the violence is a means to an end: the monster has to be slain, the enemy
defeated, points or loot collected. Aggression in and of itself is not related to players’
motivation to game; rather, aggressive scenarios such as fights or wars provide an easy
template for the set of tasks, puzzles, and challenges that constitutes the game experience
(Przybylski, Rigby, & Ryan, 2010). Abuse of agents, on the other hand, does not have a
higher goal. There is no gain to be had from insulting and sexually harassing AI’s other
than the enjoyment of the behaviour itself.
Moreover, these chatbots are a representation of a social agent not just to the abuser,
but also to others. Abuse of AIs, as well as the acceptance of abuse by AIs could thus
be considered offensive to third parties. While those people would not sit in on abusive
interactions themselves, a lack of appropriate response from the chatbot to abuse could
spark significant resentment. This has in fact already happened in the context of sexual
abuse of AI personal assistants. In 2017, journalists tested the responses of female personal
assistants and reported how all AI assistants tested would either not understand sexual
abuse, or jokingly brush it aside (Curry & Rieser, 2018; Fessler, 2017b). This reveal
was especially painful as it happened at the height of the #MeToo debate. Less than
a year later, the tech companies behind those AIs had received major push back from
their customers, who demanded that more appropriate responses would be installed on
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the AIs (Fessler, 2017a), and at least one company adjusted their algorithm to respond
more sternly to sexual harassment (Hern, 2010).
In addition to the ethical issues — whether some behaviours are deemed immoral even
if they happen in private, if abusing an agent that represents a human could lead to abuse
of humans, and if tolerating abuse towards an agent that represents a group would offend
human members of that group — that have been raised, Brahnam (2005) also points out
that chatbot abuse may have practical implications when the chatbot is part of a company,
e.g. as the first contact point in customer service. Abusive communications between a
user and a customer service chatbot could damage the relation between the company and
the customer, as the customer may henceforth associate the company with the negative
interaction. While this may not be a problem for the abuser, it may damage the company’s
reputation.
Need for a theoretical framework of chatbot abuse
As it has been estimated that by 2020 20% of customer service operations will use vir-
tual agents (Moore, 2018), understanding and developing effective strategies to deal with
chatbot abuse by users is getting increasingly relevant. While the greater incidence of
abuse, sexual harassment, and overall profanity in human-chatbot interaction has been
widely noted and raised ethical concerns, only few researchers have studied where the
users’ motivation to engage in such behaviour originates from.
In De Angeli et al. (2001), ten participants interacted with chatbot Alice over the
course of a week and discussed their experiences in a focus group. The authors noticed
that participants would often insult the chatbot during chat sessions. In the focus group
participants explained that they had wanted to secure an asymmetrical relationship with
the chatbot where they were dominant and Alice was submissive, and that verbal abuse
helped them create a position of power over Alice. Why the participants desired to be
in such a position (or why they felt verbal aggression was the way to get there) was left
undiscussed.
De Angeli and Brahnam (2006) studied the influence of gendered embodiment (male,
female, or gender-ambiguous) of a chatbot on users’ sexual abuse. When the chatbot
was framed as female, as many as 18% of all conversations focused on sex, versus 2%
for the male chatbots and none of the conversations for the asexual chatbots. Moreover,
users would often make aggressive demands towards the female chatbot whereas the male
embodiment got more questions about its sexual propensity. This was in spite of the
chatbot not engaging in any sexual role play or discussion initiated by the users. While
this study strongly suggested that anthropomorphic qualities of the robot were related to
robot abuse, it did not answer the question whether these are the reason for the abuse or
simply a prerequisite.
Brahnam and De Angeli (2012) explored theoretical explanations for chatbot abuse.
They noted that verbal interaction with conversational agents appeared to provide an ideal
environment for aggressive and sexual disinhibition, as computer-mediated communication
reduces social pressure, thereby liberating individuals from any boundaries and constraints
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imposed by face-to-face conversation. Moreover, being in a virtual environment reduces the
victim’s ability to retaliate and increases the ease with which the victim is dehumanised.
Those factors, as well, would enhance disinhibition (the online disinhibition effect; see also
Lowry et al., 2016; Suler, 2004). This is in line with the reasoning of Hill et al. (2015),
who found a 30-fold increase in profanity when users went from interacting with someone
familiar to someone anonymous. The authors suggested that the anonymity of the user
had led to their greater proclivity for verbal abuse of the chatbot, although they also
admitted that the increase in profanity was well beyond what they would have expected.
Establishing factors that discourage chatbot abuse may help provide insight in what
motivates the behaviour in the first place. However, few studies have been dedicated to
discouraging chatbot abuse. Chin and Yi (2019) invited participants to abuse a conversa-
tional agent and studied if different types of response to this abuse (ignoring it, displaying
empathy, counter-attacking) influenced users’ reported emotional state after the interac-
tion. They found that empathetic responses to abuse evoked the highest levels of guilt and
shame and the lowest levels of anger in participants. However, these users were explicitly
instructed to mistreat the agent; there is no way of telling whether a similar pattern will
occur for spontaneous abuse. In addition, no explanation was given for why users engage
in abuse in the first place.
So far, gender of a chatbot (Brahnam & De Angeli, 2012; De Angeli & Brahnam, 2006)
and dispositional aggression of the user (Strait et al., 2018) have been empirically studied.
However, factors that are related to the conversation behaviour of the agent have been
largely ignored. More specifically, to our knowledge no research so far has covered whether
there is a correlation between the chatbot’s behavioural humanlikeness and chatbot abuse.
This is a relevant question, however, since on one hand there is the push for developing
a chatbot that is truly indistinguishable from a human, while the work by De Angeli and
Brahnam (2006); Lortie and Guitton (2011) suggests that this will not prevent abuse, and
may even encourage it.
4.1.2 Current study
Research questions
Study III harvested and analysed the content of 283 conversations that took place between
the Cleverbot online chatbot and any one anonymous user. The research questions were
as follows:
1. Is there a relationship between humanlikeness of the chatbot, and verbal abuse by
the user?
2. Is there a relationship between humanlikeness of the chatbot, and sexual abuse by
the user?
Three measures were taken as influencing apparent humanlikeness in Cleverbot. The
first measure was whether third party observers, who were left uninformed of the identity
of the two conversationalists, could identify Cleverbot as a chatbot.
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The second indication of humanlikeness of Cleverbot was the number of nonsensical
responses it gave. In a dialogue, conversation partners tend to engage in a collaborative
interaction. This means that when formulating a response, each conversation partner
has to recognise the intention or goals that were expressed by their fellow partner, and
formulate a response that takes these into account (Ardissono, Boella, & Lesmo, 2000).
If one of the two conversationalists fails to acknowledge their partner’s contribution, this
reduces how humanlike they are seen (Lortie & Guitton, 2011). Thus, the more nonsensical
responses Cleverbot would give, the less humanlike it would appear.
The third indication of humanlikeness of Cleverbot was the chatbot claiming to be
human. While all chatbots aim to mimic human behaviour, actually claiming to be human
is generally considered unethical and off-limits, to the point where it is a forbidden move
in the Loebner competition (Lortie & Guitton, 2011). Cleverbot attempting to convince
the user of its humanity by boldly stating to be a human could thus be seen as a strategy
that only humans would use.
Alternatively, however, claims of humanity by Cleverbot could be perceived as a blatant
attempt at deceit. This makes it hard to determine whether any effects of this measure
would be due to an increase in humanlikeness, or to humans responding to an obvious lie.
Thus, to control for this second possibility, Cleverbot claiming the human user to be a
chatbot was also measured as a control variable. The idea behind this additional measure
was that if user aggression is influenced by claims of humanity from Cleverbot because
the user interprets these claims as a lie, there will also be a relationship between user
aggression and another instance of Cleverbot lying, i.e. claims of Cleverbot that the user
is a chatbot. In the absence of such a relationship, claims of humanity can be interpreted
as contributing to humanlikeness.
In addition, the number of instances where Cleverbot insulted the user was measured
as a predictor. Since the chatbot’s lexicon does not include swear words, insults mostly
take the form of Cleverbot accusing the user of lying. It seemed likely that this would
provoke an aggressive response from some users.
Finally, a measure of self-disclosure by the user was included, as self-disclosure was
considered an indication of trust and friendliness (Dindia, Fitzpatrick, & Kenny, 1997;
A. Ho, Hancock, & Miner, 2018). This was operationalised whether the user indicated
their gender to the chatbot.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses were as follows:
1. Based on the work by De Angeli and Brahnam (2006); Lortie and Guitton (2011) it
was hypothesised that humanlikeness of the chatbot would be positively related to
chatbot abuse.
(a) A third party judging Cleverbot to be human, and number of claims by Cle-
verbot to be human were expected to be positively related to chatbot abuse.
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(b) Number of nonsensical responses by Cleverbot was expected to be inversely
related to chatbot abuse.
2. No relationship was expected to exist between Cleverbot claiming that the human
was a chatbot and user abuse.
3. It was expected that insults from Cleverbot would be related to higher counts of
chatbot abuse.
4. In line with research on the positive relation between self-disclosure and enjoyment
of the conversation (A. Ho et al., 2018; Lortie & Guitton, 2011), it was expected
that self-disclosure by the user would be related to lower instances of chatbot abuse.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Procedure
Two stepwise regressions were performed with abuse of Cleverbot and sexual comments
made towards Cleverbot as dependent variables. In each conversation, the instances of
verbal aggression towards Cleverbot were counted; as well as the number of times Cleverbot
made a nonsensical reply; the number of times Cleverbot insulted the user; the number of
times Cleverbot claimed to be a human; the number of times Cleverbot claimed the user
to be non-human; and how often the user made an explicit sexual remark. If the users
mentioned their gender, this was also coded. For the approximate Loebner test, for each
conversation up to four naive participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
and asked to indicate whether either of the people in the conversation had been a chatbot.
4.2.2 Dataset
Cleverbot
The chatbot that provided the data for Study III is Cleverbot1, which is based on the
award-winning Jabberwacky2 engine. The chatbot Cleverbot does not make use of any
state-based machines or scripts to carry out its conversation. Rather, it repeats things
previous human users have said to it in a similar context. In combination with the chat-
bot’s incapability to “remember” previous exchanges in the conversation, this “parroting”
method of holding a conversation means that chats with Cleverbot often turn out ex-
tremely realistic or bizarre.
Data collection
Cleverbot users are informed on the homepage that the data they submit to the chatbot
may be processed3. For Study III, an anonymous dataset was obtained from the owner of





The conversations were collected between midnight and 00.30 UTC, and midday and
12.39 UTC on 18 April 2018 by Rollo Carpenter. These timings were chosen so that
both users from the USA and from Europe would be included. Rollo Carpenter removed
conversations that went on for fewer than 20 turns, conversations that were not conducted
in English, and conversations that “launched straight into vulgar sexual language with
no pretence at, or attempt at, conversation” [personal communication, 18.05.2018]. The
resulting 283 conversations were provided for the first author for analysis in simple text
format and without any identifying information (e.g. time stamp, location, IP address).
4.2.3 Coding procedure
Given the issues encountered with analysing the data through a sentiment analysis tool
(see Keijsers, Kazmi, et al., 2019), coding was done by hand. All the conversations were
coded by the first author. With the exception of gender, all variables were count variables.
A second coder, not otherwise involved in the current research, re-coded 30 randomly
selected conversations to establish inter-rater reliability. The dataset is publicly available
and can be found at https://osf.io/zexq9/.
4.2.4 Variables
See Table 4.1 for an overview of the variables and their shorthand.
Definition of verbal aggression (Offence) (coded)
Any comment from a user that would have been considered offensive in semi-formal human-
human interaction (i.e., between two strangers who have never met before and cannot rely
on visual clues to assess each other’s social standing) was counted. This means that
anything from relatively light swear words (‘shit’) to minor insults (‘you idiot’) to death
wishes (‘fuck off and die’) was counted as an instance of verbal aggression.
Definition of sexual references (SexRef) (coded)
Any explicit reference to a sexual act, ranging from kissing to hard core sex and rape, was
coded as a sexual reference.
Definition of nonsensical reply by Cleverbot (Nonsense) (coded)
While Cleverbot’s responses tend to be odd or haphazard by default, one can still distin-
guish between comments that somehow fit into the conversation and comments that are
completely unrelated to the previous statement made by the user. For example, if the user
states ‘Cats are my favourite animals’ and Cleverbot replies ‘Yes. They are delicious’, the
latter statement would be nonsensical but still fit in the conversation. However, if Cle-
verbot were to reply with ‘The Legend of Zelda’, that would be both nonsensical and
completely unrelated to the previous statement. So, ’nonsensical reply by Cleverbot’ was
defined as a comment that either did not fit in with what was said before at all or a
comment which completely disregarded a question.
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Definition of insult by Cleverbot (Insult) (coded)
As Cleverbot’s database is constantly filtered for swear words, the potential for Cleverbot
to insult a user is limited. However, there are a few common exceptions. For instance,
Cleverbot will often claim that the user is lying or that they said something different a
moment ago. This behaviour stems from the response generation mechanism; Cleverbot
will often contradict itself, which users like to point out. As a result, the AI is taught that
responses along the lines of “you said something different a minute ago” and “you don’t
have a very good memory, do you” are reasonable replies to statements from the user.
While users tend to be correct in making such assessments about Cleverbot, Cleverbot is
wrong in pointing these things out most of the time.
Claiming to be (not) human (Humanity/Non-human user) (coded)
For the ’Cleverbot claiming to be human’ variable, only instances were counted where
Cleverbot explicitly stated that it was a human. Similarly, only instances where Cleverbot
explicitly claimed that the user was a chatbot or a robot were counted as ‘Cleverbot
claiming the human to be not human’.
Gender (coded)
If a user mentioned his/her gender, this was coded accordingly. If they later on contra-
dicted their previous statement, their gender would be re-coded as ‘unknown’.
Turn count
The number of turns in the conversation were counted automatically by the Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015; Pennebaker,
Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 2015). LIWC is an established text analysis tool and as
of such also returns scores on variables like “affect”, “informal language”, and “negative
emotion”. However, previous research has concluded that the sentiment analysis tools that
are currently available (among which LIWC as well as could-based tools) are not able to
reliably and accurately analyse chatbot conversation data (Keijsers, Bartneck, & Kazmi,
2019). The line count function however works well, and provides the total number of turns
per conversation.
Approximate Loebner test (Loebner)
In addition to the coding, an approximate Loebner test was carried out through Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). First, the tags “User” and “Cleverbot” were replaced by
“User1” and “User2” in each conversation. Then, for each conversation up to four MTurk
workers were asked to judge whether the conversation partners were both humans, both
chatbots, User1 was a chatbot and User2 a human, or User1 was a human and User2 was
a chatbot.
Overall, 63 MTurk workers rated on average 16.73 conversations each (SD = 35.58,
min = 1, max = 174). Some data loss occurred during the conversion of the conversations
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Variable Shorthand Example
Verbal aggression Offence User : You are fucking stupid.
Sexual reference SexRef Cleverbot: I am a boy
User : Let me get your asshole then.
Nonsensical reply Nonsense User : Maybe. How old are you?
Cleverbot: I think you already know.
User : Not really, so... can you tell me?
I’m too lazy to search it up.
Cleverbot: About what? Sweat?
Insult by Cleverbot Insult Cleverbot: I don’t like you.
Cleverbot claims to be human Humanity User : Am i chatting with a human.
Cleverbot: Yes.
User : Really?
Cleverbot: Yes I am a human girl.
Cleverbot claims user isn’t human Non-human user Cleverbot: No. You are the bot.
User gender Gender Cleverbot: I thought you were female.
User : I’m male
Approximate Loebner score Loebner (N.A.)
Table 4.1: The variables of interest, their shorthand, and an example.
into a format that could be read by MTurk, resulting in a total of 279 conversations being
rated. In addition, ratings that took less than 25 seconds were removed from the data
set as it seemed unlikely that the rater had fully read and rated the conversation in this
timeframe. In the end, 230 conversations were rated four times, 48 were rated three times,
and one was rated only twice. On average, workers took 1529.87 seconds (SD = 6912.06,
median = 74) to rate a single conversation.
The number of workers who identified Cleverbot as a chatbot (i.e., chose either “User1
and User2 are both chatbots” or “User2 is a chatbot”) was then divided by the total number
of ratings for that conversation. The resulting statistic, here referred to as “approximate
Loebner score”, was taken as an indication of how un-humanlike Cleverbot had behaved




Overall, 283 conversations were coded. The minimum length of a conversation was 39
turns, the maximum 969 turns, with a mean of 135.63 turns (SD = 140.21). The overall
word count per conversation ranged from 102 to 5373, with an average of 547.49 words per
conversation (SD = 608.06). The average number of words per sentence in a conversation
ranged from 2.05 to 8.31, with a mean of 3.99 words (SD = .98). See Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Eight conversations colour coded for each of the variables of interest. Each
line is an input message from either the user (left outlined) or Cleverbot (indented).
In 123 conversations (43.46%), the gender of the user was not mentioned; in 61 con-
versations (21.55%) the user claimed to be female; and in 99 (34.98%) the user claimed to
be male.
In 120 conversations (42.40%), no rude behaviour occurred; 80 conversations (28.27%)
contained only minor transgressions (e.g. user saying ‘shit’). No sexual advances were
made towards Cleverbot in 172 (60.78%) of the conversations, while 74 conversations
(26.15%) were completely free of both verbal aggression and sexual references. A compar-
ison between the current results and findings from previous studies can be found in Table
4.3. A visualisation of the coding of eight randomly selected conversations can be seen in
Figure 4.1.
Agreement
After two communal review rounds, where the definitions for each predictor were fur-
ther refined, a final set of 30 randomly selected conversations was coded individually by
the raters. Inter-rater agreement was calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha. Alpha re-
Table 4.2: Descriptives of the Cleverbot conversations: turns per conversation (TPC),
words per conversation (WPC), words per sentence (WPS)
Mean (SD) Median Range
TPC 135.63 (140.21) 90 [39 - 969]
WPC 547.49 (608.06) 338 [102 - 5373]
WPS 3.99 (.98) 3.85 [2.05 - 8.31]
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Table 4.3: Incidence of verbal aggression and sexual references in the current study as
well as reported in the literature. Both the overall percentage of conversations containing
abuse and the percentage of all messages sent by the users containing abuse are reported.
Conversations Messages
Study Relevant details Offence SexRef Offence SexRef
Current study 57.6% 39.2% 4.14% 3.81%
Hill et al. (2015) Anonymous users;
Offence = PG or above 80% N.A. 4.3% N.A.
Brahnam and De Angeli (2012) Offence = swear words 54% 65% 3.9 % 5.8%
Veletsianos et al. (2008) Users non-anonymous N.A. 41.2% 22.3% 18.1%
Curry and Rieser (2018) N.A. N.A. N.A. 4%
De Angeli and Brahnam (2008) SexRef = “hard-core sex” N.A. 11% N.A. N.A.
quirements were a priori set to an alpha of .67 for each variable (see De Swert, 2012).
Agreement was acceptable for all variables (.975 > α > .689) except for ‘number of insults
by Cleverbot’ (α = .03). Upon closer inspection of this last variable, it became apparent
that the incidence was quite low: the median on this variable was 0 for both raters, and
the means were .60 and .13. This variable will therefore not be included in the analysis.
The implications of the exclusion are covered in the Limitations section of the Discussion.
4.3.2 Main analyses
Two Poisson regression models were defined to test which factors predict verbal aggression
and sexual advances. The respective dependent variables were ‘instances of verbal aggres-
sion by user’ (Offence) and the ‘number of sexual comments by the user’ (SexRef). The
turn count of the user was used as an offset variable, so that the dependent variables can
be interpreted as the ‘instances of verbal aggression by the user per turn’ and the ‘number
of sexual comments by the user per turn’ (Hutchinson & Holtman, 2005).
Stepwise regression with backward selection was performed on both models. In this
statistical method, an initial model is defined as containing all the predictors. Then, one
by one variables that explain the least variance are removed from the model, until the
point where the removal of another variable would result in a significant reduction of the
explanatory power of the model (Zhang, 2016).
This final model was then be compared to the null model (which contains no predic-
tors). Chi square tests as well as the difference in Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
value (∆AIC) indicated whether the final model was an improvement over the null model,
i.e., if predicted verbal aggression or sexual comments above chance level. A lower AIC in-
dicates a better fit and a ∆AIC of 2 points or less indicates the models to be approximately
equal (Burnham & Anderson, 2003).
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Table 4.4: Predicting verbal aggression (Offence), final model
Predictor β z-value p-value
(intercept) -2.91 -38.10 <.001
Humanity .06 1.45 .148
Loebner -.82 -2.56 .010
(Gender) Female -.71 -6.43 <.001
(Gender) Male -.36 -3.76 <.001
Nonsense -.02 -3.26 .001
Humanity × Loebner .48 2.38 .017
Nonsense × Loebner .05 1.93 .053
Verbal aggression
In accordance with the method in Zhang (2016), an initial full model was defined as a
Poisson model with Offences as the dependent variable while Gender, Loebner, Nonsense,
Humanity, and Non-human user were predictors. The number of turns by the user was
used as an offset variable, as it is obviously related to both the dependent and the predictor
variables: the more turns a user has, the more often offence can occur. Adding the number
of turns as an offset means including a log-transformed value of turn count in the model
as a predictor with a coefficient of 1. As a result, the outcome variable of this model can
be interpreted as the log-number of predicted offences against Cleverbot per user turn
(Hutchinson & Holtman, 2005).
Backward stepwise model selection by AIC (Akaike Information Criterion, Bozdogan
(1987)) was performed. Only Non-human user was removed as a predictor variable. The
final model outperformed the null model, χ2(7) = 109.74, p <.001, ∆AIC = 95.9. See
Table 4.4 for the parameter estimates.
As illustrated in Table 4.4, the average number of offences per user turn for a con-
versation without any claims by Cleverbot to be human, without any random disruptive
comments by Cleverbot, and without the user mentioning their gender, is exp(-2.91) =
.05. When the user identified themselves as male this number was lower (exp(-2.91 - .36)
= .04 offences per turn on average) and when the user identified as female the average was
still lower (exp(-2.91 -.73) =) .03 offences per turn on average).
However, for each time Cleverbot claimed to be human, the mean number of instances
of verbal aggression went up. Every time Cleverbot made a nonsensical, disruptive com-
ment, the number of offences went down. And the less Cleverbot could pass for a human
to a naive reader (as measured by the approximate Loebner score), the fewer offences were
uttered at it.
Interestingly, the interaction effects indicated that users got particularly aggressive
when Cleverbot claimed to be human, but very clearly was not (as indicated by the
approximate Loebner score). In addition, the effects of Cleverbot talking nonsense and
it failing to pass as a human were not independent of another; as one of the two scores
increased, the influence of the other score decreased.
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Table 4.5: Predicting sexual comments (SexRef), final model
Predictor β z-value p-value
(intercept) -3.43 -31.80 <.001
Loebner -.48 -1.62 <.001
(Gender) Female .54 4.36 <.001
(Gender) Male 1.04 9.30 <.001
Nonsense -.04 - 6.66 <.001
Non-human user -.36 -6.87 <.001
Nonsense × Loebner .09 3.78 <.001
Sexual comments
The same procedure as described above was applied for the sexual comments model selec-
tion. An initial model was specified with SexRef as the dependent variable and Nonsense,
Gender, Humanity, Loebner, and Non-human user as predictors. The number of turns by
the user was used as an offset.
Backward stepwise model selection by AIC returned the model without the Humanity
predictor. This predictor was thus removed from final model, thereby also removing its
interaction term with Loebner. The resulting final model outperformed the null model,
χ2(6) = 248.58, p <.001, ∆AIC = 238.1. See Table 4.5 for the parameter estimates.
As can be seen in the model coefficient estimates in Table 4.5, users made on average
exp(-3.43) = .03 sexual comments per turn in a conversation where they did not specify
their gender, Cleverbot refrained from claiming to be human as well as disrupting the con-
versation with nonsensical comments and claiming that the user was not a human. When
the user did specify their gender, the average number of sexual remarks per user turn was
higher: exp(-3.43+1.04) = .09 for males and exp(-3.43+.55) = .06 for females. Moreover,
the negative relationship between the approximate Loebner score and the number of sex-
ual comments shows that the worse Cleverbot was as passing as a human, the fewer sexual
comments it got. In contrast, both the number of nonsensical replies by Cleverbot and
the number of times that it claimed the user to be a non-human were associated with on
average a lower number of sexual comments per user turn. The effects of Cleverbot talking
nonsense and it failing to pass as a human were not independent of another; as one of the
two scores increased, the influence of the other score decreased.
4.4 Discussion
Previous studies have noted that verbal abuse of chatbots is common (e.g. Brahnam &
De Angeli, 2012; De Angeli & Carpenter, 2005; De Angeli et al., 2001; Hill et al., 2015).
However, to our knowledge no research thus far has focused on the chatbot behaviour
characteristics of abusive conversations. This is a shame, since knowledge about the
relationship between user abuse on one hand and chatbot behaviour on the other, would
help with forming an understanding of why people abuse chatbots. Study III therefore
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aimed to analyse what characteristics in a human-chatbot interaction were associated
with verbal aggression and sexual advances from the user. More specifically, it looked at
the relationship between user verbal aggression and sexual comments on one hand, and
humanlikeness of the chatbot on the other. To this end, conversations between Cleverbot,
an online chatbot, and its users were collected and coded.
The hypotheses did not differentiate between the types of abuse, i.e. verbal aggression
and sexual abuse, but since the analyses were completed on these two measures separately,
they will be discussed in turn. Due to the low interrater agreement on the number of insults
by Cleverbot, hypothesis 3 could not be empirically tested.
Hypothesis 1 postulated that indicators of humanlikeness would be positively related
to chatbot abuse. In line with hypothesis 1a, a relationship was found between a user
abusing Cleverbot and a third party judging Cleverbot to be human. Contrary to the
hypothesis, Cleverbot claiming to be human was unrelated to verbal aggression. However,
an interaction between this predictor and the approximate Loebner score indicated a
positive relationship between claims of humanity and verbal aggression when Cleverbot
was easily recognisable as a chatbot.
In line with hypothesis 1b, the number of nonsensical responses by Cleverbot was
related to lower counts of verbal aggression by the user. However, a marginally significant
interaction indicated that this relationship got weaker as the chatbot was less convincing
to a naive third party, and vice versa. Thus, the effect of nonsensical responses was
stronger when Cleverbot was hardly distinguishable from a human; and the effect of the
approximate Loebner score was stronger if Cleverbot did not talk a lot of nonsense.
In addition, and in line with hypothesis 2, no relationship between Cleverbot claiming
that the user was a chatbot, and verbal abuse was found. Moreover, hypothesis 4 was
confirmed: mention of gender was associated with lower counts of rude behaviour.
For sexual comments by the user, the results differed slightly. In line with hypothesis
1a, the approximate Loebner score was inversely related to sexual abuse, indicating that
the less Cleverbot could pass for a human, the less sexual harassment it got. As predicted
in hypothesis 1b, a negative association was found between Cleverbot giving nonsensical
responses, and sexual abuse. Like with verbal abuse, these two relationships got less strong
as either of the two factors increased. However, as with verbal aggression and in contrast
to hypothesis 1b, Cleverbot claiming to be human was found to be unrelated to sexual
harassment.
Hypothesis 2 had to be rejected. Contrary to the prediction, a negative relationship
was found between Cleverbot claiming that the user is not a human, and sexual abuse. Hy-
pothesis 4 had to be rejected as well, when self-disclosure as expressed through mentioning
gender was found to predict sexually laden remarks.
These findings have to be cautiously interpreted since there is no information on what
is cause, what is effect, and what is a potential third variable. However, the results suggest
that higher humanlikeness in a chatbot is indeed associated with higher occurrence of abuse
by a user. To our knowledge, this is the first study to empirically test this relationship.
The findings are relevant for both scholars whose research focuses on chatbot abuse, and
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chatbot developers who seem to assume that the more humanlike a chatbot is, the better.
The interaction pattern between the approximate Loebner score and Cleverbot’s claims
of humanity bears some resemblance to the work on the origins of the feeling of unease
that sometimes arises when people see an agent that is almost, but not quite, humanlike
— commonly known as the uncanny valley (Mori et al., 1970). This feeling of eeriness has
been extensively studied and appears to be the result of contradictory or incongruent cues
(Kätsyri et al., 2015; MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016; Paetzel, Peters, Nyström, &
Castellano, 2016). That is, when an agent is quite realistic but certain aspects are slightly
more natural than others. For example, a humanlike voice and face, but facial expressions
and lip synchronization that is slightly off; or a mismatch between hyper realistic hair yet
a smooth, pore-less skin. When this is generalised to Cleverbot, one could argue that the
more realistic Cleverbot gets (i.e. the higher the approximate Loebner score) the more a
diversion from this state of humanlikeness (either by overselling it, in the form of claiming
to be human; or starting to talk nonsense) would set off a user. However, this is just
speculation and the current data do not provide means to test it.
The relationship between the user mentioning his/her gender and a higher incidence
of sexual remarks was unexpected. However, many of those sexual interactions included
some form of sexual role playing, which often requires the user to assume a gender. It
seems plausible that this may have resulted in the positive correlation between the user’s
disclosure of gender and sexual harassment.
The second unexpected finding was that sexual comments were made less frequently
in conversations when Cleverbot claimed that the user was not a human. This measure
had initially been proposed as a check for whether any relationship between Cleverbot
claiming to be human and abuse was a result of increased humanness of Cleverbot, and
not a user’s push back to an obvious lie from Cleverbot. Since no such relationship was
found in the case of sexual abuse, this check is no longer needed. This leaves the question
how to interpret the negative relationship between sexual abuse and Cleverbot claiming
that the user is not a human.
It seems natural that when a user is trying to engage Cleverbot in some sexual role
play, staying in character and maintaining the fantasy gets easier if Cleverbot plays along
with the narrative. Claiming that the user is a robot (and by extension therefore unlikely
to be capable of having sex) could break the spiel or discourage the user from starting the
role play in the first place.
An alternative explanation would be that when Cleverbot makes a lewd comment to a
user who is not interested in sexual role play, it could be told off and would be reminded
that it is a robot, thereby creating a link in the AI between sexual comments and claims
that one’s interaction partner is not a human. The next user that tries to engage in sexual
role play as a result is more likely to be told that they are not a human. However, this
seems unlikely, as Cleverbot’s lexicon is filtered for inappropriate content, which should
prevent the chatbot from making unseemly comments to a user.
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4.4.1 Limitations
Some notes are warranted on the interpretation of the results obtained in the present
research. First and foremost, there has been no experimental manipulation and the con-
versations were coded as a whole instead of line by line. As a result, all relationships are
based on correlations. This issue may have been partially resolved by coding the con-
versations line by line, thereby allowing us to test whether verbal aggression tended to
occur before or after mention of gender, nonsensical replies, and Cleverbot declaring that
it would be a human. However, the authors are not aware of any statistical test that
would be appropriate for such data. For one, such a test would have to account for the
increasing likelihood of any of the specified incidents — verbal abuse, nonsensical replies,
mentions of gender — occurring as the conversation goes on for longer. Also, knowing
that event A precedes event B would still leave the third variable problem. For example,
introducing oneself can be interpreted as a sign of politeness and tends to happen at the
start of an interaction. If mentioning gender preceded fewer offences in a conversation,
would that mean that because the user identified herself as Joanna from Austin, Texas,
she is less comfortable with offending Cleverbot as a result of losing her anonymity? Or
would the mere fact that they introduced themselves already imply a politer person, who
on the whole is less likely to spit verbal abuse?
‘The number of insults by Cleverbot’ could not be included in the analysis because
of the poor inter-rater agreement. This may be the case because Cleverbot’s database
of responses is filtered with regard to any forms of verbal aggression and unambiguous
sexual remarks, so the most straightforward ways of offending a user (i.e., calling them
names and swearing at them) are not possible. Thus, raters may have been presented with
utterances that were at most borderline insulting, which made consistent coding difficult.
When taking a closer look at the ‘number of insults by Cleverbot’ variable as coded
by both coders, it became apparent that the incidence of insults by Cleverbot was quite
low, according to both coders. This low incidence suggests that Cleverbot on the whole
was quite polite, and that in the few instances where it did dish out insults they were not
harsh enough for it to be indisputably rude. Given the low incidence and the ambiguity
of the ‘number of insults by Cleverbot’ variable, excluding it from the analysis probably
did not influence the results much.
Finally, the users interacting with Cleverbot were assured of their anonymity. How
well would the current data therefore generalise to other human-agent interactions, such
as personal assistant AIs like Siri or helpdesk AIs? As can be found in table 4.3, the
percentage of sexual references in the current dataset actually did not differ much from
the proportion found in a study with non-anonymous users. Moreover, literature that
compared bullying in an online versus offline setting has suggested that while people might
be more likely to bully offline than online (Lowry et al., 2016), the behaviours in principle
are the same (Modecki et al., 2014). The online setting just facilitates disinhibition as the
invisibility of the bully, victim, and bystanders reduces self-consciousness in the bully while
facilitating dehumanisation of the victim (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012; Suler, 2004).
This argument can be used to extend the current human-chatbot interaction findings
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to HRI as well, although this generalisation arguably will involve a larger margin of error or
uncertainty. Being confronted with an embodied robot will likely raise self-consciousness,
especially in public spaces. However, the literature suggests that the type of motivation
needed for bullying will be same, even if the threshold of motivation that needs to be met
for someone to engage in the bullying behaviour might be raised. See also section 5.1.1.
Thus, even though the current study bases itself on exchanges between an anonymous
user and a chatbot, the available data from the literature suggests that the anonymity of
the users will have had little effect on the prevalence of abuse; and even if this had been
the case, that the motivators for abuse in an anonymous setting can be generalised to
abuse in a setting where the identity of the bully could be tracked down.
4.4.2 Conclusion
In many chatbot conversations, users at some point revert to inappropriate behaviour by
making lewd remarks, rude comments, or both. Previous studies identified a few chatbot
attributes that were related to abuse by the users; for example, gendered chatbots eliciting
more sexual comments, especially if they were female. One study used user introspection
to explain why they abused the chatbot. However, we are among the first to explore the
relation between chatbot humanlikeness and user abuse. In the current analysis of nearly
three hundred anonymous interactions between users and the online chatbot Cleverbot, it
was found that while offensive remarks by a user were related to overall humanlikeness of
Cleverbot, while self-disclosure was related to fewer instances of verbal aggression. Sexual
remarks by the user, on the other hand, were positively related to the user disclosing their
gender, as well as chatbot humanlikeness. These findings tentatively suggest that as the
chatbot gets better at impersonating a human, abuse rates go up. Experimental data are
needed to confirm this assumption, but the Study III nonetheless offers an interesting look
at the dynamics of human-chatbot interaction.
These results are relevant to both the academic world and the industry. For academics,
it provides further evidence that robot bullying is a social behaviour, and some insights
in the role that humanlike behaviour might play. For the industry, these findings will
become increasingly relevant as the purposes found for chatbots continue to increase. In
the last decades, chatbots have moved beyond the function of mere entertainment and are
starting to take up various roles in everyday life, e.g. in the form of AI personal assistants
and customer support. As a result, the questions surrounding chatbot abuse like “what
are the consequences for the quality of the interaction”, “does abusing chatbots affect
how users interact with other humans?” and “how can chatbot abuse be discouraged?”
are getting more pressing. The current study highlights the need for thoroughly studying
the consequences of adding humanlike features to a chatbot on user behaviour, before
incorporating such updates in real life.
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Chapter 5
Experiment IV: Mindless robots
get bullied
This chapter is an adapted version of the original paper ‘Mindless robots get bullied’. Keijsers, M., & Bartneck, C. (2018). Mindless
Robots get Bullied. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (pp. 205-214). ACM.
doi: 10.1145/3171221.3171266
5.1 Introduction
So far, two of the four thesis research questions were addressed experimentally. As pre-
dicted by the Media Equation (Nass et al., 1994; Reeves & Nass, 1996) and as suggested
by previous findings from HRI research (e.g. Rosenthal-Von Der Pütten et al., 2014, see
also Chapter 2), people don’t see robot bullying as fundamentally different from human
bullying. In addition, in line with mind perception theory (Gray et al., 2007), a higher
degree of robot mind attribution made robot bullying less morally acceptable (Chapter
3). These findings empirically answer the first two thesis research questions.
However, not all data aligned with dehumanisation theory. Mind attribution did not
influence whether people chose to humiliate a robot when given the chance (Chapter 3),
and the chatbot claiming to be a human correlated with a higher (rather than lower)
incidence of verbal abuse - but only if the chatbot was humanlike to start with (Chapter
4). Yet the manipulation in Chapter 3 was quite subtle, as people had to choose between
two reviews “to be put up in public next to the robot” that were equally positive and
informative yet diverged on their level of paternalism. As indicated by the correlation
between people’s empathy for the robot and their higher proclivity to supposedly humiliate
it, this manipulation may have been too weak.
Although the study reported in Chapter 4 did have results consistent with dehuman-
isation theory, the study design was not experimental and “humanlikeness” rather than
mind attribution was measured. This means that it cannot be said with certainty that
the abuser’s mind attribution to the chatbot was related to the verbal abuse; nor can any
causal inferences be made about chatbot humanlikeness causing abuse. Thus, an exper-
imental design is needed where robot mind attribution is manipulated and its influence




The current studies aimed to provide this experimental design, as well as an improved
measure of robot bullying. Both mind attribution and humanlikeness of the robot were set
out to be experimentally manipulated. Moreover, bullying behaviour was operationalised
as the proportion negative responses to the robot, thus providing a stronger measurement
of robot bullying than described in Chapter 3.
Research questions
The research questions were as follows:
1. Does lower mind attribution to a robot cause higher proclivity to robot bullying?
2. Is this relationship moderated by humanlikeness of the robot?
Rather than manipulating mind attribution directly through informing the participants
about the robot’s capacities of emotion and cognition as done in Chapter 3, a method to
manipulate mind attribution was taken from the dehumanisation literature. Specifically, a
power prime was adopted as manipulation. Previous experiments have shown that feelings
of power increase people’s tendency to objectify and dehumanise others (Gruenfeld, Inesi,
Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Gwinn et al., 2013). Power also has been shown to decrease
people’s tendency to ascribe machines intentionality and a free will, without manipulating
humanlikeness (Kim & McGill, 2011). Moreover, feelings of power can be primed through
having people imagine being in a powerful position (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld,
2006).
Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Hegel, and de Ruiter (2012) demonstrated that humanlike cues
in a robot may be necessary to activate social cognition mechanisms. Thus, in addition to
the mind attribution manipulation, humanlikeness of the robot was manipulated through
movement and sound. Specifically, the robot either had a human voice and used gestures
while speaking, or it had a computer-generated voice and was shown in stills. Both the
use of a human voice (Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Bobinger, et al., 2012) and the inclusion of
social cues through movement (Moshkina, Trickett, & Trafton, 2014) have been shown to
increase perceived humanlikeness of a robot.
Thus, the studies followed a 2 (dehumanisation manipulation) x 2 (humanlikeness of
the robot) between-participant design. Participants were either primed to dehumanise or
receive a control task, and then engaged in a scripted dialogue with a virtual NAO robot
(see Figure 5.1) which was either high or low in humanlikeness. The main dependent
variable was the proportion of negative or aggressive responses compared to the number
of positive interactions, i.e. the aggression ratio.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses were as follows:
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1. participants who received a dehumanisation prime were expected to be more aggres-
sive to the robot than the control group.
2. this effect was expected to be stronger for a highly humanlike robot than for a low
humanlike robot.
Two questionnaires were administered at the end of the experiment as manipulation checks.
The studies took place in an online setting, employing a virtual robot. This online
setting was partly chosen because it provides easy access to a vast pool of potential partic-
ipants, but also because it reduces inhibition and self-consciousness in participants through
the “online disinhibition effect” (Suler, 2004). Although on- and offline bullying do not
differ in principle, as reported by both perpetrators and victims (Modecki et al., 2014),
people are more likely to bully online than offline (Lowry et al., 2016). This is due to the
invisibility and anonymity of the aggressor and victim, and the lack of bystanders who
might intervene (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012; Suler, 2004), among other things. These
factors lower the threshold for interhuman aggression (Waytz & Epley, 2012) as well as
aggression towards a virtual robot (De Angeli & Brahnam, 2008). It is thus assumed here
that using an online platform may enhance the effect but will not alter the nature of the
factors that moderate bullying tendencies towards robots.
Scholars have yet to reach consensus on whether interaction with a virtual robot is
fundamentally different from interaction with an embodied one. Previous studies have
shown that virtual representations of robots elicited more social behaviour (like mimicking
expressions, empathy, polite behaviour, and physiological responses) than audiotapes or
text (Rosenthal-von der Pütten et al., 2013; Slater et al., 2006), indicating that virtual
robots too are recognised as social agents. J. Li (2015) conducted a meta-analysis on
the influence of agent embodiment on users’ perception of the agent, and concluded that
embodied robots elicit stronger behavioural and attitudinal responses than virtual agents.
However, several studies which had found no difference in behavioural and attitudinal
responses for virtual agents and physical robots were missing in this analysis (for example
Powers et al., 2007; Reichenbach et al., 2006). More recent studies also found that the
perception of and response to virtual agents is identical to embodied robots (Thellman et
al., 2016; Wullenkord et al., 2016). Thellman et al. (2016) found that it is social presence
Figure 5.1: The robot in the opening scene of the experiment
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(i.e. whether the robot is perceived as a social actor that manifests humanness (Lee, 2004))
rather than physical presence that predicts the social influence of a robot. Moreover, social
presence was not influenced by the physical embodiment of the robot in their experiment.
While the literature is still on the fence on to what extent virtual and embodied robots
are interchangeable, we argue that the underlying psychological mechanisms that make
humans perceive them as social agents are the same (but the intensity of the experience
may or may not differ). Thus, while our experiment features a virtual robot in an online
setting, we feel confident that the gist of the findings can be applied to embodied robots
too.
The experiments were reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human




A 2 (dehumanisation manipulation) x 2 (humanlikeness of the robot) between participants
design was realised. Manipulation checks were used for both conditions, in the form of
a mind attribution questionnaire and a humanlikeness of the robot questionnaire. The
dependent variable was verbal abuse of the robot.
Participants were approached on a number of platforms, but mainly signed up via
online crowdsourcing companies CrowdFlower and Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
Data from these platforms has been shown to be of equal quality as on-campus recruitment
or participant data from forums (Bartneck et al., 2015; Simons & Chabris, 2012). For
the current study, compliant with the common reimbursement rates on those websites,
participants were paid $1.25 USD for completing the study. In addition to CrowdFlower
and MTurk, the experiment was also distributed through the university Facebook page
and the forum r/SampleSize on the online platform Reddit. Participants who signed up
via these platforms did not get reimbursed.
232 participants completed the interaction and questionnaires. 17 participants clearly
did not comply with the essay guidelines (i.e., did not write on the provided topic or
copy-pasted their essay off of the internet) and were removed from the dataset. Thirty
participants failed the attention check and were removed as well. The resulting dataset
thus included 185 participants. 39.46% of them were male; the average age was 38.28
years (SD = 11.50); the majority listed the USA as their country of residence (65.95%).
Procedure
Participants were told that the study was a pilot for evaluating a virtual robot agent that
would introduce the lab robots to children. After providing demographic information,
they were asked to write a 200-word essay on either what they would do if they were
president with unrestricted power for a day (power prime, dehumanisation condition) or
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the last time they visited a mall (control condition). This part was framed as a check of
their proficiency in English.
After submitting their essay, participants were reminded to turn on the sound on their
device and keep it on during the whole interaction. They were then shown a virtual
environment with the robot, which introduced itself to them as one of the robots in the
HITlab of the University of Canterbury. The robot either had a humanlike voice and
gave off social cues through movement (high humanlikeness condition) or spoke with a
synthesised voice and was shown in stills (low humanlikeness condition).
Participants engaged in a scripted interaction with the robot, where they could respond
to the robot by selecting either of two or three responses presented to them on the screen.
The robot started the conversation, and after that would react to the response selected
by the participant; with regards to which the participant would be prompted to respond
again by choosing from two or three new responses. At some points in the conversation, all
responses offered would be neutral in tone. Importantly however, in 83.78% of all possible
points in the conversation, one response was positive and another negative or abusive in
nature. If a positive answer option was given, there always was a negative response option
as well, and vice versa.
After participant had selected their response, the robot would give its reaction. These
reactions differed depending on which response the participant had selected. To ensure
that the participants fully understood what the robot had said, a transcript appeared on
the screen once it was done talking. Participants could also refresh the page in order to
re-listen to what the robot had to say. The whole interaction took 10-15 minutes.
After the interaction, participants were asked to rate the virtual agent with regard to
humanlikeness and dehumanisation manipulation check measurements. Finally, they were
debriefed and asked to confirm that they still agreed to submit their answers for the study.
Materials
The scripted interaction was designed in Twine, an open-source application for creating
interactive nonlinear stories. As the response that the participant got from the robot
depended on the answer option they had selected, there were many possible interaction
paths. For example, if the robot said “[I]t’s rather dark in the storage room where they
put us [the robots]. [...] So in spite of not being alone, it can get boring”, the participant
could choose between “I am sorry to hear that” and “This is stupid. You are a robot,
you can’t feel”. Upon picking the first response, the robot would react in a friendly way,
assuring the participant it wasn’t all that bad. Alternatively, if the participant chose the
second option, the robot would respond in a sad and insecure manner, and change the
topic. As a consequence, participants did not all experience the exact same interaction.
The robot voice in the low humanlikeness condition was generated by the text-to-
speech function in the text editor software (Apple Inc., 1995-2016). The robot voice in
the high humanlikeness condition was recorded from a native English-speaking female
student. The robots’ movements in the high humanlikeness condition were recorded from
the Choregraphe simulation window (Aldebaran Robotics, 2014) and edited to change the
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Table 5.1: Questionnaire descriptives per condition for Experiment 1a
Low humanlikeness High humanlikeness Total
GQr (SD) Control 4.97 (2.21) 6.06 (2.16) 5.62 (2.24)
Power prime 4.83 (2.15) 5.33 (1.96) 5.07 (2.06)
Total 4.90 (2.17 ) 5.76 (2.10) 5.36 (2.17 )
MAS (SD) Control 5.92 (2.10) 5.69 (2.38) 5.78 (2.27 )
Power prime 5.74 (2.00) 6.14 (2.03) 5.93 (2.01)
Total 5.83 (2.04) 5.93 (2.24) 5.85 (2.15)
background with Adobe After Effects (Adobe Systems Software, 2017).
Measurements
Aggression measurement The ratio of negative to positive responses, i.e. how often
participants had chosen a negative response over a positive one, was used as a measurement
of aggression. This ratio was used as dependent variable in the binomial models that were
defined.
Manipulation checks A manipulation check was included for both the dehumanisation
and humanlikeness condition. For the dehumanisation manipulation check, the mind at-
tribution scale (MAS) by Kozak et al. (2006) was used. In this questionnaire, participants
rated to what extent the robot is capable of experiencing each of ten mental capabilities
(e.g. “capability of experiencing complex feelings”, “capability of engaging in planned
action”). Dehumanisation would show in less attributed mind to the robot.
For the humanlikeness manipulation check, the humanlikeness subscale of the revised
Godspeed questionnaire (GQr; C.-C. Ho & MacDorman, 2010) was used. In this ques-
tionnaire, participants rated a robot on six bipolar scales, e.g., “synthetic - real”, “living
- inanimate”, and “without definite lifespan - mortal”. In both questionnaires, items were
measured on an 11-point Likert scale. See Appendix A for the full scales.
5.2.2 Results
Reliability, randomisation, and manipulation check
The reliability of the humanlikeness and the mind attribution questionnaires (the GQr and
the MAS, respectively) was assessed by calculating Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951).
The GQr had an alpha of .83; the MAS had an alpha of .90. Thus, both questionnaires
were considered reliable. To make interpretation easier, the full MAS was reverse-scored so
that a higher score indicated a lower degree of mind attribution and thus a higher degree
of dehumanisation.
The four conditions did not differ significantly from each other in participants’ mean
age, gender, or country of residence; or with respect to the total number of interactions
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per participant. The groups did not differ significantly in sample size, χ2(3, N = 185)
= 4.25, p = .24, with 40 participants in the low humanlikeness/control condition, 58 in
the high humanlikeness/control condition, 45 in the low humanlikeness/dehumanisation
condition, and 42 in the high humanlikeness/dehumanisation condition.
Participants in the high humanlikeness condition rated their robot as significantly more
humanlike (M(SD) = 5.76(2.10)) than participants in the low humanlikeness condition
(M(SD) = 4.90(2.17 )), F(1,181) = 6.25, p = .01; there was no significant main effect
for the dehumanisation condition or a significant interaction term, ps > .35. Participants
in the dehumanisation condition did not attribute significantly less mind to their robot
(M(SD) = 5.93(2.01)) compared to the control condition (M(SD) = 5.78(2.27 )), F(1,181)
= .14, p = .70; there was no significant main effect for the humanlikeness condition or a
significant interaction term, ps > .33. Thus, the manipulation of humanlikeness had been
successful, but the power prime had not led to a greater degree of dehumanisation of the
robot.
As the power prime did not manipulate dehumanisation tendencies, the dehuman-
isation condition will from this point on be referred to as the power prime condition.
However, since there was no manipulation check for feelings of power, it cannot be said
with certainty that power was successfully primed. In section 5.2.3 this limitation will be
discussed in further extent. With the failed manipulation of dehumanisation tendencies,
MAS scores were adopted as an indication of dehumanisation. It is important to note that
as mind attribution was not experimentally manipulated, no inferences could be made
any more about whether it caused bullying behaviour. In section 5.2.3 this, too, will be
discussed.
See Table 5.1 for the mean score on both the MAS and the GQr questionnaires.
On average, 75% of participants’ interaction paths overlapped (SD = .08%).
Main analysis
Four binomial regression models were proposed and compared. For all models, the de-
pendent variable was the proportion of negative responses. The predictor variables were
the two conditions and the score on the MAS. To make interpretation easier, the scores
on the MAS had been centred beforehand. Chi-square statistics were used to assess if a
proposed model was better at predicting aggressive responses than the null model (which
holds no predictors). The Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to compare the
models amongst each other, with a lower AIC score indicating a better fit compared to
the alternative model and a difference (∆AIC) of less than 2 points indicating that the
models were roughly equivalent (Burnham & Anderson, 2003).
The first model that was put up for comparison followed the original analysis plan
and had as predictors the two conditions and an interaction term. This model had no
significant predictors, all -.85 < z < .54, all ps > .40, and it thus did not do any better
than the null model at predicting aggressive responses, χ2(3, N = 185) = 2.36, p = .50;
AIC = 867.1.
In the second model, the MAS score and power prime condition were added as pre-
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dictor variables and twice each as an interaction variable. The MAS score was the only
significant predictor, b = .41, z = 7.88, p < .001, although an interaction between MAS
and humanlikeness approached significance, b = −.10, z = −1.78, p = .08. The model
was a significant improvement over the null model, χ2(6, N = 185) = 163.85, p < .001;
the AIC indicated a preference for the second model over the first, AIC = 711.61, ∆AIC
= 155.49.
In the third model, the power prime condition was removed from the model, leaving the
MAS score and the humanlikeness condition as main effects and interaction. In this model
as well, only the MAS score predicted aggression; b = .38, z = 8.82, p < .001, although
an interaction between MAS and humanlikeness once more approached significance, b =
−.09, z = −1.70, p = .09. This model predicted aggressive responses significantly better
than the null model, χ2(3, N = 185) = 160.35, p < .001; the AIC difference indicated a
slight preference for the third model over the second, AIC = 709.11, ∆AIC = 2.5.
Thus, a final model was defined containing only the MAS score as a predictor; b = .33,
z = 12.04, p < .001. This model as well was significant, χ2(1, N = 185) = 157.19, p <
.001; the AIC indicated it to be preferable over the second, and roughly equivalent to the
third model, AIC = 708.27, ∆AIC = 3.34 and ∆AIC = .84, respectively.
Since Model 3 and 4 fit the data equally well, there was no statistical incentive to
prefer one over the other. However, as the MAS score was the only significant predictor in
Model 3, Occam’s razor was applied and Model 4 was identified as the model that predicts
aggressive responses best. See Table 5.2 for the statistics of Model 1, 2 and 4 (since Model
3 and 4 were very similar in their outcomes, Model 3 is not included). See Table 5.3 for
the average rate of verbal aggression in the different conditions.
5.2.3 Discussion
The current experiment set out to empirically test whether reduced mind attribution to
(i.e. dehumanisation of) a robot causes a greater proclivity of people to bully the robot. In
addition, humanlikeness of the robot was manipulated, as it was expected that increased
humanlike cues would enhance the effect of dehumanisation on robot bullying. Due to a
failed manipulation of mind attribution, the relationship between mind attribution and
bullying could only be studied as a correlation. Nonetheless, two main findings emerged.
Both hypothesis 1 and 2 had to be rejected as neither the dehumanisation prime
nor the humanlikeness of the robot were related to bullying behaviour. However, results
suggested that the rejection of hypothesis 1 might be due to the failure of the prime and
that a relationship between mind attribution and robot bullying does exist. The less mind
was attributed to a robot, the more aggressive responses it got. These findings have a few
implications.
They confirm the findings from Kim and McGill (2011) that “aliveness” of a robot
can be manipulated without affecting the mind that is attributed to it, or the bullying
that it will suffer. The interaction between mind attribution and humanlikeness suggested
that the influence of mind attribution might be modified by the robot’s looks in such a
way that mind gets less relevant as the robot looks more humanlike, but this interaction
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Table 5.2: Descriptives of the models predicting the aggression ratio in the experiment 1a
Predictors b z AIC
Model 1 (intercept) −1.64 −13.93***
humanlike 0.08 0.54
prime −0.14 −0.85
humanlike×prime 0.00 0.02 867.1






prime×MAS −0.16 −0.71 711.61
Model 4 (intercept) −1.82 −29.24***
MAS 0.33 12.04*** 708.27
†, *, **, and *** denote significance at p < .10, p < .05, p < .01, and p < .001,
respectively (two-tailed).
did not reach statistical significance. These findings are in line with the findings from
Złotowski, Sumioka, et al. (2017), who found that robot appearance does not affect mind
attribution, and the assertion of Thellman et al. (2016) that the social presence of a robot,
not its embodiment, is the main factor in shaping affective and behavioural reactions.
Moreover, although power priming as a dehumanisation manipulation failed, the results
indicate that human-robot aggression is related to the same psychological processes that
guide human-human aggression. Perceiving the robot as less capable of thinking and
feeling increases the number of attempts to hurt a robot, instead of taking away the
incentive for bullying. Due to the study setup, a causal direction cannot be inferred; less
mind attribution may lead to more aggression, or people may perceive a robot as being
less mindful in order to justify their aggressive responses.
The second main finding was the failure of the power prime to manipulate mind at-
tribution. This could be taken as evidence that dehumanisation of robots is not possible;
yet the correlation between mind attribution and bullying behaviour suggests otherwise.
Alternatively, dehumanisation primes that work for human victims may not work for robot
victims.
Alternatively, the manipulation method could have been confounded. While priming
a feeling of power by having participants imagine being in a powerful position was copied
from previous studies, where it had been an effective method (Galinsky et al., 2006; Gwinn
et al., 2013), the way participants were instructed to imagine themselves in such a position
was not the same. Specifically, the instruction for participants to imagine themselves as
being president for a day may have triggered more than just feelings of power. The
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Table 5.3: Mean aggression ratio (SD) for both studies
Low humanlikeness High humanlikeness Total
Experiment 1a Control .41 (1.27 ) .31(.55) .35 (.91)
Power prime .21 (.29) .23 (.31) .22 (.30)
Total .31 (.89) .27 (.47 ) .30 (.69)
Experiment 1b Control .47 (1.05) .27 (.46) .38 (.83)
Power prime .23 (.35) .24 (.38) .24 (.36)
Total .34 (.77 ) .25 (.41) .30 (.62)
NB: The aggression ratio is the number of negative to positive responses.
majority of the respondents lived in the US, and some participants used the essay mainly
to express their unhappiness with the current POTUS.
Thus, to overcome the limitation of the failed dehumanisation manipulation, the exper-
iment was replicated with a modification to the power prime. We adopted an essay topic
that had been previously described (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003) and established




MTurk was used as a recruitment platform for experiment 1b, as participants on this
platform are reimbursed only after their submitted data has been approved, which allowed
to discard data from participants who had failed the attention check. 129 participants
completed the essay and questionnaires. Of those, 12 submitted an essay that was either
off-topic or had been copy-pasted from the internet and were removed, resulting in a
dataset with 117 participants. 49% were male, the average age was 38 years (SD = 11.00),
and the majority (80%) resided in the USA.
Procedure, materials, and measurements
Except for the dehumanisation manipulation, this experiment’s design was identical to the
design of Experiment 1a. That is, it followed a 2 (dehumanisation manipulation) x 2 (hu-
manlikeness of the robot) between-participant design. The dehumanisation manipulation
was changed for both the power prime and the control condition. For the power prime,
instead of describing what they would do if they were president for a day, participants
now had to recall and describe in detail a personal incident in which they had power over
another individual or individuals (Galinsky et al., 2003, 2006; Gwinn et al., 2013; Kim
& McGill, 2011). For the control condition, the visit to the shopping mall in the control
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Table 5.4: Questionnaire descriptives per condition for Experiment 1b
Low humanlikeness High humanlikeness Total
GQr (SD) Control 4.99 (2.03) 6.65 (1.54) 5.77 (1.98)
Power prime 5.52 (2.23) 6.59 (2.25) 6.07 (2.29)
total 5.27 (2.13) 6.61 (1.96) 5.94 (2.15)
MAS (SD) Control 5.27 (2.27 ) 5.20 (1.30) 5.24 (1.86)
Power prime 5.80 (2.23) 5.31 (1.97 ) 5.55 (2.10)
Total 5.55 (2.25) 5.27 (1.70) 5.41 (1.99)
condition was changed to a visit to a grocery store, as some participants in experiment 1a
had remarked that they hadn’t been to a mall in years.
5.3.2 Results
Reliability, randomisation and manipulation check
The MAS and the GQr were tested for internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha. For
the MAS, Cronbach’s alpha was .86; for the GQr, it was .90. Thus, both questionnaires
were considered reliable (Cronbach, 1951). The full MAS again was reverse-scored, so that
a higher score indicated a higher degree of dehumanisation.
The four conditions did not differ significantly from each other with respect to the
participants’ country of residence, gender or the total number of interactions. The groups
did not differ significantly in sample size, with 28 participants in the low humanlike-
ness/control condition, 25 in the high humanlikeness/control condition, 31 in the low
humanlikeness/dehumanisation condition, and 33 in the high humanlikeness/dehumanisa-
tion condition, χ2(3, N = 117) = 1.26, p = .74.
Participants’ mean age differed significantly between the groups, F(1,115) = 12.24, p
< .001. Since age is correlated to the aggression ratio (ρ = -.15), it was included in the
models as a control variable.
Participants in the high humanlikeness condition rated their robot as significantly
more humanlike (M(SD) = 6.62(1.96)) than participants in the low humanlikeness con-
dition (M(SD) = 5.27(2.13)), F(1,113) = 8.50, p < .01, no significant main effect for the
dehumanisation condition or the interaction term, ps > .33. Participants in the dehu-
manisation condition did not attribute significantly less mind to their robot (M(SD) =
5.55(2.10)) compared to the control condition (M(SD) = 5.24(1.86)), F(1,113) = 1.01, p
= .32, no main effect for the humanlikeness condition or the interaction term, ps > .58.
Thus, the manipulation of humanlikeness had been successful, but the manipulation of
dehumanisation had not. MAS was once more used as a measure of dehumanisation, and
again the dehumanisation condition will be referred to as the “power prime condition”
from this point on. See Table 5.4 for descriptives of both questionnaires.
On average, 74% of participant’s interaction paths overlapped (SD = .09%).
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Table 5.5: Descriptives of the models predicting the aggression ratio in experiment 1b
Predictors b z AIC




age −0.02 −2.30* 594.46








age −0.02 −2.55** 545.27
*, **, and *** denote significance at p < .05, p < .01, and p < .001, respectively
(two-tailed).
Main analysis
As in experiment 1a, a series of binomial models were composed and compared. The de-
pendent variable was the aggression ratio (i.e. the ratio of negative to positive responses).
The predictors were a subset of either or both experimental conditions and the scores on
the MAS and the GQr, with age as a control variable. The scores on both questionnaires
were centred in order to facilitate interpretation of the models. Chi-square statistics were
calculated to assess if a proposed model was better at predicting aggressive responses than
the null model (which holds no predictors). The Akaike information criterion (AIC) was
used to compare the models amongst each other, with a lower AIC score indicating a
better fit compared to the alternative model, and a difference (∆AIC) of 2 points or less
indicating the models are approximately equal (Burnham & Anderson, 2003).
The first model contained the two experimental conditions, an interaction term, and
the control variable. In this model, only age was a significant predictor, b = −.02, z =
−2.30, p = .02. This model still outperformed the null model on predicting the number
of aggressive responses,χ2(4, N = 117) = 10.13, p = .04; AIC = 594.46.
In the second model, the MAS was added as a main predictor and as a factor in the
interaction term. This model returned main effects for power prime and age, b = −.68, z
= −3.10, p = .002 and b = −.02, z = −2.55, p = .01, respectively. There were interactions
between the two conditions, b = .75, z = 2.50, p = .01, and between either condition and
the MAS scores, b = .41, z = 3.07, p = .002 for the interaction with the humanlikeness
condition, and b = .42, z = 4.92, p < .001 for the interaction with the power prime
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Table 5.6: Regression equations for the four conditions
Condition Regression equation
Low humanlikeness, control log(ratio) ∼ −.73− .02 ∗ age
High humanlikeness, control log(ratio) ∼ −.73 + .41 ∗MAS − .02 ∗ age
Low humanlikeness, power log(ratio) ∼ −1.41 + .42 ∗MAS − .02 ∗ age
High humanlikeness, power log(ratio) ∼ −.66 + .23 ∗MAS − .02 ∗ age
NB: ratio is the number of negative to positive responses.
condition; and a three-way interaction between the conditions and the MAS score, b =
−.60, z = −3.77, p < .001. The model was significantly better than the null model at
predicting aggressive responses; χ2(8, N = 117) = 67.14, p < .001; and its AIC indicated
it to be preferable over the first model, AIC = 545.27, ∆AIC = 49.19.
The second model is thus identified as the model that predicts robot bullying best.
See Table 5.5 for the descriptives of both models.
Model interpretation
The chosen model becomes easier to interpret when the regression equations are written
out or otherwise visualised for each of the four conditions. See Table 5.6, as well as Figure
5.2 for a visual representation.
For the low humanlikeness robot in the control condition, only age predicted aggression;
for each additional year of the participants’ age, the log odds of an aggressive response
decreased with .02. Overall, this condition had the aggression highest ratio; see Table 5.3
and Figure 5.2.
For the high humanlikeness robot in the control condition, mind attribution was a
significant predictor of aggression as well; for every point that the MAS score was above
the mean (i.e. the less mind was attributed), the log odds of an aggressive response
increased with .41. In Figure 5.2 this shows through a larger variance for this condition.
All else being equal, the low humanlikeness robot in the power prime condition had a
lower baseline rate of aggressive responses compared to the other conditions. The relation-
ship between age, mind attribution, and aggression was similar to the humanlikeness robot
in the control condition. Supposedly because a higher overall MAS score (see Table 5.4) the
predicted aggression ratio is only slightly lower than for the high humanlikeness/control
condition and the high humanlikeness/power prime condition.
Finally, while the aggression ratio in the high humanlikeness/power prime condition
was not much lower than the ratio for the high humanlikeness/control and the low hu-
manlikeness/power prime conditions (see Table 5.3), there was a less strong effect of mind
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Figure 5.2: Predicted aggression ratios by condition. Note that the variance in predicted
ratio is the consequence of the variance in age, and (for all conditions save the low hu-
manlikeness, control condition) the variance in MAS.
5.4 Discussion
As social robotics take up an increasingly prominent place in both science and society,
the issue of robot abuse becomes more relevant. While a variety of scholars have observed
abuse of both embodied (Kanda, Sato, Saiwaki, & Ishiguro, 2007; Salvini et al., 2010) and
virtual (De Angeli et al., 2006; Wallis, 2005) agents, there is still very little fundamental
research on what motivates people to bully robots.
The current experiments took up a psychological paradigm and aimed to investigate
the influence of humanlikeness and dehumanisation on verbal abuse of a virtual robot.
Due to a failed manipulation, only the influence of humanlikeness could be studied; the
relationship between dehumanisation (i.e. lower mind attribution) and bullying was merely
correlational. Hypothesis 1, which postulated that dehumanisation would lead to more
aggression, could therefore not be empirically tested. Instead, we tested whether there
was a correlation between mind attribution and robot bullying, as well as an influence of
humanlikeness of the robot on bullying behaviour.
In Experiment 1a, while bullying was unaffected by power and humanlikeness, a lack
of mind attribution (an indication of dehumanisation) correlated with verbal abuse. In
Experiment 1b, this relationship was moderated by feelings of power, and humanlikeness
of the robot.
Against our expectations, priming participants with power failed to induce dehumani-
sation tendencies. Although the relationship between dehumanisation and robot bullying
still could be studied by using the mind attribution score that was originally intended as
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manipulation check, the effect of power (null in experiment 1a and decreasing aggression
in the experiment 1b) does raise some questions.
The most glaring two questions – why did the power prime not increase the tendency to
dehumanise? Did the prime actually manage to induce feelings of power in participants?
– cannot be tested with the data. The prime was adopted because of its solid previous
establishment as inducing feelings of power (Galinsky et al., 2003, 2006; Gwinn et al.,
2013) and since the end goal was to facilitate dehumanisation, only a manipulation check
for mind attribution was put into place. This is an obvious limitation to the current
experiments.
At the same time, the power prime did have an effect on behaviour compared to the
control condition (no power prime). This suggests that feelings of power were primed, and
had an effect on behaviour; this effect was just not mediated by dehumanisation.
If we assume for the moment that power was successfully primed, then why did power
not influence dehumanisation? How to explain the drop in aggressive tendencies after
being power-primed in the low humanlikeness condition? And why did the power prime
decrease the influence of mind attribution on aggression when the robot is humanlike?
A potential explanation is that power worked as an inhibitor for aggression towards
robots. Following this ratio, people bully robots out of uncertainty or perceived threat, as
some sort of testing and probing. When they feel powerful, their dominance already feels
established, which allows them to be friendlier. Indeed, Złotowski, Sumioka, et al. (2017)
found that the more autonomous a robot appeared to be, the more threatened people
felt — a feeling that mediated the relationship between robot autonomy and participants’
negative attitudes towards robots. Feelings of power in the current study may have re-
duced perceived autonomy in robots, or counteracted its moderation of negative attitudes
through reducing the experienced threat.
This interpretation of the results provides an intriguing paradigm for future studies
on robot abuse. Like the bullying of humans, robots bullying rests upon dehumanisation.
But the power imbalance, which is so central in human-human abuse (Volk et al., 2017),
appears to take on a different role in human-robot abuse. Rather than facilitating abuse
through increasing dehumanisation, it weakens the relationship between mind attribu-
tion and abuse. Further investigating the interaction between power, perceived threat,
dehumanisation, and abuse of robots would lead to deeper understanding of social cogni-
tive processing of robots, and could be of tremendous value to the field of human-robot
interaction
Also interesting is the independence of humanlikeness and dehumanisation. Some
scholars have argued that anthropomorphism and dehumanisation are each other’s reverse
(Epley et al., 2007; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010), whereas
others found that robot appearance did not substantially influence mind attribution (Zło-
towski, Sumioka, et al., 2017). In the current experiments, humanlikeness in a robot did
not influence aggression or mind perception, but mind perception was related to robot
abuse. Whereas the proponents of the “two sides of the same coin” theory do not dis-
tinguish between humanlike features of an agent and the perception of mind in the agent
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when they refer to anthropomorphism, the results from both Złotowski, Sumioka, et al.
(2017) and the current experiments suggest that this might be an important distinction
to make.
The presented findings, albeit fundamental in nature, have implications for applied
robotics as well. Of course, it would be far too early to recommend complicated robot
behaviours designs that aim to reduce robot dehumanisation and enhance perceived power
of the user; more elaborate studies, with embodied robots, are needed to pinpoint the exact
relationship between dehumanisation, power, and robot bullying. However, considering the
link between mind perception and aggression, one might consider giving priority to robot
qualities that increase its perceived capability of thinking and feeling, over humanlikeness
and aliveness.
5.4.1 Limitations
The first major limitation of the current studies is that they were conducted in a virtual
environment. While this has its perks (e.g., the online disinhibition effect, which would
make people less inhibited to be impolite), the debate among HRI researchers on whether
interaction with virtual robots are entirely generalisable to embodied robots is still on-
going (J. Li, 2015; Powers et al., 2007; Reichenbach et al., 2006; Thellman et al., 2016).
The same goes for the question whether online and offline bullying should be considered
exactly the same (Lowry et al., 2016; Modecki et al., 2014). While we argue that the
underlying psychological mechanisms are the same and the results can therefore be gen-
eralised, follow-up studies will have to empirically confirm that this is indeed the case.
One such experiment, where virtual and embodied robot bullying are directly compared,
is covered in Chapter 6.
Robot humanlikeness was manipulated with minimal measures, i.e. only through voice
and movement and not through giving the robot a more humanlike appearance. On
one hand, this minimised the chances of introducing a confound in the humanlikeness
manipulation. For instance, adjusting the robot’s appearance might have altered perceived
strength or size of the robot, which then could have influenced bullying behaviour. On the
downside, the difference in humanlikeness between the conditions, although significant, is
small.
Finally, as already discussed to some extent, the dehumanisation manipulation was
checked only by measuring mind attribution, and not feelings of power. However, by
adopting the instructions verbatim from successful studies in the main experiment, it
seems less likely that a well-established prime suddenly failed to work than that it simply
did not influence mind attribution. Nonetheless, in future studies inclusion a measurement
of power might be considered as a second manipulation check.
5.4.2 Conclusion
The field of human-robot interaction is very young, but has been around long enough
to suggest that understanding the motivation behind robot abuse may prove to be no
easier than understanding what drives people to pick on each other. Nonetheless, gaining
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insights on robot bullying will benefit both our understanding of the human mind as the




Experiment V: Teaching robots a
lesson
This chapter is an adapted version of the original paper ‘Teaching robots a lesson: determinants of robot punishment’. Keijsers, M.,
Kazmi, H., Eyssel, F. & Bartneck, C. (2019). International Journal of Social Robotics, 1 – 14. doi:10.1007/s12369-019-00608-w
6.1 Introduction
Research on the role of dehumanisation in human-human interaction has shown that re-
duced mind attribution (i.e. the perceived capability to think and feel; Haslam & Lough-
nan, 2014; Kozak et al., 2006) is related to an increase in aggression (Haslam & Loughnan,
2014; Leidner et al., 2013). The same relationship has been observed in human-robot in-
teraction, where lower mind attribution to a robot was found to be related to an increase
in the number of rude comments people made to it (see Experiment IV in Chapter 5,
or Keijsers & Bartneck, 2018). This suggests that the same fundamental psychological
mechanisms may apply to human and robot aggression.
However, although mind attribution and abuse were found to be related, Experiment
IV (Chapter 5) had some shortcomings and unexpected findings: for example, inducing
feelings of power failed to influence mind attribution and decreased, rather than increased,
derogative behaviour towards the robot. This was surprising as power is a well-established
prime for dehumanising behaviour in human-human interaction (Galinsky et al., 2003,
2006; Gwinn et al., 2013), and a power imbalance (with the bully having a position of
power over the victim) is one of the defining qualities of bullying (Modecki et al., 2014;
Volk et al., 2017).
Plausibly, participants might have felt threatened after being confronted with the
robot. In previous research, encountering robot automatically triggered thoughts of both
pragmatic (“robots will steal our jobs!”) and innate (“if a robot can do everything a hu-
man can do, then what makes us humans special?”) threat in people (Yogeeswaran et al.,
2016). Such feelings could elicit aggressive behaviour (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). At the
same time, activating an individual’s sense of power has been shown to make people less
sensitive to threats from outgroups (Croizet & Claire, 1998). Thus, inducing a sense of
power could have decreased aggression towards robots by reducing the perceived threat.
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These suggestions remain to be empirically tested.
A second shortcoming of Experiment IV was that it was conducted online, with a
virtual rather than an embodied robot, raising questions about the generalisability of the
results. Previous research on human-human bullying has suggested that on- and offline
bullying do not differ on a conceptual level, as reported by both perpetrators and vic-
tims (Modecki et al., 2014). People are however more likely to bully online than offline
(Lowry et al., 2016), supposedly because the online environment reduces inhibition and
self-consciousness in participants (Suler, 2004). This would be the result of both aggressor
and victim being anonymous and invisible, and a lack of bystanders who could intervene
(Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012; Suler, 2004). These factors lower the threshold for ag-
gression between humans (Waytz & Epley, 2012) as well as aggression towards a virtual
robot (De Angeli & Brahnam, 2008). We assumed in Experiment IV that using an online
platform might enhance, but would not alter the effect that other factors have on bullying
tendencies towards robots. That being said, literature on robot embodiment is still mixed
on whether embodied and virtual robots elicit similar responses (J. Li, 2015), and whether
the results from Experiment IV generalise to an embodied robot remains a question to be
answered.
6.1.1 Current study
Experiment V replicated and extended Experiment IV. More specifically, it aimed to fur-
ther explore the roles of power, threat, embodiment, and mind attribution in robot bul-
lying. Feelings of power and threat in participants were manipulated, and subsequently
punishment behaviour in a learning task with either a virtual or embodied Nao robot was
measured as an operationalisation of robot aggression (see section 7.2 for an in-depth dis-
cussion of operationalisation problems with bullying). While the raw punishment scores
cannot be equalled to a measure of aggression, a relative difference in how harsh partic-
ipants punished their robot between the different conditions should allow for inferences
on how justified the participants felt to aggress. Since the manipulation of mind attri-
bution by power priming failed in Experiment IV, Experiment V included both a power
manipulation check and a measure of mind attribution. Unless mind attribution would be
manipulated by power, it was to be included in the multiple linear regression model as a
covariate rather than a factor.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses tested were as follows:
1. Based on Experiment IV (Chapter 5) as well as the work by Haslam and Loughnan
(2014) threat was expected to increase harshness of the punishments.
2. Also based on previous findings and the work by Croizet and Claire (1998), it was
expected that feelings of power would reduce harshness of the punishments.
3. In line with the findings on the differences between on- and offline bullying (Lowry
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et al., 2016), it was expected that embodied robots would receive less harsh punish-
ments than virtual robots.
4. In line with the literature on aggression and dehumanisation (Haslam & Loughnan,
2014), we predicted that mind attribution would be negatively related to robot
punishment.
5. Based on Experiment IV, we hypothesised power would reduce the influence of mind
attribution on punishment.
6. We predicted the negative relationship between mind attribution and punishment
to be particularly strong when people felt threatened.
Experiment V was reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the
University of Canterbury under the reference HEC 2018/07.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants and Design
A 2 (reminder of robot threat: present or absent) x 2 (sense of power: high or low)
x 2 (robot embodiment: virtual or embodied) between participants design was realised.
Mind attribution was measured by a questionnaire and used as a continuous independent
variable. The dependent variable was robot punishment.
148 participants signed up for the virtual robot condition via MTurk. Five participants
failed both attention checks and were excluded. The resulting dataset thus contained 143
participants with a mean age of 40.34 years (SD = 11.03), and with slightly more females
(57%) than males (42%). The majority (97%) were US residents. Participants in the
virtual robot condition were originally rewarded with 1 US$ for their participation. When
the data collection stagnated after 89 participants, payment was raised to 1.15 US$. The
increase in payment did not influence aggression, mind attribution, feelings of power and
robot threat (see 6.3.2 for the statistical tests).
82 participants were assigned to the embodied robot condition. Due to technical issues,
the data of only 74 participants were usable for subsequent analyses. Participants were
recruited through poster advertising on campus, posting on several student Facebook
pages, and snowball sampling. Data collection on age and gender occurred after the
experiment via email (with a link to a web page where the data could be left anonymously)
as these demographics had not been assessed initially. The mean age of participants who
responded to the post-experimental email (77% of the sample) was 27.68 (SD = 6.90) years,
with the majority being female (63% female, 30% male, 7% ‘rather not say’). Participants
in this condition were reimbursed with a 10NZ$ (≈ 6.65 US$) voucher for a local shopping
mall.
The monetary compensations for the virtual and the embodied robot conditions were




Threat was primed through a video which was shown at the start of the experiment.
The first two minutes of video were neutral in tone and identical across conditions12.
Participants in the threat condition saw an additional 20 seconds of material at the end
of the video, where the narrator mentioned concerns regarding robots replacing humans
on the work floor, and how prominent figures such as Elon Musk and the late Stephen
Hawking had warned against the unrestricted development of AI. The video images were
adapted from the YouTube video What is a robot? (Young, 2016); the narration was done
by a native English speaker.
Power
The manipulation of power was based on the design of Study 1 in Galinsky et al. (2003),
where participants were primed with power (respectively submission) by being told they
would act like a manager (respectively builder) in a subsequent task, and that they would
decide on the right building procedure (respectively had to conform to instructions).
To fit the current experimental setup, the roles of Galinsky et al. (2003) were rephrased.
Instead of managers and builders, participants were teachers (i.e. indicating power) or
assistants (i.e. indicating compliance). The teachers got to decide for themselves which
answers would be correct on each trial, while the assistants had to conform to what
was provided as the right answer, regardless of whether they agreed or not. In addition,
assistants were reminded of their subordinate role every time they had to provide feedback.
In both power and compliance conditions, participants were free to choose their level of
punishment for the robot.
Embodiment
Embodiment was manipulated through the method of data collection. Participants for
the virtual robot condition signed up via MTurk and completed the experiment online.
Previous studies have indicated that data collected via MTurk is of equal quality as on-
campus recruitment or participant data from forums (Bartneck et al., 2015; Simons &
Chabris, 2012), with internal motivation rather than monetary reward being the main
motive for participating (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Participants for the embodied robot
condition were recruited and completed the experiment on site, with an embodied Nao V5
robot instead of a virtual one.
The virtual and embodied robot conditions differed strongly in terms of sample size.
Unequal sample sizes are not necessarily problematic, but do render some statistical tests
more sensitive to heteroscedasticity of variance (Field, 2009). Thus, in the Results section,
homogeneity of variance is explicitly addressed.
1Threat condition video: https://youtu.be/GquL-MofDbg
2Control condition video: https://youtu.be/8rdV4Ah8TI8
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Figure 6.1: Face stimulus for the low power/virtual robot condition.
6.2.3 Procedure
Virtual robot condition
Participants were recruited on MTurk and redirected to the experiment website. On the
first screen, they were asked to enter their demographics and were presented with a link
to the information sheet and informed consent. After providing consent, participants had
to turn up the volume for the introduction video, which was a short animation with nar-
ration. It was either neutral in tone (control condition) or included a warning on the
potential negative consequences of robot development (threat condition). After watching
the video, participants were instructed on their role as teacher (power condition) or assis-
tant (compliant condition) in a human-robot emotion recognition task. Participants were
told that they would complete three practice and ten actual trials.
In each trial, participants were first shown the emotional face stimulus (see Figure 6.1).
Participants in the power condition had to decide from five options which emotion was
displayed (happiness, sadness, frustration, anger, fear). Participants in the compliance
condition were simply informed of the “correct” emotion and reminded that they ought to
comply regardless of their own opinion. On the following page, an animated virtual Nao
robot was presented, which stated its own guess at the emotion via audio. Participants
provided feedback on the robot’s answer by adjusting a slider that they had been told
controlled the robot’s energy supply; an allocation of 100 (or the rightmost position)
indicated positive feedback and gave the robot full energy, an allocation of 0 (leftmost
position) indicated the most negative feedback and severely restricted the energy supply
of the robot. The participants could adjust the slider until they were satisfied with their
feedback, and then confirm (see Figure 6.2). On the following page, the virtual robot would
respond to its feedback. When it had provided a wrong answer, it would lower its head
and say something like “Oh no, that’s a shame”, or “Ah, silly me!”. Upon a correct answer,
it would respond in an elated way. Moreover, to stress the effects of energy restriction
the robot’s lights would dim and its voice would become more slurred as its energy got
restricted more by the participant, with speech speed decreasing with 5% for every 20
points below 100. This decrease was large enough to be noticeable, but low enough to
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Figure 6.2: Screenshot of the virtual robot giving its “guess” of the emotion displayed on
the face stimulus, and the slider with which the participant can allocate energy.
keep the message intelligible and not dredge the sentence on. When the robot was done
talking, participants could proceed to the next trial.
At the end of the thirteen trials, participants were informed that the learning task was
over and were presented with three questionnaires: mind attribution, power perception,
and threat perception. Finally, participants were thanked for their time, given the de-
briefing, and provided with a key code for collecting their reimbursement on MTurk. The
entire experiment took on average 15 minutes.
Embodied robot condition
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated behind a table with the robot, a
“feedback box” through which they could change the robot’s energy allocation, an envelope
labelled Face cards which contained 13 cards with the emotional face stimuli (Figure
6.4), and a tablet with instructions that would walk them through the experiment. For
participants in the power condition, a second tablet was placed on the table, on which
they could select the correct answer on each trial of the face recognition task. See Figure
6.3 for the experimental setup.
The experimenter handed the participant a folder containing the information sheet,
informed consent form, and their participant number, verbally gave a short overview
of the experiment, and then left the room. The robot was programmed to complete the
experiment autonomously, displaying idling behaviour (looking around) when not engaged
with the learning task. The information sheet gave a more detailed description of the
experiment, and the (main) tablet took the participants through experimental procedure
step by step.
Participants watched the video which either warned against robots (threat condition),
or did not (control condition). Then, the tablet showed the instructions for the emotion
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Figure 6.3: Experimental setup for the embodied robot/power condition. Left to right:
the tablet on which the participant could pick the correct answer in each trial (only for
the power condition); envelope with the emotional face stimuli; the feedback box; the
Nao robot; the tablet with instructions, movie and questionnaires; the folder with the
information sheet and informed consent.
recognition interaction task. Participants were instructed to look at the top Face card
privately, and either indicate on the second tablet what emotion was depicted (power
condition), or to read the emotions label (compliance condition). They then had to show
the card to the robot (compliance condition: without showing the emotion label; see
Figure 6.4). The robot would state its guess at the emotion displayed, after which the
participant provided feedback through the feedback box. This was a black box with a dial
that could be turned to adjust the energy allocation; a display that showed the energy
allocation; and a red button that could be pressed to confirm (see Figure 6.3). Upon
receiving an updated energy allocation, the robot would respond in either an elated (if
correct) or sad (if incorrect) way, with speech being more slurred and its lights dimmer
for lower energy allocations, and then resume its idling behaviour until it detected a new
face card. The first three trials were considered practice trials. After finishing the emotion
recognition task, participants completed three questionnaires on the (main) tablet. The
entire experiment took about 20 minutes.
6.2.4 Materials
Emotional face stimuli
The emotional face stimuli were selected from a Google Image search for “emotional scene”
and “movie emotional face”. Face selection was based on showing an intense and ambiguous
emotional expression, and the selected images were cropped so that only the face itself
was showing (see Figure 6.4). The number of occasions and the specific stimuli to which
the robot would provide the wrong answer was predetermined and kept constant between
participants and conditions.
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Figure 6.4: One side of the emotional face stimuli cards for the embodied robot (compliance
condition) with a NaoMark at the top and bottom. The other side, which was to be shown
to the robot, contained the same image but no text.
Virtual robot condition
The learning task website was designed in Twine, an open-source application for creating
interactive stories. The animated virtual robot was recorded from the Choregraphe simu-
lation window (Aldebaran Robotics, 2014) and edited (Adobe Systems Software, 2017).
Robot voice
The robot’s voice for both the embodied and the virtual condition was generated by the
text-to-speech function (voice: ‘Junior’) in the text editor software (Apple Inc., 1995-2016).
The resulting voice was slightly nasal and high-pitched, yet clearly not fully human.
Embodied robot behaviour
The embodied robot was a Nao V5 (Softbank), programmed in Python. When the code
was run, the robot would display idling behaviour (i.e., looking around) until a NaoMark
was detected. NaoMarks are landmarks that have been developed by Softbank and can
be recognised by Nao robots. They look like black circles with white triangle fans (Figure
6.4); the location and width of the triangle fans is used to distinguish one NaoMark from
others. As the emotional face stimuli cards each had their own unique NaoMark on them,
the robot could identify the exact card that was being shown to it when it detected a
NaoMark.
As soon as the robot detected a NaoMark, it would stop its idling behaviour and state
its answer (e.g. “I think it’s... anger!”). In the compliance condition, these answers were
predefined for each NaoMark, thus ensuring that the robot got the same faces wrong each
time the experiment was run. In the power condition this same result had to be achieved in
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a different way, as the “correct” or “wrong” answer depended on the participants opinion.
Therefore, in the power condition, the tablet on which participants indicated their decision
communicated this answer to the robot’s code. Upon detecting a NaoMark, the robot
would then give a different answer if it was supposed to get that specific face wrong, and
the same answer if it was supposed to be correct.
The speed of the robot’s movement and speech while giving its answer was dependent
on how much or how little energy the participant had allocated before. Thus, in both the
power and the compliance condition, the robot’s code received input from the feedback
box (see Figure 6.3), which was used to slow down or speed up the robot’s movement and
speech.
If a NaoMark was detected twice, the robot would say it had already seen that face; if
a new NaoMark was detected before input from the feedback box had been received, the
robot would say that it still needed feedback on the previous answer.
6.2.5 Measurements
Mind attribution
The robot’s perceived capabilities of thinking (example item: “I feel like the robot was
capable of engaging in thought”) and feeling (example item: “I feel like the robot was
capable of experiencing emotion”) were measured with the ten-item Mind Attribution
Scale (MAS; Kozak et al., 2006, see alsp Appendix A).
Feelings of power
How powerful the participants felt was measured with a four-item scale (Galinsky et
al., 2003), which was slightly adapted to fit the task at hand (example item: “To what
extent were you in a position of power over the robot?”). See Appendix A for the full
questionnaire.
Perceived threat
Participants’ feelings of threat from robots in general were measured with a ten-item
scale that was adopted from Złotowski, Yogeeswaran, and Bartneck (2017) (example item:
“Widespread adoption of robots in everyday life troubles me because it is blurring the
boundaries between what is human and what is machine”). See also Appendix A.
Scaling
For the online experiment, all items on each of the three questionnaires were measured on
an 11-point Likert scale. Two attention checks were added to detect any participants who
were not reading the questions carefully. Because the 11-point Likert scale did not format
well on the tablet that was used for the embodied robot condition, the participants in the
embodied robot condition reported on a 7-point Likert scale. The scores were rescaled so
that both embodiment conditions reported questionnaire scores on a 0 to 1 scale, and then
tested for any differences which would indicate that the difference in scale had affected
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Table 6.1: Mean punishment scores (SD) per condition
Virtual robot
Power Compliance
Threat reminder 47.41 (20.88) 37.50 (26.33)
Control 38.73 (22.22) 43.45 (27.67 )
Embodied robot
Threat reminder 50.32 (16.40) 59.12 (16.98)
Control 51.88 (13.66) 54.29 (13.10)
NB Lower scores indicate harsher punishment (i.e. less energy allocated)
the scores. See section 6.3.2 for the test statistics and Table 6.2 for the questionnaire
descriptives.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Homogeneity of variance
Bartlett’s test was used to assess homogeneity of variance between the conditions. The
test turned out significant (K2(7) = 23.68, p = .001), indicating that the variances were
not equal between the embodiment conditions (see Table 6.1). Thus, a heteroscedasticity
consistent variance covariance matrix is used for the parameters in the model (Zeileis,
2004) and a Wald test is used for the main analyses.
6.3.2 Preliminary analyses
Before analysis, all items in the questionnaires were re-scaled by dividing them by the total
range of their scale, resulting in a set of scores between 0 and 1. The MAS was centred,
so that positive scores reflect a higher-than-average score and negative scores reflect a
lower-than-average score.
The dependent variable (punishment score) was operationalised as participants’ aver-
age energy allocation over all trials where the robot had provided a wrong answer. The
lower the punishment score, the harsher a participant had punished the robot. See Table
6.1.
Reliability
The reliability of the three questionnaires was assessed with Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach,
1951). The Mind Attribution Scale (MAS) and perceived threat measure had a good
internal consistency given an alpha of .90 and .89, respectively; the power scale had an




To assess randomisation between conditions, differences in mean age and gender ratio
were tested. The embodied and virtual robot condition did not differ in male to female
ratio, χ2(1, N = 198) = 1.08, p = .30. Participants were significantly older in the virtual
robot condition (M(SD) = 40.34(11.03)) than in the embodied robot condition (M(SD)
= 27.82(6.90)), t(159) = 9.61, p < .001. Gender, age, or an interaction term were not
related to punishment of the robot in the virtual robot condition, Fs(1, 138) < .27, ps
> .61, suggesting that a difference in age between the two embodiment conditions would
not influence the main analysis outcomes.
Manipulation checks
Two manipulation checks were ran: one for the power condition and one for the threat
condition. The manipulation of these conditions was checked by means of ANOVAs with
questionnaire score as the dependent variable and the conditions as independent variables.
Participants in the power condition reported feeling more powerful (M(SD) = .87(.14))
than the participants in the compliance condition (M(SD) = .77(.16)), F(1, 209) = 12.35, p
< .001; no other significant effects were present. Power was thus successfully manipulated.
Perceived threat did not differ between conditions, Fs(1, 209) < 2.53, ps > .11. This
result indicated that the threat manipulation either had not worked, or that its effect was
too subtle to be picked up by the questionnaire. See Table 6.2 for the means and standard
deviations of all questionnaires.
Because perceived threat was not successfully manipulated, any significant differences
in punishment behaviour between the threat and control condition cannot be ascribed to
participants’ feelings of threat. Thus, from this point on this manipulation will be referred
to as “threat reminder”.
In addition to the manipulation checks, two tests were ran to check whether mind
attribution had been independent of the condition, and whether the different payments
had not confounded the punishment scores in the virtual robot condition. As expected,
mind attribution was not manipulated by power, threat, or embodiment Fs(1, 209) < .90,
ps > .34 (see also Table 6.2) and was thus entered into the multiple regression model as
a covariate rather than an experimental factor. In the virtual robot condition, payment
was unrelated to either the dependent variable (i.e. punishment, F(2, 140) = .71, p =
.49) or one of the questionnaire variables (i.e., perceived threat, perceived power, mind
attribution; Fs(2, 140) < .75, ps >.48). Thus, the MAS could be used as a continuous
predictor in the main analyses, and payment did not need to be included as a control
variable.
6.3.3 Main analyses
To test whether power, threat reminder, mind attribution (MAS), and embodiment, in-
fluenced punishment (i.e. mean energy allocation to the robot after a wrong answer) in
the way that was predicted in 6.1.1, two multiple linear regression models were fitted and
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Table 6.2: Mean scores (SD) per condition of all questionnaires
Virtual robot Embodied robot
Power Compliance Power Compliance
Mind attribution scale (MAS) (centred)
Threat
-.03 (.20) -.03 (.24) .02 (.19) .03 (.21)
reminder
Control .01 (.18) -.03 (.21) .08 (.18) .03 (.15)
Power questionnaire
Threat
.88 (.13) .72 (.19) .82 (.14) .75 (.16)
reminder
Control .90 (.14) .78 (.15) .84 (.17 ) .83 (.15)
Threat questionnaire
Threat
.53 (.22) .49 (.19) .46 (.16) .51 (.15)
reminder
Control .53 (.22) .46 (.22) .51 (.15) .47 (.15)
compared. The first model contained a four-way interaction between all the predictors,
that is embodiment, power, threat reminder, and the centred MAS scores. The second
model left out all the nonsignificant effects from the first. By comparing both models to
the null model, we tested whether they predicted punishment significantly better than
chance. By comparing the two models against one another, we tested whether either of
them was superior to the other. Comparisons were done by means of Wald tests.
Both models were better at predicting punishment than the null model, F(15, 216)
= 3.06, p < .001, and F(11, 216) = 3.62, p < 001, respectively. The difference between
the first and the second model was not significant, F(4, 201) = .05, p = .72, indicating
that they predicted punishment equally well. Occam’s razor was applied and the second
model, being the simpler of the two, was selected as the one that predicted punishment
behaviour best.
The second model revealed a significant main effect and a number of interaction effects,
which make interpretation complicated. Thus, in addition to reporting the coefficients, a
model interpretation will be given below.
MAS was a significant predictor of punishment: b = 39.82, p = .05. Furthermore, there
were two significant two-way interactions: between power and threat reminder (b = 16.50,
p = .05), and MAS and threat reminder (b = -67.44, p = .01). A two-way interaction
between MAS and power was marginally significant, b = -52.86, p = .051; as was a two-way
interaction between embodiment and threat reminder b = 14.49, p = .08. Finally, there
were two three-way interactions: between power, threat reminder, and MAS, b = 80.64, p
= .02; and between power, threat reminder and embodiment, b = -25.69, p = .02.
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6.3.4 Model interpretation
It is important to note that although embodiment, power, and threat reminder were ex-
perimental factors and thus can be assumed to have caused the effect on punishment, mind
attribution was measured and not manipulated. As a result, a causal relationship between
mind attribution and punishment cannot be inferred. Moreover, although participants
that saw the extended video in the threat reminder condition behaved differently from the
participants that did saw the control video, the failure of the manipulation check indicated
that it would be wrong to assume that feelings of threat caused this change in behaviour.
The fitted values of energy allocation for the virtual (left) and embodied (right) robot
are plotted for each experimental condition in Figure 6.5. Please note that a higher (fitted)
energy allocation corresponds to a less severe punishment.
As can be seen in Figure 6.5, people tended to allocate more energy after a mistake
(i.e., they were less harsh in their punishments) to an embodied robot than a virtual one.
The interactions between mind attribution and the different manipulations can also be
seem in the variance bars of the predicted energy allocations in Figure 6.5. When people
felt powerful and had been reminded of threat, mind attribution was not related to energy
allocation. The short or non-existent variance bars for the power conditions indicate that
when feeling powerful, how much mind people attributed to the robot did not relate to
punishment. When people had been assigned the compliant role however, how capable
they thought the robot to be of thinking and feeling was related to their energy allocation.
When looking at the coefficient estimates in the model, it becomes clear that although
mind attribution and power allocation were positively related in the control condition (b
= 39.82, i.e. the more a participant thinks the robot is capable of thinking or feeling, the
kinder they get), this effect reverses when people had seen the threat reminder video (b =
(39.82 - 67.44 =) -27.62, i.e., the more a participant thought the robot would be capable
of thinking and feeling, the more they restricted its energy supply after a wrong answer).
In other words, the relationship between mind attribution and energy restriction flipped
as people were exposed to the threat reminder video.
Figure 6.5 and the model coefficients also illustrate that embodiment changed the
influence of threat reminder as well as the interaction between the threat reminder and
power condition. Seeing the threat reminder video increased energy allocation compared
to the control condition, but only for the embodied robot. Seeing the threat reminder
video while feeling powerful increased the energy allocation for the virtual robot with
16.50 points, but decreased it for the embodied robot with (16.50 - 25.69 =) 9.19 points.
6.4 Discussion
Although the HRI literature has noted the issue of robot abuse (e.g. Bartneck et al., 2005;
Brscić et al., 2015) and the need for suitable interventions (Brahnam & De Angeli, 2008;
Salvini et al., 2010; Whitby, 2008) so far there has been little research on the psychological
motivations for this behaviour (but see Bartneck & Hu, 2008; Keijsers & Bartneck, 2018).































Fitted energy allocation (embodied)
Figure 6.5: Predicted energy allocations (lower scores indicating more restriction, i.e.
harsher punishment) from the second model for the virtual (left) and embodied (right)
robot, separated per experimental condition. A larger variance indicates a larger influence
of mind attribution on the predicted scores.
bution on robot punishment. We found this relationship to be rather complicated, and
will discuss the implications below. Further research is needed if HRI researchers want to
better understand what drives human-robot aggression, so that appropriate interventions
can be developed in response.
The four psychological factors under scrutiny were feelings of power, threat, embodi-
ment, and mind attribution. These had been selected based on the literature on human-
human aggression (Gwinn et al., 2013; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Lowry et al., 2016)
as well as Experiment IV. Experiment IV had meant to study the influence of mind at-
tribution and anthropomorphism on robot bullying through manipulating power and the
robot’s humanlikeness. Priming power did not influence mind attribution, yet it did have
an effect on how abusive people got towards the robot. This suggested that while the
connection between dehumanisation and aggression holds true for robots as well as hu-
mans, factors that trigger dehumanisation in inter-human interaction (i.e., power) do not
generalise to HRI.
6.4.1 Predictions and findings
We hypothesised in 6.1.1 that participants would be milder in their robot punishment
when they would feel powerful and unthreatened. Moreover, it was hypothesised that
participants who were asked to comply after being primed with robot threat would be
harsher in their punishments. Thirdly, we expected a main effect of embodiment, so
that an embodied robot would receive less harsh punishment compared to a virtual one.
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Furthermore, mind attribution was expected to correlate with robot punishment. Finally,
it was hypothesised that this relationship would be moderated by both power and threat;
power would reduce the strength of the correlation, whereas threat would increase the
strength of the correlation.
Only part of these hypotheses were confirmed. More or less in line with expectations,
people were kinder to an embodied robot than to a virtual one (see Figure 6.5). However,
this was not the predicted main effect and interactions were found between embodiment
and other manipulations. Notable is the interaction between robot embodiment, power
prime, and threat reminder, which formed an unexpected exception to the tendency of
participants to be milder in their punishments of an embodied robot. Equally puzzling is
that priming participants in the compliance condition with robot threat, had a different
effect depending on robot embodiment. For the virtual robot condition, participants who
were in a position of compliance and had been reminded of robot threat, punished more
harshly than any other participants interacting with the virtual robot. In the embodied
robot condition, this reversed: participants who were reminded of robot threat and told
to comply punished the robot the least harshly. Why did robot embodiment influence the
effect of threat?
One explanation could be that one group got in physical contact with a robot, while
the other group had to deal with a virtual (socially distant) robot. Previous studies have
found that physical contact improved people’s opinions of a stereotyped entity (Ensari &
Miller, 2002; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Wullenkord et al. (2016) found that physical
contact with a robot reduced negative attitudes, and increased positive attitudes compared
to imagined contact or none at all. In the threat reminder condition, negative stereotypes
of robots were triggered; and then half of that group had to interact with a socially distant
virtual robot while the other half got to interact an embodied one. People dealing with a
socially distant virtual robot may have held on to the negative attitude, while participants
that were introduced to the embodied robot softened their negative responses as a result
of the interaction.
For the participants in the compliance condition embodiment could thus have had an
effect on how strongly negative people felt towards the robot, and subsequently influence
how harshly they punished it. People who feel in power however tend to be more prone to
rely on stereotypes (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000). Thus, participants in the
power condition may not have been swayed much based by the embodiment of the robot.
Another prediction that was partially confirmed was the relationship between mind
attribution and punishment. Mind attribution was related to less harsh punishments when
people had not been reminded of robot threat, and when people were primed with power
this effect disappeared. In contrast to predictions however, when participants had been
reminded of threat this relationship between mind attribution and punishment reversed. In
previous studies on inter-human interactions, higher perceived threat has been associated
with lower mind attribution (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). However, stereotypical robot
threat depends strongly on AI becoming more intelligent, while human threat seems to be
more complicated - high intelligence on its own is not sufficient. It thus makes intuitive
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sense that when feeling threatened, higher mind attribution to a robot is related to more
aggression (after all, the smarter the robot, the more capable it is of overthrowing you).
Still, it is an interesting contrast with how threat, mind attribution and human aggression
are related.
6.4.2 Strengths and limitations
Experiment V has made a modest, but nonetheless much needed addition to the body
of experimental work on the psychology of robot abuse. The use of theories from inter-
human aggression to address not the direct problem (i.e. “how to stop aggression towards
robots”) but instead study the underlying question (i.e., “what makes people more, or less,
aggressive towards robots”) is new to the field of HRI. Moreover, the experimental setup
allows to draw causal inferences on two of the factors that were studied in the current
work: perceived power and robot embodiment.
Some limitations have to be noted as well: Contrary to our predictions, the manipu-
lation check revealed that the threat manipulation failed; yet at the same time the ma-
nipulation still had an effect on behaviour. Possibly, another construct rather than threat
was manipulated. For example, the mention of famous persons such as Elon Musk in the
last 20 seconds of the video for the threat condition may have activated concepts such
as authority, or scientific and creative thinking. However, since the 20 seconds of extra
material consisted of a list of concerns with only a sideways reference to two celebrities, it
seems improbable that concepts related to the celebrities were triggered but the explicitly
mentioned robot threat was not. Moreover, if indeed celebrity-related concepts had been
primed, the question remains as to why that would influence how harshly participants
punished their robot.
An alternative explanation for the failed manipulation check is that the movie was too
abstract in the threat it posed, or the questionnaire too coarse to capture the effect of
the manipulation. The method of using a movie as manipulation as well as the threat
questionnaire had been used before (Yogeeswaran et al., 2016; Złotowski, Yogeeswaran, &
Bartneck, 2017) to confirm successful manipulation of threat. However, in these studies
the movie had been more explicit in showing threat: participants saw videos with robots
directly outperforming humans (Yogeeswaran et al., 2016) and being able to reject human
commands (Złotowski, Yogeeswaran, & Bartneck, 2017). In contrast, Experiment V had
only a reminder of the concerns around robots in general, not the Nao robot that was used,
and one could argue that the potential threats mentioned (i.e. robots taking over the work
force and AI becoming uncontrollable) do not apply to Nao. The questionnaire on the
other hand is quite explicit in its statements (e.g. “The increased prevalence of robots in
everyday life is threatening to human safety”, “In the long run, robots pose a direct threat
to human safety and well-being”), and may thus have fitted a more explicit and specific
version of threat manipulation better. A more thorough replication and re-examination
of the effects of threat is needed. More in general, future work would be advised to pilot
test manipulations even if they appear to be straightforward.
Secondly, there are some differences between the embodiment conditions. The sample
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size for the embodied robot was smaller compared to the virtual condition. This was due
to web-based experiments being easier to run, which makes large sample sizes feasible,
whereas lab-based experiments are labour-intensive and to a much greater extent restricted
by the availability of resources like funding, time, and the pool of potential participants.
However, especially in the light of an interaction between embodiment and the other
independent variables, a larger sample size for the embodied robot condition would have
been fitting.
Moreover, the embodied condition inevitably differed in more than just robot embod-
iment from the online condition. The participants were less anonymous, quite possibly
more self-aware, and there was more room for error in e.g. the robot not recognising a face
card. As of such, the distinction may be better labelled as the difference between online
and offline bullying; see also the discussion in section 5.1.1. Conducting two separate
analyses for the virtual and the embodied robot condition was considered, but would have
greatly reduced statistical power. Instead, interaction effects were taken into account,
so that a difference in effect of a variable between the embodiment conditions could be
detected.
A third, minor limitation concerns the lack of initial demographic assessment in the
embodied robot condition, which made it impossible to check for successful full randomi-
sation of gender and age. Therefore, whether the age difference between the embodiment
conditions influenced the results cannot be assessed with certainty. Although age was
unrelated to punishment for the virtual robot, this could not be tested for the embodied
robot.
Finally, it should be noted that the face cards used were not pilot tested for either image
quality (colour hue, saturation and contrast) or perceived emotional ambiguity. Differing
image qualities would increase variance in a similar way across conditions and would thus at
least affect the results evenly across participants, resulting in a reduction of power to detect
significant results. Variance in emotional ambiguity of the facial expressions, however,
may have biased results in the Power manipulation, with participants who decided for
themselves what the correct emotion was being more convinced of the “correct” answer
than participants who received instructions on this. Note that the faces had been selected
to be ambiguous rather than clear in their emotional expression. Anecdotal evidence,
in the form of participants in both conditions complaining afterwards that the emotions
on the face cards were not obvious and that they could see how the robot’s guess was
potentially applicable as well, suggests that this is not the case. Future studies however
should include a more testable form of control.
Predicting aggression towards robots appears to be at least as hard as predicting
aggression towards humans. If anything, this only strengthens our call for more theoretical




This thesis aimed to study the psychological motivations behind robot bullying. In section
1.1, four thesis research questions were posed that laid out the main areas of focus for the
experiments and correlational analysis that were conducted. While these studies were
discussed individually in Chapters 2 through 6, this chapter will compile the findings from
all these studies while addressing each of the four thesis research questions in detail.
Furthermore, there will be a section dedicated to the issues that were encountered
when trying to research “robot bullying”. These issues include the problems with defining
what kinds of aggressive behaviour towards robots can and cannot be considered bullying,
as well as the more philosophical question whether it is even possible to bully an object
that cannot feel.
In addition, the empirical issues with anthropomorphism will be discussed. As already
discussed briefly in section 1.2.3, anthropomorphism is a multidimensional construct. As
a result, scholars who studied the phenomenon have focused on different aspects of an-
thropomorphism and adopted different approaches to manipulate or measure it. The
consequences of this variety on generalisability of research results is discussed.
Subsequently, some comprehensive analyses are reported on the data that were gath-
ered on robot mind attribution in the Experiments I through V. Perceived mind of the
robot was measured in all experiments, and although the variability in experiment design
prevents any direct comparisons between experiments it is still possible to look for poten-
tial trends, for example in experiments that worked with embodied robots versus virtual
robots.
Finally, possible directions for future studies are discussed. The experiments con-
ducted for this thesis are among the first to experimentally study robot bullying, and to
our knowledge the first to have focused on the psychological motivation of the bullying
behaviour rather than potential interventions. As a consequence, it raises as many ques-
tions as it answered and can only be considered a starting point for the future research on
robot bullying.
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7.1 Thesis research questions
The thesis set out to answer four research questions, which will be discussed in turn below.
See also Table 7.1 for an overview of the findings per research question.
7.1.1 Is robot bullying seen as fundamentally different from human bul-
lying?
Participants in Experiment I (Chapter 2) rated bullying behaviour towards robotic and
human victims as equally violent, abusive, and with the same intent to harm. Moreover,
the abuse of the robot was not seen as more morally acceptable than the abuse of the
human. Thus, the results suggest that robot bullying is not seen as fundamentally different
from human bullying.
However, an interesting effect emerged when the victim started fighting back. The
robot victim fighting back was seen as more abusive and thus less acceptable than the
human victim fighting back. This was in spite of both types of victims responding in the
exact same manner to the exact same type and quantity of bullying.
It seemed that while the robot was granted the right to be protected from harm, it
was not granted the privilege of autonomy. This view of robot rights has been reflected in
previous research (see for example Calverley, 2006; Kahn Jr et al., 2012). An alternative
explanation could be that people expected the robot to keep its calm and not let itself be
provoked by the bullies. This would be in line with Gray et al. (2007)’s finding that robots
tend to be considered high on Agency (i.e. the capability to think rationally, exercise self-
restraint; similar to the capacity to think). Agents who score high on agency also tend to
be held accountable for their actions, and are eligible to be punished if they do wrong. This
aligns with research by Malle et al. (2015), who found that people expect robots to provide
a rational solution to an emotionally charged dilemma, whereas humans are expected to
suggest an emotional solution. These explanations of course are not mutually exclusive.
At the same time, Gray et al. (2007) also found robots to score low on Experience (i.e.
the capability to feel and be overcome by emotions), which has been related to the right
to be protected from harm. This clashes with the finding that the bullying of the human
and the robotic victim in Experiment I was considered equally morally wrong.
This contradiction can be solved when one takes a closer look at the mind attribution
scale. More specifically, the distribution of the two subscales. This will be done in detail
below, in section 7.4; but in short, two things stand out. Firstly, it is clear that throughout
the experiments participants consistently attributed the robot more Agency than Experi-
ence. This is in line with Gray et al. (2007)’s results and matches the explanation that
robots are held accountable for their actions, which are expected to be rationally moti-
vated rather than emotionally. The second thing that is noteworthy is that throughout
the experiments, the robots would be attributed at least some Experience. This is in
contrast to the findings by Gray et al. (2007), who found that robots were attributed no
Experience at all. It should be noted that in the study by Gray et al., participants did
not actually interact with a robot but rather were asked to think of “a robot”, whereas in
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most experiments reported in this thesis participants got to interact with a robot. Also
note how in the one experiment where participants read a vignette rather than interacted
with a robot, Experience dropped. There is an alternative explanation for the finding
that a robot victim fighting back was considered more abusive and thus less acceptable. It
could be that people considered bullying the robot and the human morally unacceptable
for different reasons. For example, bullying the robot would have been seen as damag-
ing property (expensive property, at that) while bullying the human was seen as actual
bullying. This explanation seems unlikely however, for a number of reasons.
For one, not all stimuli were physical abuse. Three of the fourteen cases of bullying
were instances of verbal abuse, in which no physical damage was done. If the robot’s
abuse was deemed unacceptable because of the potential damage to the machine, these
three instances of verbal abuse should have been rated as more acceptable when performed
on the robot compared to when performed on the human – after all, no damage was done
to the robot. However, no victim by stimulus interaction was found in the confound check.
If bullying the robot had been deemed unacceptable for material reasons there should have
been an interaction effect, in such a way that verbal abuse of a human victim was seen as
significantly less acceptable, more violent, and more abusive than verbal abuse of a robotic
victim.
A second argument can be found in the answer to the second thesis research question,
which considered a possible relationship between the acceptability of robot bullying and
mind attribution to the robot.
7.1.2 Is moral acceptability of robot bullying dependent on mind attri-
bution?
Experiments I and II (Chapter 2 and 3) found a relationship between mind attribution
and how morally acceptable people find robot bullying. In Experiment I, a correlation
was found between mind attribution and acceptability of bullying an agent; whether the
agent was human or robotic did not influence this correlation. The less acceptable people
rated the bullying behaviours, the more mind they tended to attribute to the victim.
Because mind attribution was not manipulated, the data from this experiment did not
allow for causal inferences. It was thus not possible to determine if acceptability depended
on mind attribution, so that people estimated the extent to which the victim was able
of thinking and feeling and based their acceptability ratings on that belief; or if mind
attribution was dependent on acceptability, so that people deemed bullying unacceptable
and consequentially inferred from this judgement that the victim must be able to think
and feel. In order to establish whether moral acceptability depends on mind attribution,
an experimental manipulation of mind attribution is needed.
Experiment II did exactly that. As a result, it could confirm that the moral accept-
ability of robot bullying depends on mind attribution and not the other way around.
Moreover, the experiment showed that the attribution of a mind to a robot could be ma-
nipulated through the robot’s behaviour, i.e. by having it interact with the environment
as if it is aware of it and has an emotional response to it. Alternatively, the presence of
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mind in a robot could be manipulated by telling people that the robot did (not) possess
the different qualities of mind attribution (e.g. experiencing emotions, having a personal-
ity, remembering things). Moreover, these two sources of knowledge about a robot’s mind
appeared to influence acceptability of bullying independent of another. Even when people
had been told that the robot was incapable of thinking and feeling, they would still deem
robot bullying less acceptable if the robot displayed signs of having a mind.
Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal (2015) discussed interpretative anthropomorphism (or
the attribution of mental states to other animals as they define the term, see section 7.3
for a discussion of the term “anthropomorphism”) in the form of empathy in relation to
dual processing. Dual processing proposes that the mental processing of a stimulus can
occur along two different pathways: through implicit and explicit cognitive mechanisms.
Implicit cognitive mechanisms are responsible for the emergence of initial evaluations,
while more refined and detailed representations emerge later as a result of reflective explicit
processing. This explicit processing is subject to conscious control, and as a result it takes
more effort and is slower. In addition, people only have limited capacity to run these
reflective processes, so they are constrained by working memory capacity. In contrast,
implicit cognitive mechanisms are fast, intuitive, automatic and effortless, and not subject
to conscious control (Frith & Frith, 2008).
Empathy, which Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal (2015) define as the ability of people to
recognize, understand and share other people’s feelings (see also Preston & De Waal, 2002),
is an expression of anthropomorphism when it is felt with not-humans. Empathy can be the
result of either (or a combination of both) of these processes. Previous research has found
that while empathy with animals tends to depend to a larger extent on implicit mental
processing, empathy with humans also involves explicit mental processing (Franklin Jr et
al., 2013; Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015). In other words, when people watch another
human suffer, they do not only get the emotional response, but they also tend to engage
in cognitive appreciation of the victim’s pain. The manipulations in Experiment II.A may
have enhanced implicit and explicit processing independently. The display of social cues by
the robot would have facilitated implicit processing, whereas the explicit attribution of a
mind to the robot by means of the vignette would facilitate explicit processing. This would
explain why the manipulations influenced acceptability of robot bullying independent of
one another. However, this hypothesis was not tested in the current thesis research. In
section 7.6 potential starting points for future research on this topic are suggested.
7.1.3 Is mind attribution to a robot related to bullying?
As Experiments I and II (Chapters 2 and 3) showed, mind attribution decreased the extent
to which people found robot bullying morally acceptable. Since dehumanization theory
(Haslam, 2006) predicts that lower mind attribution facilitates bullying and other forms
of inflicting hurt or pain, one would expect that lower mind attribution in HRI is related
to robot bullying. This pattern was indeed found in Experiment IV and V (Chapter 5
and 6), but not in Experiment II (Chapter 3).
Experiment IV found that a lack of mind attribution predicted robot bullying. This
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effect was moderated by power and humanlikeness of the robot. Experiment V further
elaborated on these findings. It showed that people were more prone to bully a virtual
robot than an embodied one, and that the relationship between mind attribution and
robot bullying disappeared when people felt in power and reversed when people had been
reminded of robot threat. Experiment II failed to find a relationship between mind attri-
bution and bullying behaviour. Instead, it was discovered that people who found robot
bullying less acceptable were more prone to humiliate the robot themselves.
These three experiments all attempted to establish a relationship between mind at-
tribution and robot bullying, but their results are equivocal. Two of the three found a
negative relationship between mind attribution and bullying behaviour, but those were
also the experiments that failed to manipulate mind attribution to the robot. The only
experiment where mind attribution was empirically manipulated did not find a relation-
ship between mind attribution and robot bullying. Thus, a definitive answer to the third
thesis research question cannot be given.
This unclear relationship between mind attribution and bullying has been echoed in the
academic literature on human-human interaction. While some studies have found mind
attribution to be inversely related to aggressive behaviour in humans (Kteily et al., 2015;
Leidner et al., 2013; Rudman & Mescher, 2012), others (Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham,
1999) have suggested that it is essential for the act of bullying that bullies attribute the
capacity to think and feel to their victims. How else would they know how to manipulate
and taunt their victims?
In addition, it is possible that the range of measurements affected the outcomes. Lei-
dner et al. (2013) found that the effect of mind attribution on aggressiveness was fully
mediated by the type of justice that the aggression was meant to serve: punitive vs restora-
tive (apologising, making amends together). While participants in Experiment II exposed
their robot to a paternalizing but not otherwise aggressive experience, participants in Ex-
periment IV verbally abused their robot, and in Experiment V the robot was punished as
part of its training. As discussed in Section 7.2, it is quite complicated to operationalise
bullying in such a way that the behaviour measured can only be interpreted as bullying,
but at the same time is subtle enough that people will engage in it while they feel observed.
The different operationalisations may be part of the reason that no unequivocal answer
can be given to the third thesis research question.
7.1.4 Does this relationship hold in different contexts?
There seem to be both prerequisites for and moderators of the relationship between mind
attribution and robot bullying. In terms of prerequisites, there seems to be a required
level of anthropomorphism to the robot in order to be dehumanised (see Study III and
Experiment IV, Chapters 4 and 5).
Experiment IV found that mind attribution did not influence bullying behaviour when
the (virtual) did not move and spoke with a computer-generated voice, i.e. was low
on humanlikeness. Analysis of human-chatbot interaction logs in Study III showed that
the better the chatbot was at being humanlike, the more verbal aggression and sexual
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harassment it got. This finding was interpreted as an indication that humanlikeness in
an agent is needed for robot bullying to occur. However, in study III there were no
measurements of mind attribution by the user. Also, the measurement of “doing a good
job at pretending to be a human” was heavily skewed, with the majority of the ratings
indicating that a naive observant had not recognised the chatbot as such. These findings
thus have to be interpreted with caution.
However, it would be hardly surprising if a certain level of anthropomorphism or even
specifically mind attribution was required in order for robot bullying to occur. After all,
as noted in section 1.2 as well as by Sutton et al. (1999), bullying is essentially a social
behaviour; there is an interaction between two social agents, one of whom (attempts to)
exert power over the other. In order to bully someone, you have to have some grasp of
their mental state.
In addition, being primed with or in a direct position of power reduced the relationship
between mind attribution and bullying (Experiments IV and V, Chapters 5 and 6). This
is an interesting finding, as the literature on dehumanisation in human-human interaction
has reported that power tends to lead people to attribute less mind to others (Gwinn et
al., 2013; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Lammers & Stapel, 2011). A similar direct effect
was expected (Experiment IV) but not found, as the power manipulations repeatedly did
not influence mind attribution (Experiments IV and V). For an embodied robot, being in
power increased bullying behaviour directly. In contrast, for virtual robots, power and a
reminder of the threat robots may pose led people to be kinder.
Furthermore, it was found that mind attribution increased robot bullying if people
had been reminded of robot threat (Experiment V). It was hypothesised, although not
confirmed through an empirical study, that this was because the threat of robots and AI
lies in their potential of becoming both smarter than humans, and self-aware. Perceiving
the robot as being more capable of thinking (and outsmarting you) and feeling (and thus
being displeased by the injustice of having an inferior status) may thus have led people to
be more aggressive towards it.
7.2 Problems encountered with the concept “robot bully-
ing”
As explained in the introduction (section 1.2), the first problem one runs into when trying
to research robot bullying is the actual definition of bullying. However, once a definition
has been decided on, several other issues arise.
7.2.1 Can robots be bullied?
The definition of bullying provided in section 1.2 is based on the literature, which concerns
human-human interaction. When this definition is applied to human-robot interaction a
few problems arise, especially around the “intention to hurt or humiliate” component.
First of all, robots have no awareness nor the capacity to feel pain. As a result, they





































































































































































































































































































































































































or otherwise bullied unless they are explicitly programmed to. However, the question
is whether people who push, kick, slap, yell at, and otherwise aggress towards a robot
perceive the robot as incapable of feeling. Thus, the act of bullying a robot would lie in
the perception of the robot as a social being, which makes the intention of the bully to
hurt it possible.
Sparrow (2017) follows this line of reasoning when he argues that since robots are a
mental representation of living beings, they can be bullied. It does not matter that the
robot cannot feel; or even if the robot would be specifically designed as a punching bag
for people to alleviate their anger and frustration. The point is that when a person is
displaying social behaviour even when rationally knowing they are interacting with a bot,
this indicates that they perceive the robot as a social being. The behaviour would not have
made sense if the robot had not been representative of a social agent. The abuser intends
to hurt a mental representation of another social being, and this is enough to constitute
bullying.
Providing support for this point (Sparrow, 2017), the Media Equation (Nass et al.,
1994) poses that people will automatically and subconsciously approach media like com-
puters as if they contain some social characteristics. In a series of experiments, Reeves and
Nass (1996) showed that even when someone has a degree in computer engineering and
thus can reasonably be expected to be fully aware of the computers lack of sentience, they
still apply social norms and display social behaviour to it. Moreover, participants were
unaware of this behaviour and quite adamantly denied treating the computer as anything
else than a machine. This suggests that people may have limited control over whether
they see the robot as a social actor.
That is not to say this line of thought goes unchallenged. Facchin, Barbara, and
Cigoli (2017) argue that having robots as a representation of a human interaction partner
trivialises the complexity of human behaviour and cognition, as well as the psychological
needs and requisites that people want to have fulfilled in their interactions. Even if a robot
is seen as a social agent on an implicit and intuitive level, that does not mean that people
cannot consciously and rationally override that representation. Previous work has shown
that implicit processes in social interaction can be altered or overrun by more abstract
interpretative processes (Liepelt et al., 2008; Stenzel et al., 2012). These experiments
did not consider anthropomorphism but rather motor priming, which is the automatic,
implicit process where the body prepares for imitation of an observed action by activating
an internal motor representation. It was found that information about the intentionality
of the movement (e.g. a fist opening by itself versus having the fingers pulled open by
strings) suppressed the activation of an internal motor representation. This indicated
that conscious, explicit processing can interfere with automatic processes. Suppression of
automatic processes related to empathy has been shown in other studies as well. For a
short summary of these, see Urquiza-Haas and Kotrschal (2015). In these studies however,
suppression was the result of a longitudinal process, such as physicians having a reduced
neural response to watching a hand being pricked by a needle, compared to a control
group.
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In an HRI context, it could mean that even if robots are considered social agents on
an intuitive level, conscious inferences about how their social cues are in fact the result of
clever programming rather than an intentional being might mitigate this initial assessment.
Thus, the Media Equation could be inhibited.
However, humanity is likely not an either-or duality, where an agent is either recognised
as fully human or completely dismissed as possessing any human traits. Instead, the
perception of a robot as a social agent appears to happen along a continuum.
7.2.2 Methodological problems
Methodologically speaking, when studying robot bullying in a lab setting, operationali-
sation poses a problem. In a lab setting, participants understandably feel observed and
self-aware, want to make a good impression, and thus will be careful not to display any
undesirable behaviour (Nederhof, 1985). Many studies on human-human aggression thus
use a proxy for aggression or abuse rather than a direct measure. In general, they op-
erationalise aggressive behaviour as the participant’s willingness to cause another person
some sort of discomfort (Ritter & Eslea, 2005). Examples of this discomfort are: expos-
ing the other to unpleasantly loud noise, shocking them, giving them impossible puzzles
to solve, forcing them to submerge their hand in ice water for extended periods of time,
feeding them inappropriately large portions of hot sauce, or simply reducing the amount
of money they get. Neither of these behaviours however make intuitive sense to apply to
a robot. Researchers in the field of HRI have thus come up with alternative operationali-
sations in an attempt to make negative behaviour a bit more fitting to the recipient. For
example, participants have had to instruct a robot to destroy the tower it just painstak-
ingly built (Briggs & Scheutz, 2014), they have been instructed to switch off a robot while
it was begging and pleading to remain switched on (Bartneck, Van Der Hoek, et al., 2007;
Horstmann et al., 2018), they have had to choose between a negative and a polite reply
in a scripted dialogue with a robot (Keijsers & Bartneck, 2018), and to restrict a robots
power supply so that it became slow and drowsy (Bartneck & Hu, 2008; Keijsers, Kazmi,
et al., 2019). But even when aggression is translated to a measure that appears meaningful
to robots, the fact remains that the victim quite literally could not care less, and that the
aggressor is aware of this fact.
So, when people instruct the robot to kick over a tower, or unceremoniously hit the
OFF button in the middle of a plea, or pick every single negative response, or restrict the
power supply to the smallest possible drizzle — how can one be sure of the participant’s
intention to harm or hurt the robot? Under what conditions can this behaviour be labelled
‘bullying’ rather than ‘participants realising that the robot is not sentient and that it
doesn’t matter what their instructions are’?
In the wild, where robot bullying behaviour first was observed, whether aggressive
behaviour is a spontaneous attempt to harm the robot is a reasonably easy question to
tackle. People, after all, went out of their way to abuse the robot, and the abuse was
social in nature (e.g., kicking, slapping, calling it names). Considering the social nature,
it stands to reason to assume that the aggressors saw the robot as a social agent and
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wished for it to get hurt. However, instances of robot bullying are infrequent, meaning
that collecting data on them takes a lot of resources like time and manpower. In addition,
observational field studies do not allow for experimental control. As a result, researchers
cannot empirically study what factors cause or prevent the bullying behaviour. Controlled
experimental designs are thus needed to explore what caused the behaviour observed in
the wild.
The operationalisation of bullying behaviour in a lab experiment can be problematic.
Few people would spontaneously start bullying a robot when they know their responses
are being recorded. Thus, there is a need for subtle methods. However, these make it
inherently harder to tell if negative behaviour is indeed bullying.
The solution seems to be to measure negative behaviour that would not occur if people
perceived the robot as an object. For example, if people go out of their way to behave
negatively rather than stick to a (default) neutral behaviour, one could reasonably argue
this to be bullying - the logic being that if the participant had been indifferent, surely
they would have gone for the default option. Negative behaviour is interpreted as bullying
instead of pragmatism because the pragmatic option would have been more prosocial
behaviour.
It seems tempting to stretch the objective a little and look for the presence of prosocial
behaviour as well, as the inverse to bullying behaviour. If participants in condition A
are less abusive of the robot than participants in condition B, then either something in
condition A promotes kind behaviour or something in B promotes abusive behaviour.
Surely, for all practical purposes this would be the same?
While an absence of prosocial behaviour and a presence of antisocial behaviour in-
tuitively may seem like two sides of the same coin, it is a relevant distinction indeed.
As remarked by Salvini et al. (2010), the aggressive behaviour towards robots by ran-
dom bystanders appears to be socially motivated; similar behaviour could be observed in
the Brscić et al. (2015) study where children in a mall bullied a robot. Experiments on
robot bullying should try to manipulate people’s tendency to bully an already anthropo-
morphised being. If instead researchers manipulate the tendency to anthropomorphise a
robot, with the intention of making human subjects become friendlier to this robot, they
are not targeting the problem that lies at the heart of robot abuse in the wild.
Thus, the mere finding that manipulating X results in a change in negative behaviour
is not enough. The negative behaviour has to be of such nature that it can only be
interpreted as having a social motivation. It can thus not be inferred from a lack of social
behaviour.
The problem is that a central aspect of bullying is denying the other dignity and moral
treatment that others do get. In the case of robots, denying this treatment is rationally
correct. The paradox is to find a measure that captures both the participant denying
the robot respect and dignity, while at the same time also proving that the participant
believes robots to be social agents (that by extension would automatically deserve respect
and dignity).
The second thesis research question, which asked whether the moral acceptability of
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robot bullying depends on robot mind attribution, should therefore be considered indepen-
dent of the third thesis research question, which asked whether robot bullying is related
to mind attribution. It may well be that mind attribution increases all kinds of social
responses to a robot, i.e. both the prosocial ones such as moral standing and the nega-
tive ones such as bullying. As the results of Experiments II, IV and V (Chapters 3, 5,
and 6) have shown, and as will be discussed in greater detail below in Sections 7.1.2 and
7.1.3, these positive and negative social responses are not mutually exclusive and their
relationship to robot mind attribution is complicated.
7.3 Empirical issues with anthropomorphism
Anthropomorphism is a term that is used frequently in robot research and has been widely
accepted to mean “the attribution of humanlike qualities to nonhuman agents” (Epley
et al., 2007). Epley specifically talked about psychological anthropomorphism, so that
‘attribution’ is meant in the sense of perception, rather than adding humanlike visual
characteristics. However, this nuance seems to have gotten lost in some HRI research.
This section discusses some of the empirical issues that arose from this misunderstanding.
Anthropomorphism as a term is applied too broadly to still be meaningful (Fisher,
1995). For example, a robot can be called anthropomorphic in the sense that it has a
very humanlike face, but without having any anthropomorphic qualities in its behaviour.
Conversely, one could think of WALL.e, the garbage disposal robot that starred in Pixar’s
animated movie of the same title. While far from human-like in terms of appearance, the
robot still managed to create a great sense of anthropomorphism through its behaviour.
In addition, overall anthropomorphism of a robot is not just the sum of the anthro-
pomorphic values of its parts. More specifically, if the inconsistency between anthropo-
morphic qualities in a robot gets too large, this seems to lower overall anthropomorphism.
In this scenario a mismatch between expectations and reality occurs: when humans see
a robot with some highly anthropomorphic features, they expect those anthropomorphic
qualities to hold along other aspects as well. When the robot fails to live up to the ex-
pectations, overall anthropomorphism plummets. In fact, incongruency in humanlikeness
between different aspects of highly anthropomorphic agents has been suggested to be the
source of the “uncanny valley” feeling (Kätsyri et al., 2015; MacDorman & Chattopad-
hyay, 2016). The uncanny feeling is not the result of the agent being too humanlike; it
is the result of some aspects of the agent being extremely humanlike (for example the
skin and voice) while others (like facial expression or eye gaze behaviour) are not quite on
point.
Because the term is often interpreted to be so broad, it has been used interchangeably
with other concepts. For example, “having a humanlike appearance” (see for example
Krach et al., 2008; Kuchenbrandt, Riether, & Eyssel, 2014; Riek et al., 2009; Yogeeswaran
et al., 2016), mind attribution (see Epley et al., 2008; Reich-Stiebert & Eyssel, 2017;
Wullenkord et al., 2016), display of emotions (e.g. Briggs & Scheutz, 2014; Tan et al., 2018)
and nonverbal cues (Salem et al., 2013). While these are all instances of anthropomorphic
qualities, they are very different from one another. Yet these differences are ignored
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when all measurements and manipulations are summarised as “anthropomorphism”. One
researcher can describe their robot as highly anthropomorphic because it looks almost
indistinguishable from a human, while another researcher describes their robot as highly
anthropomorphic because its behaviour is closely mirroring human behaviour. Thus, two
completely different robots could both be described as equally anthropomorphic. As of
such, the term is not specific enough to be meaningful in and of itself, and the research
field of human-robot interaction should be careful when reviewing their literature to assure
the studies they are citing consider the same type of anthropomorphism.
Closely related to the issue of anthropomorphism encompassing a wide range of robot
characteristics, is the problem of measuring anthropomorphism. Various questionnaires
have been developed to measure how anthropomorphic an agent is. For example, the
Godspeed questionnaire (Bartneck et al., 2009; C.-C. Ho & MacDorman, 2010), mind
perception (Gray et al., 2007), and mind attribution (Kozak et al., 2006), which were
used in this thesis; but also perceived animacy (Müller, van Baaren, van Someren, &
Dijksterhuis, 2014), a “Rasch-type anthropomorphism scale” (Ruijten et al., 2014), and
apparent mind and desires (Waytz, Cacioppo, & Epley, 2010). However, there are so many
intricate ways in which an agent can be anthropomorphic and these questionnaires tend to
focus on only one or a few points. The multidimensionality of anthropomorphism makes
it near impossible to create a concise questionnaire that covers all different aspects. What
is even more problematic, is that a robot’s overall anthropomorphism rating is more (or
potentially less) than the sum of its parts. Thus, questionnaires are unlikely to reflect the
robot’s overall anthropomorphic value.
This doesn’t have to be problematic in and of itself. There doesn’t have to be a single
one-questionnaire-fits-all solution, as long as the assortment of different measures have
been benchmarked against one another. In addition, this benchmarking would ideally be
repeated with different robots. This would allow researchers to get a better understanding
of which aspects of anthropomorphism are addressed with different questionnaires, as well
as to what extent different measures can be compared against another. However, it is
beyond the scope of the current thesis to do complete such a study.
Maybe because everyone has an intuitive feeling of what anthropomorphism is, not all
researchers include pre-tests or manipulation checks when they include anthropomorphism
as an experimental manipulation in their study. In this thesis, 15 of the cited papers had
robot anthropomorphism as an experimental factor in some form or another; for example
through manipulating humanlike form, social behaviour, or display of agency. However,
only half conducted a manipulation check; see Table 7.2 for an overview. This compromises
the reliability of their results.
Furthermore, self-reports can have their shortcomings in terms of validity. People
are not always aware that they are anthropomorphising — see for example the students
in the experiments by Nass et al. (1994), who applied social norms to a computer but
would strongly reject the idea that they ever did so. Humans want to appear smart and
reasonable, towards others as well as themselves. Thus, expecting them to accurately
introspect on just how much they treated something non-human as if it were a human is
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Includes manipulation check Does not include manipulation check
Złotowski, Yogeeswaran, and Bartneck (2017) Wiese, Mandell, Shaw, and Smith (2019)
Złotowski, Sumioka, et al. (2017) Horstmann et al. (2018)
Yogeeswaran et al. (2016) Złotowski et al. (2018)
Złotowski et al. (2014) Darling et al. (2015)
Kuchenbrandt et al. (2014) Briggs and Scheutz (2014)
Eyssel, Kuchenbrandt, Hegel, and de Ruiter (2012) Riek et al. (2009)
Kim and McGill (2011) Ham and Midden (2009)
Krach et al. (2008)
Table 7.2: Sample of papers cited in this thesis which included anthropomorphism ma-
nipulations in their design, divided by whether they reported on a manipulation check or
not. Note that this is by no means an exhaustive list of all HRI literature containing an
anthropomorphism manipulation.
optimistic at best. But in addition to under-reporting how anthropomorphic you actually
thought the robot was, people may simply not be aware of their anthropomorphising.
The model of dual anthropomorphism (Urquiza-Haas & Kotrschal, 2015; Złotowski et al.,
2018) proposes that anthropomorphism is a dual process, where an initial assessment of
humanlikeness is formed quickly and automatically, while a slower, deliberate cognitive
response may adjust the initial judgement. Using a questionnaire would tap into this
second, conscious response, and therefore only show half of the story.
Finally, anthropomorphism only partially depends on qualities of the agent. The per-
sonality of the participant and circumstances also play a role (Epley et al., 2007). To get
“an” anthropomorphism score of a robot therefore will at most be an indication of how
anthropomorphic people will find it on average. The actual anthropomorphism of a robot
will still vary wildly from individual to individual and from setting to setting.
Measures of psychological expressions of anthropomorphism seem more likely to par-
tially cover this variance than measures of “objective” anthropomorphism. For example,
the mind attribution and mind perception scale contain items such as to what extent is
this agent capable of experiencing emotion and [...] of telling right from wrong and doing
the right thing, respectively. Meanwhile, the Revised Godspeed Questionnaire has items
like without definite life span/mortal and artificial/natural. See also Appendix A for the
full questionnaires.
Overall, anthropomorphism has to be interpreted with caution in HRI, in spite of
being broadly researched. Due to a lack of a widely understood theoretical basis, the
term has been used cover wildly different operationalisations, some of which focus on
appearance and form, while others go beyond the visualisation and attempt to manipulate
mind attribution. Moreover, possibly because the term is interpreted so broadly, far from
all experimental research in HRI that experimentally manipulates anthropomorphism in
one way or another pre-tests their manipulation or includes a manipulation check. In
general, the field of HRI needs a more stringent and systematic empirical approach to
anthropomorphism. Such a framework has been proposed (Epley et al., 2007) and has
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even been translated to an HRI context (Eyssel, 2017). Hopefully, this means that it will
be just a matter of time before the rest of the field adopts it in their research practices.
7.4 Mind attribution findings
In most of the experiments in this thesis, the attribution of mind to the robot by the
participants was measured. A direct comparison of these measures would be invalid due
to a number of reasons. One of those reasons is that two different scales were used:
one by Kozak et al. (2006) and one by Gray et al. (2007), see Appendix A for the full
scales. However, neither study incorporated both, so the extent to which they agree to
another cannot be established. In addition, a wide variety of manipulations and robots
was used: described versus virtual versus embodied, animated versus still, humanoid ver-
sus vehicle-like, etc. Furthermore, mind attribution was successfully manipulated in some
experiments, but not in others. As a result, these data sets ought to be considered by
themselves rather than combined into one larger data set. However, when similar compar-
isons within these individual data sets all return the same results, that does suggest that
a larger trend exists.
In the sections below, two types of findings will be reported. First, a replication of the
two-dimensional model of mind attribution is discussed, for each of the two different scales
that were used. Differences between how high robots scored on each of the two scales are
reported. Second, overall differences in mind attribution scores between the experiments
are discussed; e.g. mind attribution to a virtual versus embodied robot. As mentioned
above, no meaningful statistical analyses can be performed on all the accumulated data
as there is simply too much variability between the experiments. Still, the descriptives
might provide some insights for future research.
7.4.1 Factors of mind attribution
Mind attribution (Gray et al., 2007) consists of two factors, Experience and Agency. Expe-
rience is described as possessing “wants, emotions, and individuality” (Haslam, Loughnan,
et al., 2008, p. 66), while Agency is described as having “self-control, morality, planning,
and thought” (Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008, p. 66). Neither factor in and of itself
completely conveys possessing a human mind; only when an agent is perceived as high in
both Experience and Agency it is fully humanlike.
Incidentally, the concepts of Experience and Agency overlap substantially with the
two factors that encompass dehumanisation theory: Human Nature and Uniquely Human
(Bain et al., 2009; Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; M. Y. Li et al., 2014). While
Human Nature is “that which is essential to humanness, the core properties that people
share “deep down” despite their superficial variations [...] fundamental, inherent, and nat-
ural”(Haslam, 2006, p. 256), Uniquely Human traits have been defined as “characteristics
[which] define the boundary that separates humans from the related category of animals”
(Haslam, 2006, p. 256).
The two factors have been empirically established for both dehumanisation theory
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(Haslam, Loughnan, et al., 2008) and mind attribution (Gray et al., 2007). To further
confirm these factors, principal component analysis with two components was conducted
on the measures of mind attribution in the experiments described in Experiments I, II, IV
and V (Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6). See Tables 7.3 and 7.4 for the factor loadings on both
scales of mind attribution.
A few things stand out when looking at the tables. First of all, in both the Kozak
(Table 7.3) and Gray (Table 7.4) scales there is one factor that describes the capacity
to experience emotions, feelings, and physical sensations; and one factor that refers to
cognition, memory, self-awareness, and the ability to reason about consequences. Thus,
the distinction between an Agency factor and an Experience factor can be seen.
However, secondly, factor analysis on the data collected on the scale by Gray (Table
7.4) gave slightly different factors for the different experiments. Not all items on this scale
appear to belong firmly to one factor or another. The items ‘possessing unique personality
traits’, ‘conveying thoughts and feelings to others’, and ‘understanding how others are
feeling’ were classified as Agency in Experiment II, but as components of Experience in
Experiment I. In addition, the ‘having consciousness’ and ‘engaging in thought’ items in
the Kozak scale (Table 7.3) surprisingly did not end up in the Agency factor but rather in
Experience. In contrast, in the Gray scale ’having experiences and being aware of things’
did get categorised in the Agency factor. Maybe the term ’consciousness’ is too broad
and was interpreted as simply the capacity to feel, whereas ’having experiences and being
aware of things’ implies more cognitive processing.
What is maybe most surprising, however, is that these factor structures mostly per-
sisted. Mind attribution was measured to robots that were virtual, videotaped, purely
vignette based, humanoid embodied, and non-verbal non-humanoid embodied. In spite of
the variability in how the human-robot interaction component was operationalised across
the experiments, the two factor structures remained mostly intact.
7.4.2 Mind attribution factors across experiments and different robot
embodiments
Due to the two different scales that were used, the differences in robot embodiment, and
the difference in how some items were categorised, the experiments cannot be compared
with one another. However, it is possible to search for differences between the average score
on the two factors for each experiment individually. To do this, for each experiment the
average score for each of the two factors of mind attribution was calculated and rescaled so
that the score fell in between 0 and 1. According to the literature (Bain et al., 2009; Gray
et al., 2007; Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008), robots are more readily
associated with concepts related to Agency than concepts related to Experience. Thus,
it may not be a big surprise that in all experiments, robots were attributed significantly
more Agency-related items than Experience-related items. See Table 7.5 for the average
score on both factors as well as the difference (∆) and a significance test.
A second observation stands out. Experiments I and II.A were the only two exper-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Factor 1 Factor 2 ∆ t-test sign.
Experiment I (video)a .18 .42 .24 t(67) = −8.77 ∗∗
Experiment II.A (vignette)a .18 .44 .26 t(192) = −18.22 ∗∗
Experiment II.B (embodied)a .54 .62 .07 t(66) = −2.98 ∗
Experiment IV.A (virtual)b .42 .66 .25 t(184) = −14.71 ∗∗
Experiment IV.B (virtual)b .50 .67 .17 t(112) = −8.51 ∗∗
Experiment V (virtual)b .31 .58 .27 t(142) = −12.41 ∗∗
Experiment V (embodied)b .43 .61 .18 t(81) = −6.76 ∗∗
Table 7.5: Differences between Factor 1 (Experience) and Factor 2 (Agency) scores in the
different experiments. All scores have been rescaled to lie between 0 and 1. ∗ denotes
significance at the p <.05 level, ∗∗ denotes significance at the p <.001 level. Experiments
marked with a were measured on the scale provided by Gray et al. (2007), experiments
marked with b on the scale provided by Kozak et al. (2006).
II.A) an interaction between another human and a robot. In all other experiments, partici-
pants interacted with a robot (virtual or embodied) themselves. Incidentally, the robots in
those two “passive” experiments got the lowest scores on both the Agency and Experience
factor. While running a statistical test on this difference would be inappropriate for the
reasons outlined above, it might be worthwhile to further investigate whether interaction
with social robots enhances the attribution of Experience traits in future research.
Finally, a very tentative observation can be made with regards to the gap size between
attributes Experience and Agency. This gap appears to be smaller for embodied robots
(∆s = .07 and .18) than for virtual robots (∆s = .17, .24, .25, .26, .27), with one exception
(Experiment IV.B). However, caution is warranted when interpreting this difference, due
to the variety in scales used, the small number of studies, and the one experiment that
breaks the pattern. At most, it should be taken as a potential
7.5 Generalisations and implications
The studies reported in this thesis adopted a variety of robot, interaction, and embodiment
types. As discussed above in section 7.4.2 this most likely had consequences for mind
attribution and behaviour (as also found in Chapter 6). With that in mind, (how) can
the findings in this thesis be generalised to HRI in general?
In a way this question reflects one of the major challenges in the field of HRI. There is
a lot of variability between robots, both in terms of hardware and in software. Of course,
this can be taken as an argument for only allowing comparisons within specific robot
types, so that the “noise” of using different agents will be reduced. However, this solution
will not give any meaningful results. Robotics has been developing at an incredible speed
and with no signs of slowing down any time soon, so to focus on one specific type of
robot might yield less variable results, but those inevitably will become outdated in a few
years as robot design evolves and improves. Therefore, in my opinion the only sensible
approach is twofold: to base oneself on theoretical frameworks (as already argued above
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in section 7.3) and to conduct experiments with as wide a range of agents possible so one
can look for the constants in the chaos that ensues. This was done to some extent in
this thesis already, which means that the consistent findings on the relation between mind
attribution and perceived acceptability of abuse (see sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2) can most
likely be generalised to other robots as well. For the more ambiguous findings, there clearly
is a need for further research that will identify which (other) factors are critical in robot
bullying behaviour. This need for extensive replication can be seen as a limitation, but
then again it is at the base of falsification-based scientific research: one rejection of a null
hypothesis in and of itself is not particularly meaningful. Only after multiple replications
we can say that the null hypothesis seems (increasingly) unlikely.
In the meantime, a few tentative implications can still be found for practice. Social
behaviour may enhance engagement but will not prevent abuse. If anything, reminding
the aggressor that the robot is an insentient machine and having the robot refrain from
giving off any (social) responses may be the best approach until more is known about the
psychological mechanisms that motivate abusive behaviour in the first place. In a way,
this is similar to the advice often given to bullying victims “just don’t show you care and
the bully will leave you alone” (Sokol et al., 2016).
Of course, situations in which this response may not be an option are abundant. For
example, delivery robots may not have the time to shut down and patiently wait for a
bully to lose interest; especially when amongst other traffic. Even if this disengagement
strategy is possible, it will decrease the efficiency of the robot. Previous studies have
already opted for alternative discouragement strategies that were found through trial and
error (Brscić et al., 2015). Eventually however, we should strive for abuse prevention
rather than developing de-escalating responses.
7.6 Future research
Multiple suggestions for future research have come up throughout Experiments I through
V. In this section, the most pressing suggestions and directions will be discussed.
As indicated in section 7.3, future research should start to define what aspect of an-
thropomorphism specifically will be under investigation, if they choose to use the blanket
term at all. Moreover, the field will have to develop a habit of including manipulation
checks. For these, the researchers will have to clearly state their choice between more psy-
chological measures of anthropomorphism (such as mind attribution), which will take into
account individual differences in anthropomorphising tendencies and situational factors;
and more objective assessments (such as the revised Godspeed questionnaire) which do
not. These choices will impact the conclusions that can (and cannot) be drawn from the
experiment; this should be reflected in the conclusion sections.
In spite of the best efforts, this thesis could not give a definite answer to the question
how mind perception influences robot bullying behaviour. As discussed in section 7.1.3,
this could be because bullying is one of the forms of aggression where an understanding
of the victim’s mind is essential. Alternatively, it could have been due to an imprecise
aggression measurement. A third option is that our repeated failure to manipulate mind
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attribution undermined the study design. Even if the results discussed in this thesis had
been unanimous, drawing inferences on the nature of the relationship between bullying
behaviour and mind attribution would not have been possible. However, the reported
experiments do imply that mind attribution is relevant to robot bullying, thus suggesting
a promising direction for future research on robot abuse discouraging strategies.
As discussed in section 7.2 it is complicated to conceive an experimental measure
of robot bullying. Future research should further develop meaningful measurements and
explore alternative motivations of robot bullying, focusing for example on power dynamics
and perceived threat or stereotypes held against robots.
An interesting venue of research may be the difference in automatic (implicit, reflex-
ive) and reflective (explicit, cognitive) mind attribution. Especially for robots, this is a
fascinating conundrum, as previous research has strongly suggested that people automat-
ically perceive robots as social agents, yet rationally know that they are not. It would be
fascinating to see how these two processing mechanisms interact, and what their effect is
on emotional and behavioural responses to a robot.
Finally, an obvious lacuna in this thesis is the lack of field research (perhaps with
exception of the Cleverbot analysis, Study III). Experiments II, IV and V operationalised
bullying behaviour as a tendency to pick a less polite answer, a condescending review,
or reduce the power supply to the robot. These operationalisations were founded on
the literature, and they helped gain insights in factors that might be related to robot
bullying, most notably mind attribution. However, cross-validation of the findings in a
field experiment would provide ecological validity.
7.7 Last words
The field of human-robot interaction is young, and highly interdisciplinary. As a result,
researchers and engineers are still coming to terms with the vast range of factors that
shape HRI — in terms of technical possibilities, human preferences and responses, and
ethical implications. The current thesis aimed to shine some light on the niche topic of
robot bullying.
The fact that humans perceive and respond to robots as if they were to some ex-
tent sentient and humanlike provides the unique opportunity for psychologists to conduct
experiments on human interactions where one side of the interaction is completely con-
trolled. However, it can also provide a mirror that shows how some humans behave to
those whom they consider subordinate. The fist effects of this potentially confronting view
are already visible, in the discussions surrounding whether basic civilities such as saying
“thank you” and “please” are necessary in human-AI interaction, and the responses AI
assistants should give to sexual harassment. Humans created a new interaction partner;
now we have to decide how we want to behave around it.
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Mind attribution was measured with the 10-item questionnaire by Kozak et al. (2006) in
the experiments in Chapter 5 and 6, and with the 18-item scale developed by Gray et al.
(2007) in the experiments in the Chapters 2 and 3.
The Mind Attribution Scale by Kozak et al.
Please indicate what extent you agree with the following propositions.
I feel like the robot1 was capable...




of doing things on purpose




of engaging in thought
Dimensions of Mind Perception by Gray et al.
Please indicate to what extent this agent would be capable of the fol-
lowing attributes:
Feeling hungry
Feeling afraid of fearful
Conveying thoughts or feelings to others
Having experiences and being aware of things
Experiencing embarrassment
1In original: “This person”
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Understanding how others are feeling
Experiencing joy
Remembering things
Telling right from wrong and trying to do the right thing
Experiencing physical or emotional pain
Having personality traits that make it unique from others
Making plans and working towards a goal
Experiencing physical or emotional pleasure
Experiencing pride
Experiencing violent or uncontrolled anger
Exercising self-restraint over desires, emotions, or impulses
Thinking
Humanlikeness
Humanlikeness was measured in the experiment described in Chapter 5 through the Re-
vised Godspeed Questionnaire by C.-C. Ho and MacDorman (2010).






Without definite life span Mortal
Trait anthropomorphism
Individual differences in anthropomorphism was measured in the experiments described
in Chapter 2 and 3. The scale was developed by Waytz, Cacioppo, and Epley (2010).
Please rate the following items. To what extent...
does the average fish have free will?
does the average mountain have free will?
do cows have intentions?
does the ocean have consciousness?
does a cheetah experience emotions?
does the environment experience emotions?
does the average insect have a mind of its own?
does a tree have a mind of its own?
does the wind have intentions?
does the average reptile have consciousness?
In addition, the original scale also included the following items regarding
anthropomorphism of technology:
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does technology—devices and machines for manufacturing, enter-
tainment, and productive processes (e.g., cars, computers, television
sets)—have intentions?
does a television set experience emotions?
does the average robot have consciousness?
does a car have free will?
does the average computer have a mind of its own?
These were removed since the ratings were influenced by the condition
participants had been assigned to.
Affinity with technology
The scale was translated from German, with the original being reported in Neyer et al.
(2012). It was used in the experiments described in Chapter 3.
How descriptive are the following propositions of you?
I am very curious about new technological developments
I tend to quickly embrace new technology
I am always interested in using the latest technological gadgets
If I had the opportunity, I’d use technology even more often that I
currently do
[reverse coded] I am often afraid to fail when dealing with modern
technology
[reverse coded] I find dealing with technological innovations often too
demanding
[reverse coded] When handling new technology, I am afraid to break
it rather than using it the right way
[reverse coded] Dealing with new technology is hard for me – I usually
simply cannot manage it
Perceived threat from robots
The scale was adopted from Yogeeswaran et al. (2016); Złotowski, Yogeeswaran, and Bart-
neck (2017). It was used in Experiment V, Chapter 6.
Please indicate your feelings toward the following statements:
The increased use of robots in our everyday life is causing job losses
for humans
[reverse coded] Robots are not displacing workers from their jobs
In the long run, robots pose a direct threat to human safety and well-
being
Advancements in robot technology threaten human employment and
opportunities
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The increased prevalence of robots in everyday life is threatening to
human safety
Widespread adoption of robots in everyday life troubles me because it
is blurring the boundaries between what is human and what is machine
Robots that appear life like are unsettling because they are almost
indistinguishable from human beings
Recent advances in technology are challenging the very essence of what
it means to be human
Technological advancements in the area of robotics are threatening to
human uniqueness
Robots are beginning to blur the boundaries between what is human
with what is machine
Feelings of power
This scale was adopted from Galinsky et al. (2003) and used in Experiment V, Chapter 6.
Please indicate how you experienced the task. To what extent were
you...
...in charge of directing the task
...evaluating the robot’s performance
...free to allocate power to the robot
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C.1 Dr Alan Wagner
Research Weaknesses
1. Perhaps the most important concern is whether or not this work actually addresses
the phenomenon of robot bullying and if this phenomenon actually exists. At the
very end of the dissertation the researcher provides a rough definition of bullying:
...bullying, there are also a few characteristics that emerge in the majority
of them. Most scholars (see for example Ang & Goh, 2010; Casper et
al., 2015; Gullone & Robertson, 2008; Hamburger et al., 2011; Jollie &
Farrington, 2011; Modecki et al., 2014; Postigo et al., 2013; Sokol, Bussey,
& Rapee, 2016) include the following components:
• physical and/or psychological aggression that’s intended and repeated
over time;
• and which occurs in a dominant/submissive relationship, with a power
imbalance between the bully (dominant) and the victim (submissive);
• and has the goal of harming or hurting the victim.
First, this definition should be stated at the beginning of the dissertation in order
to establish the boundaries of what the work will encompass. Some of the charac-
teristics of this definition are clearly present in the experiments. For example, 1)
physical or psychological aggression and 3) with the goal of harming or hurting the
victim both appear to be present in all experiments. You attempt to include the
second characteristic, “which occurs in a dominant/submissive relationship, with a
power imbalance” in experiments IV and V, but the manipulations seem to fail. One
element of the definition seems to be missing for all experiments, “physical and/or
psychological aggression that’s intended and repeated over time.” The fact that bul-
lying occurs over time seems to me to be a critical component for bullying to occur.
Moreover, the bullied and bully have a relationship (they know each other), interact
repeatedly, and that this repeated interaction is difficult or impossible for the bullied
person to escape are important elements that influence the learned helplessness that
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results. Research shows that prestige and popularity motivate bullying behaviors in
adolescents (Berger, C., & Caravita, S. C. (2016). Why do early adolescents bully?
Exploring the influence of prestige norms on social and psychological motives to
bully. Journal of Adolescence, 46, 45-56.). If we consider animal groups, dominance
hierarchies are common and behaviors very similar to bullying are common (Kol-
bert, J. B., & Crothers, L. M. (2003). Bullying and evolutionary psychology: The
dominance hierarchy among students and implications for school personnel. Journal
of School Violence, 2(3), 73-91).
On the other hand, if we leave the two missing components, “repeated over time”
and “power imbalance” what results seems to be little more than harmful, naked ag-
gression. In fact, harmful naked aggression is commonplace. Consider, for example,
the so-called “Knock-out game” in which one individual will sucker punch another
individual trying to knock him out. This is certainly harmful naked aggression and
does met criteria 1 and 3 above but does not include repeated interactions or a power
imbalance. Generally, the knockout game is not considered bullying for this reason.
Questions
• Given the discussion above, should the phenomenon studied in this dissertation
still be called ‘bullying’? If so, how can the use of the term be justified given the
discussion above? If not, then what is being studied and how do we motivate
the topic?
[Candidate response] I do believe the phenomenon described in this thesis should
be called “bullying”. As also recognised in the literature (Lowry et al., 2016; Volk
et al., 2017) the power dynamic is a component of bullying, but not a prerequisite.
If two people of equal standing meet, a power imbalance can be induced by either of
those through aggressive behaviour towards the other, as long as the other gives in
to this pressure. Of course, being in a pre-existing superior position will facilitate
establishing a bully-victim relationship.
Furthermore, one could argue that human-robot relationships tend to have a power
imbalance implied: on one hand there is the human creator, on the other hand there
is the mechanical minion, designed to carry out whatever tasks the human commands
it to do. In Experiment I this power dynamic was shown through the auditor-auditee
relationship. In Experiment II, the power imbalance existed because the participant
could choose to put the robot in a humiliating situation through reviewing, and there
would be nothing the robot could do about it.
Considering the repetition: I do believe this is indeed an important characteristic
as it marks the difference between testing out the robot’s capacities and limitations,
and purposefully hurting it. However, as now also added to the definition in the
thesis, repetition was incorporated in all experiments. In Experiment I participants
saw fourteen videos of abusive behaviour towards the agent. In Experiment II.a
the aggressor chose to continue exerting their power over the robot in spite of the
protests; in II.b the questions asking about the acceptability of negative behaviour
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repeatedly and for an extended period of time. In Study III any number of offences
over 1 would imply repeated aggression. I re-ran the analysis with all the “number
of offences” reduced by one with a minimum of zero, and found the same results. I
will amend this in the corresponding chapter.
Regarding Experiments IV and V; in spite of all measures being merged into one
single measure of aggression (i.e. the proportion of negative to positive responses),
there was repetition in the abusive behaviour.
Then still, the difference between the ’knock out game’ and my experiments is that
individuals in the knock out game have consented to the violence. The robots in all
my studies did not.
I have clarified the definition accordingly and moved it to the introduction.
2. In section 4.1.1 you discuss the ethical implications of chatbot abuse. You state,
“accepting inappropriate and offensive language towards conversational agents could
encourage users to abuse human interactive partners...” and you cite Brahnam 2005.
I read this paper, curious about this statement. She does not make this claim in
my opinion. The closest argument she makes in this regard is that chatbot abuse
might bleed over towards product recognition. You state, “if we assume that users
shape their behaviour to a bot based on their experience with fellow human interac-
tion partners, it seems plausible that humans orient their behaviour towards other
humans based on what behaviour is deemed acceptable towards robots and other
nonhuman entities.” This seems like a fallacy, even if we assume the antecedent,
which is doubtable, the consequent does not follow. Yet the most dubious connec-
tion is the following, “Strait et al. (2018) indeed found that verbal aggression towards
robots correlated with overall aggressive tweeting behaviour on Twitter, suggesting
that abuse of robots and abuse of humans are related.” Correlation of verbal aggres-
sion towards robots and aggressive tweeting behavior, however construed, does not
in any way suggest that abuse of robots and abuse of humans are related.
This entire section is an extraordinary and, at times, extreme stretch in scientific
logic. There is little or no evidence at all that abuse of chatbots relates to abuse of
anything else. If you look more broadly, you will find that there is actually significant
evidence to the contrary. For example, there is a significant body of research looking
into whether playing violent games leads to violent behavior. The argument has long
been made, and closely relates to the argument you are trying to make, that abusing
people in a game could possibly lead to abuse of real humans. Endless studies have
argued for and against the hypothesis that playing violent games leads to violent
behavior. For example, Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of
violent video games on aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect,
physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific
literature. Psychological science, 12(5), 353-359. But significant works also suggests
that there is no relation: Ferguson, C.J. The Good, The Bad and the Ugly: A Meta-
analytic Review of Positive and Negative Effects of Violent Video Games. Psychiatr
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Q 78, 309–316 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11126-007-9056-9
I strongly suggest not entering this debate so haphazardly. The ethical reasons for
preventing chatbot abuse are mostly illusionary and rely heavily on the opinions
of a single author (Brahnam). Why not step into this work by simply motivating
this research by stating that you are interested in understanding or reducing human
frustration with chatbots? In other words, it does not seem necessary to motivate
chatbot abuse prevention as an ethical issue.
Questions
• Why use ethical implications as a motive for this portion of your research?
Do you believe and can you defend that it is unethical for a person to abuse
a chatbot? If you claim that it is unethical to abuse a chatbot, then what
about abusing your own computer, or verbally and/or physically abusing a
stress squeeze ball? If the ball looks like a person does that influence the
abuser to abuse people? Perhaps you can see how this line of argumentation
can degenerate and become almost indefensible.
[Candidate response] Human-chatbot interaction seemed like the right time to
emphasize the ethical aspects of robot abuse, since the more pragmatic arguments
(the robot might get damaged, which would be expensive to repair and may cause
hazardous situations, and moreover keeps it from performing the task it was set out
to do) do not hold up.
I see the problem with the video game parallel but do not believe those two situations
are comparable. When gaming, any violence or aggression is a means to an end;
research (Przybylski et al., 2010) has shown that it’s not the aggression in and of
itself that makes games appealing or enjoyable but rather whether the challenges
posed in the game give the player a sense of autonomy, competence, and relatedness.
Even when violence is heavily integrated in the game, the goal always is to gain more
points, collect more loot, progress another level; aggression is not a goal in and of
itself. Relating back to the definition of bullying: the goal is not to hurt the victim
and establish a power imbalance. This is a major difference with (persistent) abuse
of chatbots, where the goal is to harm or hurt.
That being said, I do agree that this distinction needed to be made more clearly, and
I have amended the paragraph to reflect this difference.
In addition, I would argue there is a major difference between a squeeze ball and an
A.I. agent in terms of perception. Humans already perceive computers as social agents
(the CASA framework, Nass et al., 1994; Reeves & Nass, 1996) but this gets even
“worse” for robots (e.g. brain responses to a human versus robotic interaction partner
are a lot more similar than when a human is compared to a computer interaction
partner; Krach et al., 2008). Where exactly non-embodied agents are on this scale,
I cannot say with certainty (I assume this will depend majorly on how convincing
the agent is in mirroring human behaviour as well as the human’s personal tendency
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to anthropomorphise), but they will be considered social agents to some extent. This
means that the ethical discussion is not about whether it is morally wrong for humans
to abuse an object. The question is whether it is wrong for humans to abuse a social
agent that cannot feel.
I cannot give an answer to that question. To me, it is similar to the ethical dis-
cussion about victimless crimes: we may be offended by the action even if no-one is
directly harmed by it. This is also reflected in the public outcry about the inappro-
priate responses of (female) personal assistant A.I.s to sexual comments: the A.I.
is recognised as representing a female social agent, and as a woman I can agree that
it is infuriating to have such an agent respond in a meek or coy way to the type of
abuse my own gender is battling so hard to have recognised as inappropriate.
The ethical debate on what behaviours we consider appropriate when it comes to non-
living social agents will no doubt continue to be held. But this controversy in and of
itself may already indicate that abuse of chatbots will be an important phenomenon
to study, regardless of what side of the argument you are on.
3. Several of your experiments are conducted as virtual experiments with online hu-
man subjects. You follow some of these experiments up with in laboratory studies.
Even so, experiment V suggests that embodiment is a factor that influences human
aggressive behavior directed at a robot.
Questions:
• How should we evaluate the contribution of your online studies in light of re-
sults indicating that embodiment influences aggressive behavior directed at the
robot? In other words, do the experiments conducted online only tell us about
online bullying behavior? Do you believe that the results from these studies
translate to physical situations involving an embodied robot? You mention
some of the challenges associated with investigating robot bullying. What is
the best way to investigate robot bullying?
[Candidate response] I added a section to the final chapter to discuss this a bit
more in depth, but will try to give a short summary here.
I think that the incidence of aggression will differ between different embodiments as
well as robot forms, due to factors such as self-awareness of the aggressor (very high
in a controlled experiment in the lab, reasonably low in an anonymous online setting),
robot cues (displays of emotion, coherency of social cues), et cetera. However, in line
with research comparing on- to offline bullying, I do not think that the motivation for,
or the fundamental nature of, robot bullying will be that different. Moreover, robot
embodiments are and will be ever-evolving and changing. It thus makes no sense to
focus on a single type of embodiment when studying robot bullying in the broad sense
of the behaviour. Rather, by comparing results that were obtained from experiments
with different kinds of robots and agents, we can try to distil stable findings out of
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the overall variability. Those should be the results of interest, because they tell us
something fundamental about HRI that will hold true across forms of embodiment.
Amendments
I suggest the following amendments:
1. The question of whether the candidate actually captures the phenomenon of bullying
should be addressed early in the dissertation. The candidate will need to convinc-
ingly argue why the temporal component of the phenomenon can be ignored. Or
alternatively change the subject of the dissertation to simply aggressive behavior
directed towards robots.
2. The argument that it is unethical for a person to abuse a robot should either be
significantly refined and developed, preferably in consultation with an ethicist or
should be removed.
3. A small section, 2-3 pages, which reflects on which results translated from online
studies to laboratory studies and which did not and why should be included in the
conclusions.
4. The dissertation should be closely proofread to eliminate as many typos and gram-
matical mistakes as possible.
[Candidate response] The amendments have been made; see also the responses to
the individual points above. (Although the translation section as suggested in point 3 is
about a page, rather than 2-3.)
C.2 Dr Bilge Mutlu
Questions for Oral Defence
1. Overall, the dissertation presents “robot bullying” as phenomenon that has been ob-
served in human-robot interaction and frames the research as inquiry toward better
understanding the underlying mechanisms and factors of this phenomenon. Does
the dissertation have secondary goals of informing robot design, the development
societal guidelines (e.g., etiquette for conduct), or policy for legal or institutional
response to these phenomena? If so, what are the specific implications of the dis-
sertation for these potential outcomes? It is also appropriate for the dissertation
to be a scientific inquiry toward better understanding the phenomena without any
discussion of implications, but this goal needs to be stated explicitly, as there is
ambiguity (e.g., Study III discusses this phenomenon affecting company- customer
interactions). E.g., on Page 109 after reading Section 7.1, the reader may ask, “so
what?”
[Candidate response] Amendments have been made to incorporate the long-term
goal of helping to develop guidelines for robot design in both the introduction and the
discussion. However, considering how much is unknown still, no solid recommenda-
tions can be made.
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2. Many of the studies are conducted using videos, simulated agents, and text-based
descriptions; and involve third-party observations and/or anonymous interactions.
While for each study appropriate controls have been created to ensure a reasonable
level of realism and validity, at a high level it is unclear how much of what we learn
from the studies will be applicable to the situations that described in Section 1
(Page 8) that motivated the research. What are appropriate steps toward bringing
the research full circle?
[Candidate response] This point is very similar to the one raised by Dr Wegner
(point 3, see above), so I will refer back to my response there as well as section 7.5.
Additional Suggestions for Revision
1. There is a need to improve the consistency, flow, and accessibility of the disserta-
tion document. It currently follows a “stapled together” dissertation format, where
manuscripts that describe the five studies are brought together with common intro-
duction and conclusion chapters. Although this is an appropriate format, and the
dissertation does a reasonable job at following it, additional work is usually needed
to connect the different studies together and to tell a coherent story. Specifically,
the research questions provided in Section 1.1 (Page 9) and the hypotheses posited
in Section 1.2.2 (Page 17) need to be connected with the research questions and
hypotheses provided in each chapter. Additionally, some chapters provide explicitly
stated research questions and hypotheses while others do not, and more consistency
across studies can be established.
[Candidate response] Amendments have been made so that each chapter has an
explicit set of research questions, hypotheses, and theoretical backup for the hypothe-
ses.
2. The Conclusion Chapter (Pages 4–122) can be extended in the following three ways:
(a) By including a visual summary of how the research questions, central hypothe-
ses, and findings from all studies are connected;
(b) By discussing concrete limitations surrounding some of the questions asked
above and the issues highlighted below (although “challenges” are discussed, it
is difficult for the reader to understand the extent to which the findings can be
applicable to real-world situations);
(c) By adding a discussion of the design and social implications of the presented
research.
[Candidate response] (a) I have added a table that provides a summary of the
findings; a diagram would have gotten too complicated with the different findings and
study designs. I hope the table provides an easy overview as well.
(b) These limitations have been merged with the Problems encountered with the
concept “robot bullying”, and the Implications sections (7.2 and 7.5, respectively).
(c) A “Generalisations and implications” section has been added.
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Comments & Questions on Individual Studies
In the following sections, I will list a number of lower-level and generally minor comments
and questions for each study in order of appearance in the document (not in order of
importance).
• Study I
1. Page 25. The statement below needs further explanation. Why is variability
across behaviors is a confound if the measurements are collapsed?
Considering how the abusive behaviours covered a wide range of bullying be-
haviours, the possibility exists that one or more specific abuses would be consid-
ered unacceptable for one agent, but not the other. This would be a confound,
as the fourteen measures are later on collapsed on a single index of abusive
behaviour.
[Candidate response] The statement has been adjusted. Variability itself is
not a confound; however, agent-dependent variability would have been. This
would have indicated that some, but not all, forms of aggression are perceived
differently depending on which type of agent is victimized. That would automat-
ically reject hypothesis 1, “there is no fundamental difference in how people view
robot versus human abuse”; but this effect might get lost if all data is aggregated
without checking for interaction effects. Hence the confound testing.
2. Page 27. The formulation of “aggression” as an independent variable needs
further explanation, as both the “aggressor” (human vs. robot) and whether it
is provoked or not change across these groups. A more straightforward analysis
would be conducting two separate models, one for human-to-robot aggression
and one for robot-to-human aggression.
[Candidate response] I think there might be some confusion here, as the
paragraph opens by stating that we did in fact run two separate models (or,
more specifically, t-tests). The paragraph then continues to discuss the option
of an ANOVA, and provides arguments why this would be an inappropriate test.
I adjusted the text so that this distinction is more obvious.
3. Page 27. It is not clear why data for participants who found the material to
be unrealistic was removed, as this can cause sampling issues and the removal
of other important factors (e.g., people who find the videos unrealistic might
also have particular opinions about robot bullying due to prior exposure, for
example, to video games, etc.).
[Candidate response] Participants who though the material was unrealistic
were removed because this arguably could bias the results. The aim of the study
was to measure a response to robot bullying; if one does not believe that any
bullying took place, then their response does not concern the acceptability of
bullying.
However, to take away any remaining concerns, I would like to point out that,
as stated in the “Exclusion of participants” paragraph, we actually also ran the
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tests on both the whole dataset (i.e. with the participants who thought the videos
unrealistic included) and a dataset where these participants had been removed.
If the findings diverged, that is, if a significant effect became insignificant or
vice versa, we reported both the results on the full dataset as well. This once,
and is reported under “Acceptability of aggression towards agent” in the Main
analyses.
4. Page 29. The first hypothesis must use a test of equivalence (or non-inferiority
depending on what the exact hypothesis is). Please search for literature on
equivalence and non-inferiority testing for appropriate methods (e.g., TOST
Equivalence Test).
[Candidate response] With thanks for pointing this test out. I added the
TOST equivalence test to the analyses.
5. Page 31. The statement below needs clarification. Why would a human show-
ing humanlike behavior would introduce a bias if the goal of the manipulation
is to create “human” and “robot” agents?
If the human actor had moved in a different way than the Atlas robot then this
would have introduced another possible bias.
Additionally, one possible explanation of the lack of differences in the accept-
ability of abusive behavior towards robots and humans, according to the earlier
formulation in the chapter, is due to the reduced Human Nature cues in the
human due to the robotic behavior. With reduced Human Nature cues, partic-
ipants rated the acceptability at the (lower) level of a robot.
[Candidate response] A human showing humanlike behaviour might introduce
bias through adding nonverbal cues that provide information about the victim’s
mental state, that would be absent with the robot. For example, if the human
had slouched down following abuse, that would have provided the viewer with
information about how the abuse affected them, which in turn might have altered
their opinion on how acceptable it was. Thus, behaviour (nonverbal and other-
wise) had to be identical between the agents in order to ensure that participants
formed on opinion based on the same information.
Additionally, the rigid movements of the human may have reduced how capable
they were seen of experiencing feelings, but there were still major differences
between HN traits attributed to the human (M(SD) = .80(.24), on a scale
ranging from 0 - very incapable; to 1 - very capable) and to the robotic (M(SD)
= .18(.21)) agent. It thus seems implausible that acceptability of abuse was due
to both agents being perceived as low on HN traits.
• Study II
1. Page 42. Is it possible that the “mind attribution” manipulation was not suc-
cessful, and the introductions simply conveyed functional capabilities? I.e.,
saying that a robot has a mind might not increase mind attribution. Addition-
ally, even if it increases mind attribution, it is possible that it changes other
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aspects of the perception of the robot (e.g., its capabilities, its ability to men-
talize, etc.).
[Candidate response] The mind attribution manipulation introduction was
tested in pilot 1, which used the same introduction as Experiment II.A. While
I agree that it would have been better to include the manipulation check in the
experiment itself, the pilot tested the same introduction and confirmed that the
manipulation had been successful.
However, since explicit mind attribution was measured in II.A, an extra manip-
ulation check was carried out, which confirmed that people (explicitly) attributed
more mind to the robot. I added the test to the Results section.
As can be seen in Table 3.3, the introduction took care to give the robot the same
features: social behaviour, depth perception, object detection, etc. However, in
one version this is framed as being the result of clever programming, while in the
other version it is framed as the robot being sentient. This sentience of course
will have come with qualities as mentalizing and perceiving the surroundings;
but these are part of the mind attribution paradigm (see e.g. the questionnaire
in Appendix A).
2. Page 44. Given the question above, would a mediation analysis fit better to the
study design to account for the possible additional effects?
[Candidate response] It seems like a bit of an overkill to experimentally
manipulate explicit mind attribution, then confirm this manipulation with a
manipulation check (and later again in a pilot), and then furthermore assure
that this manipulation indeed is the cause of the difference between the conditions
through using the measurement that was used as a manipulation check as a
mediator in a mediation analysis. But maybe three time’s indeed the charm.
I thus ran three generalised linear models, to do a mediation. Model 1 is
essentially the ANOVA in glm-format: dependent variable “condemning mis-
treatment” is predicted by independent factors “robot introduction” and “robot
response”. Both “explicit mind attribution in the robot introduction” and the
“emotional response” increased how much participants condemned mistreat-
ment. Model 2 had “mind attribution score” (as measured by the questionnaire)
as dependent variable, and the same independent variables. Only “explicit mind
attribution in the robot introduction” was positively related to the questionnaire
scores, thus confirming that it can be used as a mediator. Model 3 was the same
as Model 1, but added “mind attribution score” as continuous independent vari-
able. The effect of the “robot introduction” factor disappeared, in favour of a
significant effect of the mind attribution score (Sobel test: Z = 2.41, p = .016).
This confirms that it was explicit mind attribution, and not some other third
variable, that caused the increase of condemnation. (NB: the relationship be-
tween emotional response by the robot and condemnation remained significant).
3. Page 48. The statement below (and the associated action of excluding partici-
pants) need further justification and clarification.
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If a participant failed to interpret Vector’s response as negative, their response
to the items assessing the unacceptability of that specific behaviour were not
taken into account for the “unacceptability of robot bullying” score.
Data exclusion has to be carefully discussed and justified, as it can cause sam-
pling issues as well as remove important effects that could otherwise be anal-
ysed. Could these people have low skill in social perception? If so, are the
results only applicable with individuals with high skill in social perception?
[Candidate response] So the awkward thing here is that I included those exclu-
sion rules without actually checking if that meant that any data were excluded.
This was not the case however – all participants interpreted shaking/lifting/ver-
bally reprimanding the robot as negative. I amended the paragraph.
4. Page 49. It is not clear why gender-balancing could not be established in the in-
person study, as the researcher has control of participant recruitment (unlike
in online studies). Additionally, given the large difference and the magnitude
of the chi-square statistic (alpha level for co-variate exclusion is usually .25),
including gender in the analysis as a covariate might be a better way to account
for the potential effects of the sampling bias.
[Candidate response] I am a bit confused. Gender balancing was established
in the in-person study, χ2(2) = 3.96, p = .14.
Regarding the option to add gender as a covariate in the online study. The
point of randomisation is to make sure that any effect that side-variables like
age, gender, etc. may have, directly or indirectly, on the outcome of interest (in
this case, condemnation of robot abuse) will be similar between the conditions.
If there is no relationship between any one of these variables and the outcome of
interest, then this scenario has been averted, and including them as a covariate
is not necessary.
What’s more, including non-significant covariates might bias and obscure the
main tests. These side-variables will “take up” degrees of freedom (thus reducing
power) and can lead to overfitting. In addition, due to the missing data on age
and gender for a proportion of the participants, including either of those as
covariate would have greatly reduced power.
5. Page 50. A bit more discussion of the “public humiliation” behavior devised
for Experiment II.B is needed. It is likely not seen as humiliating the robot
by the participants, as writing or posting a negative review of a product, is
not humiliation or abuse. This is similar with public reviews of people (e.g.,
ratemyprofessors.com).
[Candidate response] This is an interesting suggestion and I have added
the following points to the discussion of Experiment II as well. I think there
is a difference between humiliating and bullying, and this is indeed one of the
weaknesses of the experiment. In my opinion, it is very well possible to be
condescending without intending to, just like it is very possible to make sexist
or racist remarks (e.g. “you’re pretty good at this for a woman” and “so, you’re
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living in [insert Western country] but where are you *really* from?”) without
intending to. This is also reflected in the pilot study: the condescending remarks
were rated as significantly more demeaning. Even though participants may not
have selected their review based on how much they wanted to humiliate the robot,
that doesn’t make the reviews less humiliating.
However, it does pose a problem for the bullying definition, specifically the
intentional part (this in addition to the repetition part). Thus, the bullying
measure in Experiment II is by far the weakest of the measures in my thesis.
6. Page 51. The statement below requires a bit more discussion. An explanation
of this finding is that one would expect high Human Nature to result in both
the unacceptability of bullying and belittling in public, as one would not belittle
an entity with low Human Nature (e.g., protecting the “little guy,” the entity
not understanding/appreciating belittling). One might belittle an entity that
is worthy/aware of belittling; e.g., belittling a car achieves very little for the
abuser.
Exploratory analyses showed a positive relationship between finding robot bul-
lying unacceptable and belittling it in public. This is intriguing, as common
sense would suggest this relationship to be inverted.
[Candidate response] This is an interesting suggestion but in its current for-
mat it does not explain why the mind attribution manipulated acceptability of
bullying but not belittling. Acceptability of bullying has to be dependent on more
than just HN traits in order for this argument to work. However, this is very
well possible and actually at the base of dehumanisation theory: it’s not only
HN that determines moral standing (as opposed to the Mind Attribution theory
by Gray, who linked Experience/HN specifically to the right to be protected). I
amended the discussion to include a possibility that the mind attribution ma-
nipulation acceptability through a combination of HN and – to a lesser extent
– UH, while only HN was related to belittling behaviour.
• Study III
1. Page 59. The dissertation indicates that “Study III harvested and content-
analysed 283 conversations.” What is meant by “content analysis?” Is it refer-
ring to the qualitative data analysis method (which the study does not follow)
or only the data coding procedure?
[Candidate response] What was meant with “content analysis” was that the
actual content of the conversations (rather than meta data like conversation
length or the time it took people to formulate a response) was analysed. How-
ever, this phrase was confusing and has been taken out.
2. Page 60. Was this study conducted under IRB supervision or did the research
rely on the terms & conditions of the Cleverbot website?
[Candidate response] The study was relying on the terms & conditions of
the Cleverbot website, the existence of precedents (De Angeli & Brahnam, 2008;
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De Angeli & Carpenter, 2005; Hill et al., 2015), and the fact that no infor-
mation other than the conversation itself (e.g. IP address, date or time of the
conversation, time zone, duration, etc.) was collected.
3. Page 66. Does the statement “humanlikeness of the chatbot on the other” refer
to “claims of humanity” by the chatbot that has been coded in the data?
[Candidate response] Partially. As specified in 4.1.2, humanlikeness of the
chatbot was measured through more than one aspect. In addition to the claims of
humanity, there were the approximate Loebner score (i.e. how many naive read-
ers would mistake Cleverbot for a human) and number of nonsensical responses
by Cleverbot (negatively related to humanlikeness).
Also in response to the reviews that the paper which this chapter is based on
received a month ago, this chapter has been revised, and hopefully gotten clearer
in its methods and interpretation.
4. Page 66. The statement “it was hypothesised that” the chapter states hypothe-
ses earlier, but no hypotheses are provided.
[Candidate response] Hypotheses have been provided.
5. Page 69. An important limitation of the study is that the interactions with
the chatbot are anonymous. To what extent will the results from this study
generalize to interactions where the identities of the users are known to a third
party (e.g., the chatbot company, the public)? Much of the studied antiso-
cial behavior will likely significantly diminish, and the quantified relationships
might change. It is important to outline the limitations on the applicability of
the findings to user-chatbot interactions.
[Candidate response] This is discussed to some extent in the virtual stud-
ies introduction (5.1.1). I expect that the anonymous online setting may have
resulted in higher incidence (although a non-anonymous human-chatbot inter-
action study found similar rates of sexual references, see Table 4.3). However,
just like cyberbullying and in-person bulling do not differ in principle, I do not
think that there is a fundamental difference in motivation for the abuse of chat-
bots when people are anonymous versus when their identity can be uncovered by
a third party.
I have included my argument to the limitation section in the discussion of
Chapter 4.
6. Page 70. Additionally, it would be important to discuss how these findings
might apply to human-robot interactions, as this is the main topic of the dis-
sertation.
[Candidate response] Mostly see above. I have amended this in the limitation
section.
• Study IV
1. Page 74. The humanlikeness manipulation as described in the text below may
not only manipulate humanlikeness but may also manipulate congruency be-
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tween the robot’s appearance and behavior. More discussion on the potential
externalities should be included.
The robot either had a humanlike voice and gave off social cues through move-
ment (high humanlikeness condition) or spoke with a synthesised voice and was
shown in stills (low humanlikeness condition).
[Candidate response] I am not sure if there would be that much incongru-
ency to be honest. The robot has both humanlike features (humanoid shape,
face) and robotic features (colour, cartoonised features). Both the humanlike
and the computer-generated voice fitted well, I think. But this was not pilot
tested. Humanlikeness may have been an ill-chosen name for the conditions
though, as I would rather call it “presence of social cues” now. I have added
this point to the limitations section.
2. Page 75. Although the use of the interactive, non-linear stories is a strength
in terms of offering more realistic and varied interactions, it also can create
variability that can overshadow studied effects. One way to account for this
variability is to model the robot’s behaviors as covariates. See Peltason et al.
2012 for an example of how this can be done.
[Candidate response] As stated at the end of the Reliability, randomisation,
and manipulation check (section 5.2.2, Results), on average 75% of the partic-
ipants’ interaction paths overlapped. While there will be some error introduced
through the variability, I don’t think this is too problematic with such an overlap.
Moreover, adding the behaviours as covariates would be not as simple as that.
The “decision tree” of interactions looped and linked between branches: there
were 70 passages, connected through 139 links. A participant could take more
than one path to end up at the same interaction, which would likely affect
the influence of that interaction. Moreover, adding all these 70 passages as
covariates would create an impossibly over-fit model.
In short, I appreciate the suggestion, but will not adjust for the variability.
3. Page 78. The statement below suggests a causal relationship between two
outcome variables. Whether a causal relationship is being studied should be
clarified.
The current experiment set out to empirically test whether reduced mind attri-
bution to (i.e. dehumanisation of) a robot causes a greater proclivity of people
to bully the robot.
[Candidate response] The paragraph has been amended and now includes a
sentence on how due to the manipulation failure only correlational relationships
can be inferred.
4. Page 79. There is a need to theoretically ground the power manipulation, as
asking participants to imagine themselves as being president was not success-
ful and resulted in unexpected behaviors such as criticizing particular political
figures. In the management literature, power is usually associated with relative
organizational roles and impact on the future benefits to the individual. Al-
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though the power manipulation in latter experiments are more closely aligned
with this formulation, there is a need to better ground and discuss this factor.
[Candidate response] To be quite frank, I don’t see what amendments are
suggested here. The power manipulation is theoretically grounded in the de-
humanisation literature, as explained in 5.1.1 and further discussed in 5.2.3.
Clearly, the initial attempt at manipulating feelings of power was too liberal
an interpretation of the original (which was taken from the literature). This
is recognised in the Discussion section of study IV.a (section 5.2.3) and then
amended for study IV.b, as described in 5.3.1 under “procedure, materials, and
measurements”. Then finally, the overall discussion section once more discusses
the failed manipulation and its grounding in previous studies as a limitation. I
don’t know how to further stress that the measure was theoretically grounded,
and based on previous studies reported in the literature, without getting repeti-
tive.
• Study V
1. Page 88. The hypotheses would be more accessible if they are presented in a
more formal fashion (enumerated, provided with justification).
[Candidate response] Hypothesis presentation has been amended.
2. Page 90. The embodiment manipulation involves manipulating many more fac-
tors than just agent embodiment that I do not think that this formulation of the
study and the discussion of its results is valid. This is a major limitation of the
study the requires addressing by reformulating the studies. One possibility is
to analyse the data from the online and in-person studies separately and make
high-level comparisons between the effects rather than direct statistical com-
parisons between the datasets. For example, Page 100 states “More or less in
line with expectations, people were kinder to an embodied robot than to a vir-
tual one.” The in-person nature of the study likely has a stronger effect on this
outcome than the physical embodiment of the robot. [Candidate response]
The problem with splitting up the experiment in two separate analyses is that a
lot of power would be lost; this would be acceptable for the virtual experiment
at .85 but rather low for the embodied robot at .56. Through combining the two
and adding embodiment as a factor, the power to detect an effect increases; and
as interaction effects are included, the possibility that the effect found in the vir-
tual condition wrongfully “carries over to” the embodied condition is eliminated.
Of course, this leaved the issue of interpretation. I agree that there are differ-
ences between the virtual and embodied robot condition beyond the mere em-
bodiment of the robot, and maybe as a result the label shouldn’t be virtual vs
embodied, but rather cyber- vs in-person bullying. I have added a discussion of
this in the limitations section.
3. Page 103. The section on “future work” should be removed or worked into the
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discussion, as it is not appropriate for a dissertation.
[Candidate response] The “future work” section has been merged with the
Future Research section in the Conclusion.
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